scholarly journals The DEW Line and Canada’s Arctic Waste: Legacy and Futurity

2016 ◽  
pp. 23-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myra Hird
Keyword(s):  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Resource Exploitation ◽  
Waste Remediation ◽  
Military Exercises ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Distant Early Warning ◽  
Dew Line ◽  
The Cold War

During the Cold War, the United States and Canada embarked on an ambitious military construction project in the Arctic to protect North America from a northern Soviet attack. Comprised of sixty-three stations stretching across Alaska, Canada’s Arctic, Greenland, and Iceland, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line constitutes both the largest military exercise and waste remediation project in Canadian Arctic history. Despite the massive cleanup operation undertaken, the DEW Line’s waste legacy endures as a prominent and deeply rooted feature of Canada’s Arctic history. Drawing upon a rich historical, anthropological, military, political science, and environmental studies literature, this article explores waste as a key issue in the shifting narratives concerned with the modernization of the Canadian Arctic. While the DEW Line has been extensively analyzed in terms of its effects on the modernization of the Arctic, this article seeks to link Canadian sovereignty, security, resource exploitation, environmental stewardship, and Inuit self-determination directly to waste issues. As industrial activity and military exercises stand to significantly increase in the Arctic, I want to draw attention to the lessons of the DEW Line; that ”develop now; remediate later” incurs steep human health, environmental, financial, and political costs.

Beach observations of plastic and marine litter along the Northwest Passage

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Gijsbers ◽  
Hester Jiskoot
Keyword(s):  
Marine Pollution ◽  
Chukchi Sea ◽  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Canadian Arctic Archipelago ◽  
Bering Strait ◽  
Marine Litter ◽  
Northwest Passage ◽  
Distant Early Warning ◽  
Dew Line

<p>Marine litter and microplastics are everywhere. Even the Arctic Ocean, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Island are contaminated as various publications confirm. Little, however, is reported about marine waters and shores of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This poster presents the results of a privately funded citizen science observation to scan remote beaches along the Northwest Passage for marine litter pollution.</p><p>The observations were conducted while enjoying the 2019 Northwest Passage sailing expedition of the Tecla, a 1915 gaff-ketch herring drifter. The expedition started in Ilulissat, Greenland, on 1 August and ended in Nome, Alaska, on 18 September. After crossing Baffin Bay, the ship continued along Pond Inlet, Navy Board Inlet, Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Peel Sound, Franklin Strait, Rea Strait, Simpson Strait, Queen Maud Gulf, Coronation Gulf, Amundsen Gulf, Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea and Bering Strait. The vessel anchored in the settlement harbours of Pond Inlet, Taloyoak, Gjoa Haven, Cambridge Bay and Herschel Island. In addition, Tecla’s crew made landings at remote beaches on Disko Island (Fortune Bay, Disko Fjord), Beechey Island (Union Bay), Somerset Island (Four Rivers Bay), Boothia Peninsula (Weld Harbour), King William Island (M’Clintock Bay), Jenny Lind Island, and at Kugluktuk and Tuktoyaktuk Peninsula.</p><p>Following the categorization of the OSPAR Guideline for Monitoring Marine Litter on Beaches, litter observations were conducted without penetrating the beach surfaces. Beach stretches scanned varied in length from 100-400 m. No observations were conducted at inhabited settlements or at the abandoned settlements visited on Disko Island (Nipisat) and Beechey Island (Northumberland House).</p><p>Observations on the most remote beaches found 2-5 strongly bleached or decayed items in places such as Union Bay, Four Rivers Bay, Weld Harbour, Jenny Lind Island (Queen Maud Gulf side). Landings within 15 km of local settlements (Fortune Bay, Disko Fjord, Kugluktuk, Tuktoyaktuk) or near military activity (Jenny Lind Island, bay side) showed traces of local camping, hunting or fishing activities, resulting in item counts between 7 and 29. At the lee shore spit of M’Clintock Bay, significant pollution (> 100 items: including outboard engine parts, broken ceramic, glass, clothing, decayed batteries, a crampon and a vinyl record) was found, in contrast to a near-pristine beach on the Simpson Strait side. The litter type and concentration, as well as the remains of a building and shipwrecked fishing vessel indicate that this is an abandoned settlement, possibly related to the construction of the nearby Distant Early Warning Line radar site CAM-2 of Gladman Point. DEW Line sites have long been associated with environmental disturbances.</p><p>Given the 197 beach items recorded, it can be concluded that the beaches of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, which are blocked by sea ice during most of the year, are not pristine. Truly remote places have received marine pollution for decades to centuries. Where (abandoned) settlements are at close range pollution from local activities can be discovered, while ocean currents, wind patterns, ice rafting, distance to river mouths, and flotsam, jetsam and derelict also determine the type and amount of marine litter along the Northwest Passage.</p>

