scholarly journals The Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS) with the Kollsman, Inc. Model LH-40, Infrared (Erbium) Laser Rangefinder hazard analysis and safety assessment.

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold L. Augustoni
2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barak Fishbain ◽  
Leonid P. Yaroslavsky ◽  
Ianir A. Ideses ◽  
Ofer Ben-Zvi ◽  
Alon Shtern

2002 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Brooker

This is the second of two papers on Quantitative Safety Assessment – vital to the successful introduction of future Air Traffic Management systems. The focus is en route European controlled commercial traffic, particularly the mid-air collision risk. Part 2 develops soundly based and practical methods for safety assessment. The objective is to determine the key questions and the best ways to answer them. Aspects covered include lessons from Hazard Analysis and Airproxes together with ‘realistic’ risk budgeting. Two abstract concepts are introduced: Position Integrity and Reasonable Intent (essentially the need to be on the ‘right’ flight path), and their implications for risk calculations are discussed.


Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (17) ◽  
pp. 5700
Author(s):  
Jaroslaw Barela ◽  
Krzysztof Firmanty ◽  
Mariusz Kastek

Today’s long-range infrared cameras (LRIRC) are used in many systems for the protection of critical infrastructure or national borders. The basic technical parameters of such systems are noise equivalent temperature difference (NETD); minimum resolvable temperature difference (MRTD); and the range of detection, recognition and identification of selected objects (DRI). This paper presents a methodology of the theoretical determination of these parameters on the basis of technical data of LRIRCs. The first part of the paper presents the methods used for the determination of the detection, recognition and identification ranges based on the well-known Johnson criteria. The theoretical backgrounds for both approaches are given, and the laboratory test stand is described together with a brief description of the methodology adopted for the measurements of the selected necessary characteristics of a tested observation system. The measurements were performed in the Accredited Testing Laboratory of the Institute of Optoelectronics of the Military University of Technology (AL IOE MUT), whose activity is based on the ISO/IEC 17025 standard. The measurement results are presented, and the calculated ranges for a selected set of IR cameras are given, obtained on the basis of the Johnson criteria. In the final part of the article, the obtained measurement results are presented together with an analysis of the measurement uncertainty for 10 LRIRCs. The obtained measurement results were compared to the technical parameters presented by the manufacturers.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barak Fishbain ◽  
Leonid P. Yaroslavsky ◽  
Ianir A. Ideses

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (7) ◽  
pp. 180212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingwei Xu ◽  
Kaili Xu ◽  
Li Li ◽  
Xiwen Yao

Safe production is the foundation of the normal operations of petrochemical enterprises, and it helps maintain social stability. The main purpose of this study is to prevent petrochemical enterprise accidents by proposing a composite safety assessment approach based on the cloud model, preliminary hazard analysis–layer of protection analysis (PHA–LOPA) and the bow-tie model. First, the petrochemical enterprise and its relevant indicators were evaluated based on the cloud model. Second, the quantitative effect of the uncertainty transformation on the evaluation result of the cloud model was further analysed. This mainly includes the error analysis of the numerical characteristics under the conditions of few samples and small values. Third, the critical indicators such as shock and noise can be weakened and prevented by corresponding safety measures based on PHA–LOPA and the bow-tie model. After adopting two independent protection layers, the risk levels of shock and noise decrease from 3 to 2. Then, shock and noise were analysed in depth with the bow-tie model, and the causes and consequences were identified. Moreover, corresponding safety measures were taken to prevent accidents. The case study validated the validity and feasibility of the composite safety assessment approach proposed here.


