Do Nonrecurring Items Play the Roles in Valuation and Managerial Incentive?

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshie Saito
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Incentive

The Equilibrium Relationships between Performance-Based Pay, Performance, and the Commission and Detection of Fraudulent Misreporting

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Buhui Qiu ◽  
Steve L. Slezak
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Signal Jamming ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Information Manipulation ◽  
Performance Based Pay ◽  
Equilibrium Relationships ◽  
Governance Costs

ABSTRACT We develop an agency model in which managerial information manipulation creates pooling and entails ex post costs internal and/or external to the firm. We examine the implications of the strategic interactions between shareholders (who set internal governance and managerial incentive compensation), the manager (who exerts effort and reports on its outcome), and an external regulatory authority or RA (who investigates for fraud and levies penalties ex post). When the RA cannot pre-commit to an ex post investigation strategy, a fraudulent equilibrium obtains if the firm's internal governance costs are sufficiently high. Consistent with (so far fairly scant) post-SOX empirical evidence, but the opposite of the implications of signal-jamming models and equilibria with pre-commitment, the model implies an increase in minimum internal governance standards or ex post fraud penalties (as with SOX) results in decreased equilibrium pay-for-performance sensitivity and firm performance.

Abnormal investment, changes in institutional ownership, and SEO long-run performance

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (8) ◽  
pp. 842-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiju Young ◽  
Ching-Chih Wu
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Good Growth ◽  
Quadratic Relation ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Empire Building ◽  
Long Run

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate that how firms’ pre-issue investment levels and changes in institutional ownership (IO) affect their long-run performance after seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Design/methodology/approach The authors use Richardson’s (2006) method to measure firms’ pre-issue investment levels and then divide the SEO firms into the under-, normal-, and overinvesting groups. The study examines the relation between the pre-issue abnormal investment and long-run post-issue performance. In addition, the authors examine whether changes in IO around SEOs affects SEO firms’ performance. Findings The authors find a quadratic relation between the pre-issue abnormal investment and the long-run post-issue performance. In other words, the underinvesting and overinvesting groups tend to underperform. The authors also find that changes in IO around SEOs positively associate with firms’ long-run performance. Research limitations/implications The authors ascribe the underperformance of underinvesting firms to the deficiency of good growth opportunities; for overinvesting firms, the authors link to the misalignment problem of managerial incentive (i.e. empire building). Originality/value The results suggest that long-run investors should be cautious of buying new-issue shares of underinvesting and overinvesting firms, especially those with insignificant increases in IO.

Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt

2006 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hernan Ortiz-Molina
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Yield Spreads ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Equity Ownership ◽  
Effect On Yield ◽  
Bond Characteristics

AbstractThis article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders price new debt issues using the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentive structures, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership.

The effect of managerial stock ownership on the relationship between material internal control weaknesses and audit fees

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santanu Mitra ◽  
Bikki Jaggi ◽  
Talal Al-Hayale
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Stock Ownership ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Ownership Effect ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of managerial stock ownership on the relationship between material internal control weaknesses (ICW) and audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses multivariate regression analyses on a sample of 1,578 ICW and 1,578 pair-matched (based on both propensity score and managerial stock ownership) non-ICW firm observations for a period from 2004 to 2010 to investigate how managerial incentive at various stock ownership levels impacts the relationship between material ICW and audit fees. Findings For the firms with low managerial stock ownership (up to 5 per cent stockholdings), the authors find no significant effect of managerial ownership on the positive relationship between audit fees and ICW. However, the impact of managerial stock ownership on the relationship between ICW and audit fees is significantly positive when managerial ownership is medium, i.e. more than 5 per cent and less than or equal to 25 per cent stockholdings, and the managerial ownership effect is even higher when managerial stock ownership is high, i.e. more than 25 per cent stockholdings. The result is especially robust for the ICW firms with high managerial stock ownership (i.e. where managers hold more than 25 per cent equity stake in the firms). The additional analyses further show that this managerial ownership effect is more pronounced when the firms suffer from company-level material control weaknesses that have pervasive negative effect on financial reporting quality. Research limitations/implications The results imply that in a low managerial ownership firms with substantial misalignment between manager and shareholder incentives, managerial stock ownership has little effect on the ICW and audit fee relationship. But when managers’ ownership interest is at a high level, they are more prone to purchase higher-quality audit service to reduce the risk of financial misstatements due to material ICW, which results in higher audit fees. The results add to the audit fee literature by suggesting that managerial incentive at various ownership levels is a critical governance factor that impacts auditor’s fee structure especially when higher reporting risk exists due to material ICW. Originality/value Prior literature documents that there is some relationship between managerial attributes and earnings quality; however, there is no substantive empirical evidence on the effect of managerial stock ownership on audit pricing when client companies face higher risk of financial misreporting as a result of material ICW. In this study, the authors seek answers to these empirical questions and fill the gap in the literature.

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