Logistic problems in the Canadian Arctic

Polar Record ◽  
1961 ◽  
Vol 10 (67) ◽  
pp. 365-371
Author(s):  
T. A. Harwood
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Weather Bureau ◽  
Weather Stations ◽  
Resolute Bay ◽  
States Weather

In 1946 the United States Weather Bureau and the Canadian Meteorological Service installed the first of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations at Resolute Bay. The network of satellite stations was extended into the Arctic archipelago in the following years on roughly a 275-mile spacing to Mould Bay, Isachsen, Eureka and Alert.

scholarly journals Increasing Relevance of Treaties: The Case of the Arctic

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 52-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Polar Bear ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

The Arctic was one of the main theatres for strategic military confrontation during the Cold War between the blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. There was no place for multilateral cooperation, other than for very limited issue areas, such as the 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears between the five states with polar bear populations. Yet, the warming of relations by the end of the Cold War changed all this. Inspired by Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in 1987, in which the Soviet leader pro-posed various possible areas for Arctic cooperation, differing ideas for international cooperation were advanced. Canadians, in particular, were trying to advance international treaty-based general cooperation for the Arctic, but this never came to pass and it was eventually Finland who was able to broker soft-law collaboration between the Cold War rivals.

Accord de coopération dans l'Arctique entre le Canada et les États-Unis d'Amérique

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 345-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
François-Antoine Mathys
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Prevention Act ◽  
The Right

SummaryThe Arctic Cooperation Agreement signed at Ottawa on January 11, 1988 deals strictly with movements of United States government-owned or government-operated icebreakers. In future, the United States will seek Canada's prior consent for each and every transit of United States icebreakers through the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. The Agreement provides Canada with more effective control over the waters of the Arctic archipelago than it had at the time of the Polar Sea voyage through the Northwest Passage in 1985. The Agreement does not resolve the legal dispute between Canada and the United States over the status of the Canadian Arctic waters. It does not affect the legal position of either country. Canada takes the view that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal waters by virtue of historic title. The United States, on the other hand, takes the position that these Arctic waters are international straits subject to the right of innocent passage or the right of transit passage. The Agreement does not cover the movements of U.S. naval vessels, including submarines, which are in accordance with Alliance commitments and relevant bilateral arrangements. U.S. (and other foreign flag) commercial vessels operating in Canadian Arctic waters have to conform, as in the past, with the provisions of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and other relevant laws and regulations.

Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles L. Glaser ◽  
Steve Fetter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Significant Damage ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Damage Limitation ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Military

As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the Soviet force was. Part of the answer depends on the military-technical feasibility of the United States achieving a significant damage-limitation capability: What would be the outcome of military competition over the survivability of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and command and control, and over the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defenses? The answer also depends on the benefits that a damage-limitation capability would provide; these could include contributions to homeland deterrence, extended deterrence, and reassurance of U.S. regional allies. The final piece of the analysis concerns the potential costs of a damage-limitation capability, which could include increased escalatory pressures during crises and growing political tension between the United States and China. A thorough analysis demonstrates that the United States should forgo such a capability because the prospects for preserving a significant damage-limitation capability are poor; the deterrent benefits would be small; and the escalatory and political costs would be relatively large.

Fast ice characteristics, with special reference to the eastern Canadian Arctic

Polar Record ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 17 (110) ◽  
pp. 521-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Jacobs ◽  
Roger G. Barry ◽  
Ronald L. Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Sea Ice ◽  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arctic Sea Ice ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
National Academy Of Sciences ◽  
Ice Dynamics ◽  
Pack Ice ◽  
Fast Ice ◽  
Eastern Canadian Arctic

