The Determinants of the Voting Premium in Italy: The Evidence from 1974 to 2003

Author(s):  
Ettore Croci ◽  
Lorenzo Caprio
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-214
Author(s):  
Feng Gao ◽  
Ivy Xiying Zhang

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 2433-2443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Caprio ◽  
Ettore Croci
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doron Levit ◽  
Nadya Malenko ◽  
Ernst G. Maug
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 1143-1181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinmoy Ghosh ◽  
Fan He

On Mar. 21, 2007, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 to make it easier for cross-listed firms to deregister from the U.S. market and escape its regulatory costs. Using difference-in-difference (DD) tests, we find that, on average, Rule 12h-6’s passage induced an increase in voting premium, a decline in equity raising, and a decline in cross-listing premium. These effects are observed for exchange-listed firms and for firms from countries with weak investor protection. We conclude that although cross-listed firms are still valued at a significant premium over non-cross-listed firms, the rule decreased the value of commitment to the U.S. regulatory system.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 206
Author(s):  
Antonio Salvi ◽  
Emanuele Teti ◽  
Anastasia Giakoumelou ◽  
Felice Petruzzella

We investigate the different aspects affecting the control premium by carrying out an empirical analysis on the respective in the Italian stock market since 1987 employing the Voting Premium methodology. We demonstrate how the introduction of new regulations in this field in 2012 has contributed to a substantial premium reduction. The impact of the aforementioned regulations needs to be examined within the macroeconomic setting that has distinguished the period of reference, particularly the last decade, within which the decision to raise the tax rate on financial yields needs to be contextualized.


2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 732-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Bryson ◽  
Rafael Gomez ◽  
Tobias Kretschmer ◽  
Paul Willman

Across countries, union membership and voter turnout are highly correlated. In unadjusted terms, union members maintain a roughly 0.10 to 0.12 point gap in voting propensity over non-members. We motivate empirically and propose a model—with three causal channels—that explains this correlation and then empirically tests for the contribution of each channel to the overall union voting gap. The first channel by which union members are more likely to vote is through the so-called "monopoly-face" of unionism (i.e., unionization increases wages for members and higher incomes are a significant positive determinant of voting). The second is the so-called "social custom" model of unionism, which argues that union co-worker peer pressure creates incentives to vote amongst members for the purpose of having cast a ballot or being seen at the voting poll. The third and final channel is based on the "voice-face" of unionism whereby employees who are (or have been) exposed to the formalities of collective bargaining and union representation at the workplace are also more likely to increase their attachment to structures of democratic governance in society as well. We test to see how much of the raw "union voting premium" is accounted for by these three competing channels, using contemporary data from 29 European countries. We find that all three channels are at work, with voice the dominant effect (half of the overall gap attributed to this channel) and the other two (monopoly and social custom), each accounting for approximately one-fourth of the overall union voting gap.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 92-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Sancetta ◽  
Nicola Cucari ◽  
Salvatore Esposito De Falco

A large body of research deals with voting premium as a proxy of private benefit of control. Almost all of them find positive voting premium, in particular in Italy. Therefore appears interesting to ask what is the current status of private benefits of control in Italy in the last decade (2007-2017). Surprisingly, we show three major findings: i) reduction of non-voting share in the Italian scenario; ii) prevalence of negative voting rights premium more than positive ones, thus conflicting with the assumption and the observations by other researchers; iii) limits of the voting premium method. Our aim is that this study, despite its limitations, may encourage further researches focused on the analysis of the improvement and the change in the Italian corporate governance. The article points out that interesting evidence already exists, although still much remains to do in the future.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 1515-1544
Author(s):  
Byungkwon Lim ◽  
Pyung Sig Yoon ◽  
Hyangmi Choi

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