More is Not Always Better: New Evidence in Assessing Firm-Level Corporate Governance Across Countries

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaifeng Fan
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-35
Author(s):  
Ranjan DasGupta ◽  
Monika Dhochak

We examine the strength and nature of firm aspiration and expectation as strategic mediators in the association of risk antecedents and firm risk, after exploring the possible impact of such antecedents on firm aspiration, and firm aspiration’s preliminary influence on firm risk. Empirical literature is mostly silent about risk antecedents of firms in an emerging market or cross-country context, and to the best of our knowledge, the mediators proposed in this study are yet to be explored. We report strong significant positive mediating effects of firm aspiration and expectation in association of risk antecedents and firm risk. Our results also validate that all studied risk antecedents, except corporate governance- composition, significantly influence aspiration and expectation mediators and firm risk in line with our hypotheses. Our results also hold true after controlling for firm-level and country-level heterogeneities and conducting two additional robustness tests.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zara Liaqat

Using a sample of 321 textile and clothing companies for the years 1992 to 2010, this paper analyses the effect of quota phase-outs on firm-level efficiency in Pakistan following the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). It highlights sectoral heterogeneity within the manufacturing industry as a result of MFA expiration. The empirical methodology uses the structural techniques proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in order to take care of endogeneity in the estimation of production functions. The results differ for the two industries: MFA expiration lead to an increase in the average productivity of textile producing firms but a significant reduction in the mean productivity of clothing producers. We offer a number of explanations for this outcome, such as a change in the input and product mix, entry by non-exporters in the clothing sector, and sectoral differences in quality ladders. A number of crucial policy lessons can be drawn from the findings of this study. JEL Classification:F13; F14; D24; C14; O19 Keywords: Multi-Fibre Arrangement, Trade Liberalisation, Productivity, Firm Heterogeneity, Simultaneity and Production Functions, Endogeneity of Protection


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Krenn

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to explain under what circumstances firm-level adoption of codes of good corporate governance will more likely be superficial rather than substantive in nature. The article contains lessons for any agency or country that attempts to implement deep and lasting changes in corporate governance via codes of good corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – The article reviews the literature on compliance with codes of good corporate governance and develops a conceptual model to explain why some firms that have formally adopted a code of good governance decouple this policy from its actual use. Findings – Decoupling in response to the issuance of codes of good corporate governance will be more attractive to firms and also more sustainable under the following conditions: firms’ compliance costs are relatively high firms’ costs of outright and visible non-compliance are relatively high and outsiders’ compliance monitoring costs are relatively high. Originality/value – The article contributes to the debate on compliance and convergence and provides policymakers with a conceptual framework for assessing the likelihood of successful regulatory change in corporate governance.


1992 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-251
Author(s):  
JASON G. CUMMINS ◽  
KEVIN A. HASSETT
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.G. DeBoskey ◽  
Yan Luo ◽  
Jeff Wang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of board gender diversity on the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). Design/methodology/approach Two empirical proxies, CPD transparency and policy transparency, are constructed from a data set jointly produced by the Center of Political Activity and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research. The CPD transparency score measures the level of transparency in voluntary corporate disclosure of the amount of political contributions and the identity of the recipients as well as the titles and names of the executives who authorize the political spending. The policy transparency score measures the level of transparency in the voluntary disclosure of the policies governing corporate political spending. Board gender diversity is measured by the percentage of women on the board of directors. Findings Higher proportions of female directors are associated with more transparent disclosure of political contributions after controlling for a set of corporate governance and firm-level variables. Originality/value This study is the first to examine whether and how gender-diversified boards enhance the transparency of CPD. It contributes to the literature by providing evidence that gender-diversified boards enhance corporate governance.


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