Corporate Governance Determinants: The Firm-Level Evidence from Transitional Country, Ukraine

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitaliy V. Zheka
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Transitional Country

Understanding decoupling in response to corporate governance reform pressures

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Krenn
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Compliance Monitoring ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Actual Use

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to explain under what circumstances firm-level adoption of codes of good corporate governance will more likely be superficial rather than substantive in nature. The article contains lessons for any agency or country that attempts to implement deep and lasting changes in corporate governance via codes of good corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – The article reviews the literature on compliance with codes of good corporate governance and develops a conceptual model to explain why some firms that have formally adopted a code of good governance decouple this policy from its actual use. Findings – Decoupling in response to the issuance of codes of good corporate governance will be more attractive to firms and also more sustainable under the following conditions: firms’ compliance costs are relatively high firms’ costs of outright and visible non-compliance are relatively high and outsiders’ compliance monitoring costs are relatively high. Originality/value – The article contributes to the debate on compliance and convergence and provides policymakers with a conceptual framework for assessing the likelihood of successful regulatory change in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

Does board gender diversity affect the transparency of corporate political disclosure?

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.G. DeBoskey ◽  
Yan Luo ◽  
Jeff Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ethics Research ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of board gender diversity on the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). Design/methodology/approach Two empirical proxies, CPD transparency and policy transparency, are constructed from a data set jointly produced by the Center of Political Activity and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research. The CPD transparency score measures the level of transparency in voluntary corporate disclosure of the amount of political contributions and the identity of the recipients as well as the titles and names of the executives who authorize the political spending. The policy transparency score measures the level of transparency in the voluntary disclosure of the policies governing corporate political spending. Board gender diversity is measured by the percentage of women on the board of directors. Findings Higher proportions of female directors are associated with more transparent disclosure of political contributions after controlling for a set of corporate governance and firm-level variables. Originality/value This study is the first to examine whether and how gender-diversified boards enhance the transparency of CPD. It contributes to the literature by providing evidence that gender-diversified boards enhance corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corruption and corporate governance: a cross-national study

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-315
Author(s):  
David Ng ◽  
Kun Qian ◽  
Adam Dix
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Standard Deviation ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
National Study ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Standard Deviation Increase ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Governance Analysis ◽  
Significant Negative Impact ◽  
Cross National Study

This paper examines the importance of country-level corruption in explaining the variation of firm-level corporate governance. Analysis of firm-level corporate governance data and country level corruption data on over 400 companies in 26 countries confirms the hypothesis that corruption has a statistically significant negative impact on the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. One standard deviation increase in country-level corruption is associated with a 0.5 to 0.7 standard deviation decrease in firm-level corporate governance scores

Does External Monitoring from Government Improve the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengyu Li ◽  
Hongsong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Production Management ◽  
Geographic Location ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Production Data ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Effective Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Input Prices

Abstract This paper investigates the impact of external monitoring from government on SOE performance, using variation in monitoring strength arising from a nationwide policy change and firms’ geographic location in China. We utilize a structural approach to estimate input prices and productivity separately at the firm level using commonly available production data. We show that enhanced external monitoring, as a key component of corporate governance, can substantially reduce managerial expropriation in procurement (proxied by input prices) and shirking in production management (proxied by productivity). The results suggest that government monitoring can be an effective policy instrument to improve SOE performance.

National Culture and Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 67-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong K. Duong ◽  
Helen Kang ◽  
Stephen B. Salter
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
National Culture ◽  
Hierarchical Linear Modeling ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Linear Modeling ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Preference Index ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Robust Evidence

ABSTRACT This paper examines the influence of national culture on corporate governance. We postulate that national culture can shape the contracting environments by serving as an informal constraint that affects incentives and choices in corporate governance. We hypothesize that national culture can explain cross-country variations in corporate governance after controlling for legal, political, financial, and economic institutions. We develop a Rule Preference Index as a proxy of national culture for a sample of 12,909 firm-year observations from 41 countries. Employing a hierarchical linear modeling approach to isolate the effects of firm-level and country-level variables, we find robust evidence that firms (and countries) with a higher Rule Preference Index tend to have better corporate governance.

Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings

2021 ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Ahmed Hassanein
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Corporate Managers ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

Corporate cash induces the opportunistic behavior of corporate managers that can create an agency problem. A corporate governance system controls the opportunistic behavior of managers and can affect the firm's policy on holding cash. This study explains how the aspects of corporate governance, country-level and firm-level governance, can affect the corporate policy on holding cash. First, the study provides the nature, definition, and importance of corporate cash holdings. Second, it outlines various motivations and theories behind holding corporate cash. Third, it explains the relation between firm-level governance and corporate cash holdings. Fourth, it focuses on the impact of firm-specific governance attributes on the level of corporate cash holdings. Fifth, it presents the relation between country-level governance and corporate cash holdings.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Listed Chinese Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusheng Kong ◽  
Takuriramunashe Famba ◽  
Grace Chituku-Dzimiro ◽  
Huaping Sun ◽  
Ophias Kurauone
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Negative Effect

This study analyzes corporate ownership as a corporate governance mechanism and its role in creating firm value. Previous research shows that there is no convergence on the firm-value corporate ownership relationship. Most research in this area takes a cross national approach ignoring the uniqueness of each institutional setting particularly those of emerging nations. Using a unique firm level dataset, we investigate how corporate control nature and ownership concentration affect the value of Chinese listed firms. First, non-state owned control is associated with a higher Tobin’s Q while a negative premium is found for state owned. Using the hybrid and the correlated random effects model we confirm a U-shaped non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q, implying that firm value first decreases and then increases as block holders own more shares. Further investigation reveals that the negative effect of ownership concentration is weaker when a firm equity nature is non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While ownership concentration appears to be an efficient mechanism for corporate governance its effect is weaker for SOEs compared to non-SOEs. The results support privatization of SOEs, sound reforms such as the split share structure reform as crucial for the development of China’s stock market.

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