Discretionary Accruals, Earnings Management, and Earnings Benchmarks*

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Hansen
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks

Discretionary Accruals and Earnings Management: An Analysis of Pseudo Earnings Targets

2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ayers ◽  
John (Xuefeng) Jiang ◽  
P. Eric Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Earnings Distribution ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Unexpected Earnings ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Earnings Targets

We investigate whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analystsbased unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as “pseudo” targets. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark extends to pseudo targets throughout the earnings distribution. We find similar results for the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings. We develop an additional analysis that accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management incentives may be more pronounced). We find similar effects around the actual earnings increase benchmark. However, analogous patterns exist for cash flows around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. In sum, we are unable to eliminate other plausible explanations for the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.

Earnings benchmarks, earnings management and future stock performance of Chinese listed companies reporting under ASBE-IFRS

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 502-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camillo Lento ◽  
Wing Him Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Stock Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Earnings Change

Purpose Prior literature has revealed three key earnings benchmarks: earnings level; earnings change; and analysts’ expectations. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the authors seek to establish which earnings benchmark induces the largest extent of earnings management. Second, the authors explore the implications of earnings management on firm future performance. Both of these purposes are investigated for Chinese listed companies during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era. Design/methodology/approach The authors rely upon the unique regulations and incentives for Chinese listed companies in order to develop four testable hypotheses. Next, the authors employ both logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to test the hypotheses. Findings The results suggest that Chinese listed firms have the highest level of income increasing discretionary accruals around the earnings level benchmark, followed by the earnings change benchmark. The authors do not find any evidence of earnings management to beat analysts’ expectation. In addition, the authors find evidence that Chinese listed firms with relatively high level of earnings management and low earnings exhibit relatively weak future stock performance. Originality/value The findings are the first to document an earnings management benchmark hierarchy with respect to the extent of income increasing discretionary accruals, while simultaneously establishing a link between earnings management and firm future stock performance, for Chinese listed companies. The findings are valuable for regulators and investors by suggesting that management intervention in the reporting process during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era may act to circumvent delisting regulations and cloud earnings signal for firms that beat certain earnings benchmarks.

The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Young Lee ◽  
Vivek Mande
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Potential Benefit ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
Joint And Several Liability ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Deep Pockets

This study examines how the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) affects auditors' incentives to curtail earnings management by client managers. The most significant reform of PSLRA was the elimination of joint and several liability under which auditors and other parties could be named to lawsuits because of ‘deep pockets’ rather than culpability. While the elimination of joint and several liability provides significant relief to auditors from litigation, opponents of PSLRA argue that it discourages meritorious lawsuits and lowers audit quality, reducing investor confidence in markets. The potential benefit would be greatest for Big 6 firms, who have the highest exposure (largest clients) and significant resources to pay damages. In this paper we argue that if PSLRA induces decreases in audit quality, then we should expect increases in the prevalence of accruals after this Act. To investigate this issue we examine the discretionary accruals of a sample of 2,600 companies three years before and after the act. Our results support this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that after PSLRA income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 firms but not for auditees of non-Big 6 firms.

Earnings Management, Litigation Risk, and Asymmetric Audit Fee Responses

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Price Earnings Ratio ◽  
Year 2000 ◽  
Conservative Bias

This study examines the association between audit fees and earnings management, using publicly available fee data. We hypothesize that, due to asymmetric litigation effects, audit fees decrease (increase) with a client's risk of income-decreasing (increasing) earnings management risk. We also hypothesize that the positive relation between income-increasing earnings management risk and audit fees is heightened for clients that are high-growth firms. We test our hypotheses with a sample of 429 public, non-regulated, Big 5 audited companies, using fee data for the year 2000. We find that downward earnings management risk, as estimated by negative (i.e., income-decreasing) discretionary accruals, is associated with lower audit fees. We also document that upward earnings management risk, as estimated by positive discretionary accruals, is associated with higher audit fees and that the interaction of this risk with an industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio has an incrementally significant, positive effect on fees. We interpret our findings as consistent with a conservative bias on the part of auditors. The conservative bias arises from asymmetric litigation risk in which income-increasing discretionary accruals exhibit greater expected litigation costs than income-decreasing discretionary accruals (Simunic and Stein 1996; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Richardson et al. 2002; Heninger 2001).

scholarly journals Management Entrenchment, Firm Characteristics and Earnings Management Of Conglomerate Companies In Nigeria

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Temitope Olamide Fagbemi ◽  
Olubunmi Florence Osemene ◽  
Oyinlade Agbaje
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
P Value ◽  
Secondary Source ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Management Entrenchment ◽  
The Impact

Sometimes the rivalry between shareholders and management is an indication of the level of entrenchment within the corporate environment. Managers are believed to routinely manipulate earnings in order to mislead shareholders about their company's actual economic outlook or performance. As a result, the study investigated the impact of managerial entrenchment, firm characteristics and earnings management of conglomerate companies in Nigeria. Employing the ex-post facto research design, the data was gathered from secondary source of the 6 listed conglomerate companies for the 11-year period running (2008-2018). The study used discretionary accruals a proxy for earnings management and to calculate discretionary accruals, the study used modified Jones model. The result showed that management entrenchment and firm characteristics have Impact on multinational firms ' earnings management in Nigeria. Specifically, from the conglomerate’s entrenchment proxies, CEO’s tenure has a positive and significant impact on earnings management (coff. =1.062821, p-value =0.0367) and management entrenchment as measured by CEO’s shareholding has a negative and insignificant effect on earnings management (coff. =-6252391, p-value = 0.4090) while firm size, profitability and leverage indicated a significant and positive impact on earnings management (coff, = 0.124587, p-value = 0.0000; coff. = 0.006647, p-value = 0.0431 and coff. = 0.032065, p-value = 0.0000). The study therefore recommended among others that management should reduce the debt in their capital structure in order to improve their companies’ value and their capital structure should be majorly financed by equity rather than debt and reduce CEOs tenure to minimise earnings management practices.

Accounting Discretion, Horizon Problem, and CEO Retirement Benefits

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1553-1573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Kalyta
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Pension Plans ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Retirement Benefits ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accounting Choices ◽  
Fortune 1000 ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT: Empirical research on the impact of managerial retirement on discretionary accounting choices is inconclusive, with most studies finding no evidence of earnings management in the pre-retirement period. I argue that income-increasing accounting choices in final pre-retirement years are particularly appealing to managers whose pension depends on firm performance in these years. Using primary data on retired CEOs of Fortune 1000 firms, I investigate the impact of CEO pension plans on discretionary accruals. Consistent with the prediction, I find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in the pre-retirement period only when CEO pension is based on firm performance. I also report evidence of negative abnormal market reaction to CEO retirement in firms with performance-contingent CEO pensions.

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