The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Dual-Class Voting Premium

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-214
Author(s):  
Feng Gao ◽  
Ivy Xiying Zhang
2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Paulo Vieito ◽  
Antonio Melo Cerqueira ◽  
Elísio Brandão ◽  
Walayet A. Khan

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Diane Parker ◽  
Nancy J. Swanson ◽  
Michael T. Dugan

Author(s):  
Jefferson Duarte ◽  
Katie Kong ◽  
Lance A. Young ◽  
Stephan Siegel

2020 ◽  
pp. 031289622094638
Author(s):  
Dewan Rahman ◽  
Robert Faff ◽  
Barry Oliver

We examine whether insider opportunism is reduced by board independence. Using a sample of 18,194 firm-year observations over the period 1996–2016, we show that board independence constrains opportunistic insider trading. Our identification strategy uses the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act) and associated changes to the listing rules of NYSE/NASDAQ as a source of exogenous shocks in board independence. Our results are economically significant as insider opportunism declines by about 10.5%. We find that insider trading restrictions is the channel through which board independence reduces insider opportunism. Our additional analyses show that in competitive and R&D (research and development) intensive firms, the impact of board independence on opportunism is less pronounced. We also find that board independence constrains opportunism only in less complex firms. However, in co-opted boards, independent directors are less effective. Overall, we support the monitoring channel of board independence for reducing insider opportunism. JEL Classification: G14, G34, G40


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Joe ◽  
Arnold Wright, and ◽  
Sally Wright

SUMMARY We present evidence on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments during a unique time period, immediately following several U.S. financial scandals and surrounding calls for reforms in auditing and financial reporting, which culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). During this period, auditors and their clients faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators. In addition, auditors had to contend with changed incentives, a new external regulator (i.e., the PCAOB), and upcoming annual PCAOB inspections. We extend prior studies by considering a broader range of factors potentially impacting the resolution of proposed adjustments, including the effect of client tenure, strength of internal controls, and repeat adjustments. Data on 458 proposed adjustments are obtained from the working papers of a sample of 163 audit engagements conducted during 2002 by a Big 4 firm. We find that 24.2 percent of proposed adjustments were subsequently waived. The results indicate audit adjustments are more likely to be waived for clients with whom the audit firm has had a longer relationship, although the pattern does not reflect favoring such clients. We also find that adjustments are more likely to be waived for repeat adjustments. Data Availability: Due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating audit firm the data are proprietary.


2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Bhattacharjee ◽  
J. Owen Brown

ABSTRACT Concerns over “revolving door” practices of companies hiring directly from their external auditor led to a Sarbanes-Oxley Act provision mandating a one-year cooling-off period before such hires can occur. Yet little is known as to whether these alumni affiliations, still prevalent today, actually impair audit quality. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we conduct an experiment to examine whether auditors experience heightened identification with an alumni-affiliated client manager and, if so, how this perceived relationship affects their professional skepticism in response to a management persuasion attempt. As predicted, absent the use of a management persuasion tactic, auditors identify more with an alumni-affiliated manager than a non-alumnus with equal professional experience, and this perceived social bond enhances the manager's influence. However, the use of a common persuasion tactic, while effective at influencing auditor judgment when used by an unaffiliated manager, “backfires” when used by an alumni-affiliated manager, leading to diminished persuasion and increased professional skepticism. Evidence suggests that auditors are better able to identify the inappropriateness of the persuasion attempt when the tactic is used by an alumni-affiliated manager.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-23
Author(s):  
Alexey Lyubimov ◽  
Larry Davis ◽  
Greg Trompeter

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