Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance and Monetary Policy: Firm-Level Evidence from India

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saibal Ghosh ◽  
Rudra Sensarma
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Finance ◽  
Firm Level

Bookkeeper-Controller-CFO: The Rise of the Chief Financial and Chief Accounting Officer

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Doron ◽  
C. Richard Baker ◽  
Kiren Dosanjh Zucker
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Finance ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Legal Liability ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Chief Financial Officers ◽  
Management Positions ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT This paper traces the evolution of the chief accounting and chief financial officers from minor figures in corporate governance for most of the 20th century to senior management positions by the late 1970s. The paper begins with the testimony before Congress of Arthur Tucker during the debates over the legislation that would become the 1933 Securities Act. Tucker's testimony resulted in the controller or chief accounting officer being included among those persons specifically listed as potentially liable for fraudulent statements or omissions under Section 11 of the Act. The impact of Tucker's efforts, the evolution of the legal liability of financial and accounting officers over the next several decades, the increasing complexity of corporate finance and financial reporting that led to the establishment of the CFO as a position second only to the CEO, and the place of the accounting officer among senior management, are analyzed in the subsequent sections.

Understanding decoupling in response to corporate governance reform pressures

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Krenn
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Compliance Monitoring ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Actual Use

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to explain under what circumstances firm-level adoption of codes of good corporate governance will more likely be superficial rather than substantive in nature. The article contains lessons for any agency or country that attempts to implement deep and lasting changes in corporate governance via codes of good corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – The article reviews the literature on compliance with codes of good corporate governance and develops a conceptual model to explain why some firms that have formally adopted a code of good governance decouple this policy from its actual use. Findings – Decoupling in response to the issuance of codes of good corporate governance will be more attractive to firms and also more sustainable under the following conditions: firms’ compliance costs are relatively high firms’ costs of outright and visible non-compliance are relatively high and outsiders’ compliance monitoring costs are relatively high. Originality/value – The article contributes to the debate on compliance and convergence and provides policymakers with a conceptual framework for assessing the likelihood of successful regulatory change in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

Company Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenda Hannigan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Finance ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Corporate Entity ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Corporate Insolvency

Company Law brings clarity and analysis to the ever-changing landscape of this field. The text aims to capture the dynamism of the subject, places the material in context, highlights its relevance and topicality, and guides readers through all the major issues. From incorporation through to liquidation and dissolution, the work explores the workings of the corporate entity. The book is divided into five distinct sections covering corporate structure (including legal personality and constitutional issues), corporate governance (including directors’ duties and liabilities), shareholders’ rights and remedies (including powers of decision-making and shareholder petitions), corporate finance (including share and loan capital), and corporate insolvency.

Does board gender diversity affect the transparency of corporate political disclosure?

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.G. DeBoskey ◽  
Yan Luo ◽  
Jeff Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ethics Research ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of board gender diversity on the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). Design/methodology/approach Two empirical proxies, CPD transparency and policy transparency, are constructed from a data set jointly produced by the Center of Political Activity and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research. The CPD transparency score measures the level of transparency in voluntary corporate disclosure of the amount of political contributions and the identity of the recipients as well as the titles and names of the executives who authorize the political spending. The policy transparency score measures the level of transparency in the voluntary disclosure of the policies governing corporate political spending. Board gender diversity is measured by the percentage of women on the board of directors. Findings Higher proportions of female directors are associated with more transparent disclosure of political contributions after controlling for a set of corporate governance and firm-level variables. Originality/value This study is the first to examine whether and how gender-diversified boards enhance the transparency of CPD. It contributes to the literature by providing evidence that gender-diversified boards enhance corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corruption and corporate governance: a cross-national study

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-315
Author(s):  
David Ng ◽  
Kun Qian ◽  
Adam Dix
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Standard Deviation ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
National Study ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Standard Deviation Increase ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Governance Analysis ◽  
Significant Negative Impact ◽  
Cross National Study

This paper examines the importance of country-level corruption in explaining the variation of firm-level corporate governance. Analysis of firm-level corporate governance data and country level corruption data on over 400 companies in 26 countries confirms the hypothesis that corruption has a statistically significant negative impact on the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. One standard deviation increase in country-level corruption is associated with a 0.5 to 0.7 standard deviation decrease in firm-level corporate governance scores

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