Process: Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporation by Service of Process on Local Sales Agent

1948 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 1130
Author(s):  
F. William Hutchinson
Author(s):  
Retselisitsoe Phooko

On 2 August 2002 South Africa signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, thus effectively recognising and accepting the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal. Among the cases received by the SADC Tribunal was a complaint involving allegations of human rights violations by the government of Zimbabwe. It ruled that the government of Zimbabwe had violated human rights. Consequently, Zimbabwe mounted a politico-legal challenge against the existence of the Tribunal. This resulted in the review of the role and functions of the Tribunal in 2011 which resulted in the Tribunal being barred from receiving new cases or proceeding with the cases that were already before it. Furthermore, on 18 August 2014, the SADC Summit adopted and signed the 2014 Protocol on the Tribunal in the SADC which disturbingly limits personal jurisdiction by denying individual access to the envisaged Tribunal, thus reducing it to an inter-state judicial forum. This article critically looks at the decision of 18 August 2014, specifically the legal implications of the Republic of South Africa’s signing of the 2014 Protocol outside the permissible procedure contained in article 37 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. It proposes that South Africa should correct this democratic deficit by introducing public participation in treaty-making processes in order to prevent a future situation where the executive unilaterally withdraws from an international treaty that is meant to protect human rights at a regional level. To achieve this, this article makes a comparative study between South Africa and the Kingdom of Thailand to learn of any best practices from the latter.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-334
Author(s):  
Javier García Olmedo

AbstractThe legitimacy crisis confronting the international investment regime has called for reforms to eliminate the asymmetric and troubled nature of investment treaties. These instruments grant extensive investor protections without offering reciprocal safeguards for host States wishing to preserve regulatory space. This article argues that any reform designed to redress imbalances in the existing regime should first aim at narrowing the personal jurisdiction of investment tribunals. Problematically, access to most investment treaties depends on broad nationality requirements, which have enabled investors to use corporations or passports of convenience to obtain treaty protection. This practice exacerbates the unbalanced relationship between host States and investors. It increases host States’ exposure to investment treaty claims and allows investors to circumvent newer, more State-oriented investment treaties. Using as an example the novel anti-nationality planning approach embraced in the 2019 Dutch Model BIT, this article suggests effective treaty mechanisms that States can adopt to restrict the range of investors that are entitled to claim.


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