Autorytarne decyzje dyskrecjonalne w procesie nacjonalizacji w Polsce

Nationalisation in Poland took place for and without compensation. Decisions concerning the nationalization of German companies, as declaratory decisions confirming only their adoption by law. The remaining enterprises were taken over on the basis of constitutional decisions. These were discretionary decisions to which, due to the effects caused, it was possible to successfully include the term authoritarian.

Practice Makes Dialogue: Reconceptualizing Constitutional Interaction between Courts and Legislatures

The question of how to understand and conceptualize inter-institutional interaction between courts and legislatures, particularly in the context of constitutional challenges, has drawn considerable attention over the years. This question is of special importance to the apprehension of constitutional dialogue as simultaneously describing and shaping constitutional interaction. This article focuses on the descriptive aspects of the constitutional dialogue and through them proposes a reconceptualization of constitutional dialogue, which is not based on the mere existence of legislative responses or the number thereof, or on the existence of different structural constitutional mechanisms. Instead, this reconceptualization is based on the de facto use in constitutional practices during the routine constitutional examination process, by the judiciary and political branches altogether. The article introduces a breadth-and-depth approach, which observes many constitutional decisions and legislative responses and uses them to analyze the nature of courts-legislatures dynamics. These insights are derived not only from the mere existence of a ruling or a statute, but also from the content and design of the institutional outcome thereof. The conclusions drawn using this approach are comprehensive, providing insight into the constitutional and dialogic interaction between courts and legislatures in each constitutional system, as well as identifying trends and changes as they occur. The article also offers an application of this approach to Israeli jurisprudence, illuminating the depth and complexity of this interaction, and enabling us to recognize it as a constitutional system with strong dialogic characteristics.

Normative Function of Constitutional Decisions

Introduction. This work analyses the normative function of constitutional judgments, their cha- racteristics and their limits. Theoretical Basis. Methods. The theoretical bases start from the work of Hans Kelsen in relation to the condition of “negative legislator” of the constitutional court, which already implies a dero- gatory capacity on the legal order and, therefore, a normative function, completed with the differ- entiation of Vezio Crisafulli between “disposition and norm” that allows opening the constitution- al jurisdiction to a consideration as “positive legislator”. Likewise, theoretical contributions from other works by the author of the research are incorporated. The method that has been used to prepare the work is based on the analysis of the current legal reality of the constitutional jurisdic- tion taking into account the legal context in which it develops its functions. Results. It is concluded that the normative function of constitutional judgments is a structural fea- ture inherent to constitutional jurisdiction, which presents a series of specific characteristics. This normative function is characterized by being a complex reality, due to the diversity of procedures in which it occurs and the different legal material with which the constitutional jurisdiction works. It is also a complementary normative function, which lacks the plenitude of the legal production of law. Lastly, it is a fragmentary normative function, which operates on specific dispositions or provisions of the normative chains, without having the capacity to configure complete normative chains that correspond only to the legislator in the exercise of his legislative function. Discussion and Conclusion. Constitutional decisions clearly develop a normative function, as they incorporate more into the legal system than just the interpretation of the provisions of the law or the Constitution. These decisions derive from legal or constitutional provisions norms that complement the constitutional and legislative levels of the legal system. Thus, they contribute, albeit with the limitations noted in this paper, to the development of the legal system, resolve conflicts and establish norms that can help prevent new disputes. Thus, they perform the peace- keeping function that is inherent in any justice.

“As Far as Human Prudence Could Insure”

Despite ample opportunity, Chief Justice Marshall did not build on McCulloch v. Maryland to engage in nation-building through his constitutional decisions. In Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Marshall construed the term “commerce” to include navigation, and struck down a state monopoly over steamboat travel. Gibbons is widely understood as an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause that joins McCulloch in establishing the constitutional foundations of broad federal legislative powers. Yet Gibbons made no mention of McCulloch and marked a significant retreat from McCulloch’s conception of implied powers. Indeed, from McCulloch’s issuance in 1819 to the end of Marshall’s life in 1835, the Marshall Court never cited McCulloch’s discussions of constitutional interpretation, nationalist constitutional theory, or implied powers. Marshall’s studied refusal to endorse implied commerce powers is best explained as resulting from his desire to keep the Court out of the two incendiary issues of constitutional politics: internal improvements and slavery.

Term Limits and the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine

This chapter examines the interaction between term limit provisions and the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine in Latin America. It illustrates the varied approaches of courts concerning the validity of attempts to amend presidential term limits. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court intervened to prevent what it saw as an undue easing of term limits (after permitting one round of easing); in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, courts generally allowed attempts to ease or eliminate term limit using less demanding rather than more demanding procedural routes; and in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia, judiciaries deployed the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine in order to eliminate rather than to protect term limits. After mapping the major constitutional decisions issued on this issue in Latin America in recent years, the authors argue that transnational anchoring holds some promise in clarifying the proper scope of control of constitutional change regarding term limits.

The Laws of Mass Media

This chapter surveys the development of three regimes in the laws of print, broadcast, and cable media, with different frameworks for government regulation, and the challenge of applying any of those frameworks to communications on the internet. The chapter considers constitutional decisions in each of the areas over the course of the middle and late twentieth century.

Parliamentary Deliberation on Constitutional Limits in the Legislative Process

Like the other branches of government, parliaments are ‘responsible constitutional agent[s]’. They play a formative part ‘in expressing and pursuing’ constitutional government. A dimension of this agency is that parliaments, and more specifically parliamentarians, have a responsibility to consider whether proposed laws overstep the constitutional boundaries of their powers.[3] When, as is the wont of constitutional principles, the relevant limits are uncertain, the task of deliberating about constitutional validity can be challenging. Difficulties increase when a proposed law is an innovative attempt to respond to emerging problems at the edge of doctrine espoused in previous constitutional decisions.