Content externalism and the subject’s point of view
In relation to perception-based demonstrative thoughts, I argue that, their intentions notwithstanding, Fregean and non-Fregean anti-individualists alike fail to provide a theory of content that explains the subject?s cognitive perspective. I propose an individualist alternative that meets this requirement in conformity with the view that difference in thought-contents needs to be transparent, as does their sameness, if thought-content is to serve to explain the subject?s cognitive perspective.
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 29
(5)
◽
pp. 721-726
Keyword(s):
1992 ◽
Vol 9
(2)
◽
pp. 202-218
◽
Keyword(s):
1927 ◽
Vol 8
(6)
◽
pp. 713-726
◽
Keyword(s):