2018 ◽  
Vol 295 ◽  
pp. S171
Author(s):  
M. Nepelska ◽  
M.T.D. Cronin ◽  
R. Cubberley ◽  
M. Dent ◽  
J.W. Firman ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Yuqing Wang ◽  
Lingzhi Li ◽  
Dongmei Wang

An introduction of the background, purpose and the methodology of seismic Probability Safety Assessment (PSA) for the typical three-loop pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant are firstly given. Seismic hazard curves for the site of the plant are developed through Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA). With the input of site specific Uniform Hazard Response Spectrums (UHRSs), Soil-Structure Interaction analysis is completed using multiple time-history analysis method. After the development of the seismic equipment list, a screening process is completed with screening criteria determined on the basis of seismic hazard curves and a rough estimate of the seismic risk level. For the structures and components not screened out, seismic fragility parameters are calculated following the separation of variables approach. A seismic PSA model is developed afterwards, in which a seismic pre-tree and several seismic event trees as well as relating fault trees are built to model the accident sequence in seismic events. The quantification of the model is done on the software of RiskSpectrum and its additional code for hazard analysis, RiskSpectrum.HazardLite. According to the results, seismic induced Core Damage Frequency (CDF) of the plant is 2.69×10−6/reactor year, and the range of Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) of seismic events from 0.30g to 0.45g has the most significant risk contribution. Seismic induced loss of offsite power, loss of emergency AC power and DC power are important accidents for the plant. Electrical components, auxiliary feeding water tank, diesel generators and ceiling of main control room of the plant are important contributors to seismic risk.


Author(s):  
Karoline De Carli Loureiro Van Loon ◽  
Ana Luisa Orsolini ◽  
Karla Ysla ◽  
Marcelo Ramos Martins

The number of Floating Production Storage and Offloading units (FPSOs) operating worldwide has been increasing due to the fact that they are well recognized as one of the most economical systems to develop offshore (ultra) deep water areas lacking infrastructure. In order to comply with the regulations, especially the Classification Society rules, and to monitor the hull integrity, all the cargo tanks must be submitted to periodical surveys on a continuous base. Eventually during this survey, some anomalies may be found, such as cracks and thickness loss in structural elements that will require repairs. This study provides a brief review of the methodology provided by the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) proposed by IMO (2002) and its application to the activities performed to survey and repair a cargo tank of an operating FPSO. A detailed description of these activities is provided in order to define the scope and frontiers of this study. Special attention is paid to the first step of the FSA methodology and the “Preliminary Hazard Analysis” technique is applied to the mentioned activities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2B) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellison Amaro De Oliveira ◽  
Patricia Da Silva Pagetti De Oliveira ◽  
Miguel Mattar Neto ◽  
Marcos Coelho Maturana

Deterministic and probabilistic nuclear safety analysis methodologies have been developed and updated based on operational experience, investigation of past incidents or accidents, and analysis of postulated initiating events in order to maintain the protection of workers, the public and the environment. The evaluation of accident sequences and the total radiological risk resulting from off-site releases are general objectives addressed by these methodologies. There are hazards that continually challenge the safety of a nuclear facility or its nearby area. In particular, seismic events represent a major contributor to the risk of a nuclear facility. Different levels of ground motion induced by earthquakes may be experienced by the structures, systems and components (SSCs) of the installation. In this context, a seismic hazard analysis, seismic demand analysis and seismic fragility analysis must be carried out in order to characterize the local seismic hazard and what are the seismic demands on SSCs, allowing an adequate seismic classification of SSCs, even in installations located in sites with low seismicity. In this article, a general description of the Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (Seismic PSA) methodology is presented, with emphasis on their support studies, aiming at applying the methodology described in this article to an experimental nuclear installation containing a PWR reactor designed for naval propulsion to be installed in a low seismicity zone in Brazil.


Author(s):  
Timo Malm ◽  
Tapio Heikkilä ◽  
Jari M. Ahola

The needs for using robots to assist human workers in accomplishing heavy tasks in a variety of industries are increasing. Almost by default this implies sharing the work space between robots and human operators. As a consequence, safety issues must be carefully taken into account. We have implemented a pilot system based on a standard industrial robot (KUKA KR120 R2500) for interactive handling of heavy and/or large parts and loads. Here we report the safety analysis and risk assessment of such a system following the harmonized robot standards (ISO 10218-1 & -2), including Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Use Case Safety Analysis (UCSA) and analysis of system functions and communications.


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