Arctic sea ice is currently receiving increasing attention, both in relation to technological problems associated with resources development and shipping (Walker and Penney, 1973), and to basic research questions. The polar pack ice in the Beaufort Sea, for example, is the focus of the Arctic Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment (AIDJEX) (Untersteiner, 1974), while an analysis of physical links between the characteristics of polar surfaces and climate is to be the crux of the United States contribution to the Polar Experiment (POLEX) (Weller and Bierly, 1973; National Academy of Sciences, 1974). A general discussion of sea ice, with emphasis on pack ice, has been presented recently by Wittman and Burkhart (1973), but another aspect of the sea ice regime deserving separate attention, particularly in the light of Arctic offshore oil developments, is the landfast or fast ice, ie that part of the sea ice which remains attached to the shore (see “Sea ice terminology”). This paper attempts to provide a broad picture of fast ice characteristics in the context of our field experience in the eastern Canadian Arctic.

scholarly journals Military-political strategies of the United States and Canada in the Arctic

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-69
Author(s):  
P. Sevost'yanov ◽  
Yu. Davydova ◽  
A. Matyuhin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
System Analysis ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Problem Analysis ◽  
Arctic Zone ◽  
Political Strategies ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Military

The purpose of this study is to identify the military and political specifics of the Arctic zone, which is part of the United States and Canada. The authors used such research methods as system analysis, problem analysis, logical analysis, and historical analysis. The authors draw attention to the fact that issues of strategic stability and security appeared in US developments in the 1950s and the first researcher to officially propose this concept was Robert McNamara, us Secretary of defense in 1961-1967. Despite the fact that in 1972 the first Treaty on the limitation of missile DEFENSE systems and OSV-1 was signed. the cold war during the Soviet-US rivalry made the Arctic a zone of strategic confrontation with the routes of nuclear strikes. The authors note that although the cold war ended long ago, the Arctic region has not lost its strategic importance. The authors consider the main directions of military-strategic activities of the two countries, the dynamics of development and key elements of the strategy. In conclusion, the authors conclude that the military strategy of both the United States and Canada in the Arctic does not provide for military threats and the primary risks are environmental and social. The practical and theoretical significance of the work is that the Arctic is strategically important for all countries of the Arctic zone, so the military and political strategies of these States are of considerable interest both for scientific discourse and for determining Russia's foreign and domestic policy in this region.

scholarly journals Avoiding War: How Should Northern Europe Respond to the US-Russian Rivalry?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (0) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Tormod Heier
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Northern Europe ◽  
Entire Region ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
National Defence

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable “buffer” between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm’s length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from “buffer” to “springboard” for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway’s role as a “springboard” for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia. Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway

scholarly journals U.S. and the Arctic in the Last Two Decades

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-206
Author(s):  
Roman S. Czarny
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Arctic Council ◽  
Track Record ◽  
The Us ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
International Instruments

Abstract The United States became an Arctic country by virtue of purchasing Alaska from Russia in 1867. For a variety of reasons, discussed in this work, the Arctic used to be a focal point for the US during the Cold War, but later on this country paid much less attention to the region, including somewhat dubious awareness of America actually being an Arctic state. The aim of this article is to present some opportunities and challenges posed by governing the Arctic, and in particular a brief outline of the U.S. approach towards the region through its track record in the span of about last two decades, until the year 2015. It also attempts to present the expectations connected with American chairmanship of the Arctic Council, as well as the reasons for the country’s inability to ratify one of the fundamental international instruments, i.e. the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS.

scholarly journals Cyber Capacity Building in the Canadian Arctic and the North

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Csenkey ◽  
Bruno Perron
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Capacity Building ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Canadian Arctic ◽  
Skills Training ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Information Technology Security ◽  
The North ◽  
Multi Stakeholder

The Canadian Arctic cyber domain is set to rapidly expand in the next decade with emerging security vulnerabilities that would benefit from a multi-stakeholder Arctic Cyber Security Ecosystem. Great power competition will affect the Arctic as the United States, Russia, and now China seek to influence the resource rich region. Cyber is not only a matter of defence, but it is interconnected with education and economic development. The threat of disinformation is an example of how new ways of warfare can impact Canada through the Arctic. Cyber capacity building (CCB) could include domestic cyber education, skills training, and investment in scientific and technical (S&T) and information technology (IT) infrastructure. A focus on CCB would need to foster growth of resources available to territorial governments and local communities, hardening the region’s cyberspace and support incident response to malicious cyber actor activity. Information technology security (ITSEC) resources need to be combined with community-based media literacy and critical thinking education programs to increase the region’s resilience to malign influence.

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