The Relation between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Gunny
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Real Activities Manipulation

Real Earnings Management by Benchmark-Beating Firms: Implications for Future Profitability

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke D. Beyer ◽  
Sandeep M. Nabar ◽  
Eric T. Rapley
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Large Firms ◽  
Financial Health ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Bid Ask Spread ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
The Difference

SYNOPSIS Prior studies document both an improvement (Gunny 2010) and deterioration (Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009) in the future operating performance of firms engaging in real earnings management (REM) to meet earnings benchmarks. These results suggest that some firms use REM to signal their favorable prospects, whereas others use REM opportunistically. We hypothesize that firms with less robust information environments, more costly REM, and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks are more likely to engage in REM to signal future performance. Consistent with expectations, we find the positive relation between REM and future profitability is limited to firms that have less robust information environments (measured with stock return volatility, bid/ask spread, and analysts following), more costly REM (measured with market share and financial health), and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks (measured with market-to-book ratio, transient investors, and seasoned equity offering). In supplementary analysis, we note that Bhojraj et al. (2009) restrict their sample to relatively large firms, whereas Gunny's (2010) sample includes both large and small firms. Our analysis indicates that the difference in sample composition explains the differing results. We find that small firms use REM to signal positive future performance, but large firms do not. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.

Long-Term Orientation and Earnings Management Strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Haga ◽  
Fredrik Huhtamäki ◽  
Dennis Sundvik
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Precision ◽  
Management Strategy ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT In this study, we investigate how country-level long-term orientation affects managers' willingness to engage in earnings management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries for the period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in long-term-oriented cultures rely relatively more on earnings management through accruals, while firms in short-term-oriented cultures engage in relatively more real earnings management. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-term-oriented cultures suggesting that manipulation of accruals enables benchmark beating with high precision. JEL Classifications: M14; M16; M21; M41.

The Effect of Board of Director Composition and Audit Committee Expertise on The Real Earnings Management in Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-117
Author(s):  
Feby Astrid Kesaulya ◽  
Weny Putri ◽  
Dewi Sri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
The Real ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Director ◽  
Real Activities Manipulation

The Objective of this research was to prove that the implementation of good corporate governance will have an effect on the real activities manipulation which was done by the management. The implementations of good governance used by this research are board of director composition and audit committee expertise. This research was conducted in Indonesia by using 306 firm years’ observations. The result of this research showed a different result from previous researches. This research showed that the implementation of good corporate governance in the form of board director composition and audit committee expertise do not impact the practice of real activities manipulation. Or, in other words some of the good corporate governance tool could not mitigate the real activities manipulation in the company.

Analysts’ reactions to firms’ real activities management

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-612
Author(s):  
Joonho Lee ◽  
Sung Gon Chung
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Accounting Earnings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Accounting Earnings Management ◽  
Operating Activities

Purpose Firms’ real activities management (RAM) can have a more detrimental effect on firms’ future performance than accrual earnings management. This paper aims to examine whether analysts, who play an important role as information intermediaries, understand the negative effect of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond to it accordingly. Design/methodology/approach The authors investigate whether analysts lower their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of the firms with RAM. The authors measure RAM by examining firms’ abnormal decreases in discretionary expenses, abnormal increases in production and abnormal decreases in cash flow from operations following prior literature. Findings The authors find that after controlling for earnings surprises and other important firm characteristics, analysts lower their forecasts of future annual earnings and stock recommendations of the firms that show signs of RAM. Research limitations/implications First, as in other RAM studies, the results in this study are subject to measurement errors inherent in the estimation of RAM (i.e. abnormal production costs, abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenditures). Second, we include only firm-year observations that barely make positive income in our samples following the previous study. This sample selection criterion helps increase the power of the test by examining the “suspect firms group,” which are more likely to engage in earnings management. However, one can challenge that our findings on the association between RAM and analysts’ reactions could be only case-specific and cannot be generalized. Practical implications This study contributes to the literature on earnings management and especially on RAM. Specifically, none of the previous studies clearly examines whether analysts understand the negative impact of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond accordingly, although there are studies showing the negative association between RAM and firms’ future operating performance and studies showing the negative association between analysts following and RAM. Thus, filling the gap, this study provides a specific reason for the negative association between the analyst following and real earnings management presented in previous studies. Social implications The findings will be of interest to regulators, who are concerned about the potential negative consequences in which tighter accounting standards can result. For example, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically demonstrate that tighter accounting standards can prompt more RAM instead of accounting earnings management. The study provides important evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market. If the market is able to detect RAM and allocate fewer resources to the firms that engage in it, then the concerns associated with the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and RAM can be diminished. Originality/value Prior research suggests that tighter accounting regulations (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) prompt more RAM than accounting earnings management. The study provides evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market.

Motivations for Classification Shifting: A Systematic Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Nisreen Mohammed Almaleeh
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks

The purpose of the current paper is to highlight the motivations that may encourage managements of firms to shift core expenses to special items in order to inflate core or operating earnings i.e. to practice classification shifting, which would have an effect on the decisions of financial statements' users. This was done through conducting a systematic review on the available literature about classification shifting. The most obvious findings to emerge from this study is that management may engage in classification shifting for the reason that it is less costly than other earnings management methods, the firm being in current or potential state of financial distress, the desire of the management of the firm to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, the ownership structure of the firm having some characteristics that encourage management to engage in such a practice, the firm performing in a weak corporate governance environment, or due to the fact that classification shifting is tough to be detected by external monitors compared to other earnings management methods.

scholarly journals Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Cheng ◽  
Jimmy Lee ◽  
Terry Shevlin
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Team Work ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Alternative Measures

ABSTRACT We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: G32; M40.

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