On Soviet Managerial Incentive Structures

1976 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 490 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Bonin
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Incentive Structures

Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt

2006 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hernan Ortiz-Molina
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Yield Spreads ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Equity Ownership ◽  
Effect On Yield ◽  
Bond Characteristics

AbstractThis article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders price new debt issues using the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentive structures, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership.

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