Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Equity Financing Decisions

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Datta ◽  
Mai E. Iskandar-Datta ◽  
Kartik Raman
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Financing Decisions

Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Equity Financing Decisions*

2005 ◽  
Vol 78 (5) ◽  
pp. 1859-1890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Datta ◽  
Mai Iskandar‐Datta ◽  
Kartik Raman
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Financing Decisions

Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Colonnello ◽  
Giuliano Curatola ◽  
Giang Hoong
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Credit Spreads ◽  
Compensation Structure

scholarly journals Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure: the case of Islamic financing modes

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moncef Guizani
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Pecking Order ◽  
Pecking Order Theory ◽  
Corporate Financing ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Executive Managers ◽  
The Capital Structure

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the basic premises according to the pecking order theory provide an explanation for the capital structure mix of firms operating under Islamic principles. Pooled OLS and random effect regressions were performed to test the pecking order theory applying data from a sample of 66 Islamic firms listed on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stock market over the period 2006–2016. The results show that sale-based instruments (Murabahah, Ijara) track the financial deficit quite closely followed by equity financing and as the last alternative to finance deficit, Islamic firms issue Sukuk. In the crisis period, these firms seem more reliant on equity, then on sale-based instrument and on Sukuk as last option. The study findings also indicate that the cumulative financing deficit does not wipe out the effects of conventional variables, although it is empirically significant. This provides no support for the pecking order theory attempted by Saudi Islamic firms. This research highlights the capital structure choice of firms operating under Islamic principles. It explores the implication of the relevant Islamic principles on corporate financing preferences. It can serve firm executive managers in their financing decisions to add value to the companies.

scholarly journals Executive compensation structure and the motivations for seasoned equity offerings

2014 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 330-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric R. Brisker ◽  
Don M. Autore ◽  
Gonul Colak ◽  
David R. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Compensation Structure

Tracing the links between executive compensation structure and firm performance: evidence from the Brazilian market

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 1393-1408
Author(s):  
Alexandre Dias ◽  
Victor Vieira ◽  
Bruno Figlioli
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Performance Indicators ◽  
Multiple Correspondence Analysis ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Structure

Purpose This study aims to investigate how different executive compensation structures were related to the performance of firms. Design/methodology/approach This study was based on a sample of companies with the highest standards of corporate governance listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange. We adopted the multiple correspondence analysis followed by the hierarchical cluster analysis to propose a typology defined by fixed and variable components of the executive compensation and multiple firm performance indicators. Findings The analysis produced three clusters, which were submitted to robustness tests, highlighting that companies used the compensatory incentives in striking distinct ways as governance mechanisms. The study found a positive relationship between the performance of companies and the variable incentives of executive compensation, especially the long-term incentive, as well as a negative relationship between the performance of firms and the fixed component of the compensation structure. Research limitations/implications This research, whose sample was based on an emerging market, adds empirical evidence to the literature. However, future studies are invited to address the relationships between executive compensation structures and firm performance in other markets, as well as to examine these relationships in companies with distinct levels of governance. Practical implications This study provides insights on how the incentive structure can be adopted as an efficient governance mechanism, especially for companies in emerging markets. Originality/value The main novelty of this paper is that the methodological strategy used here enabled the authors to discriminate distinct executive compensation structures and establish a relationship between these compensation structures and different types of performance indicators.

Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Colonnello ◽  
Giuliano Curatola ◽  
Ngoc Giang Hoang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Credit Spreads ◽  
Compensation Structure

Does Mandatory Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinghua Gao ◽  
Yonghong Jia ◽  
Siyi Li
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Corporate Financing ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Financing Choices ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Financing Behavior ◽  
The Impact

We examine the impact of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) on firms’ financing choices and how firms alter their financing behavior after the mandated disclosure of ICWs. We find that, before disclosure, ICW firms tend to seek external financing more than non-ICW firms do and are more likely to use equity financing as opposed to debt. After the disclosure, however, ICW and non-ICW firms exhibit similar financing preferences. In exploring the motivations for equity financing, we find that ICW firms are more prone than non-ICW firms to use the equity proceeds to fund investments and that this penchant disappears post-disclosure. The overall evidence indicates that ICW disclosure alters the information environment and managerial incentives, which has significant impact on firms’ financing decisions.

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