Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Colonnello ◽  
Giuliano Curatola ◽  
Ngoc Giang Hoang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Credit Spreads ◽  
Compensation Structure

Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Colonnello ◽  
Giuliano Curatola ◽  
Giang Hoong
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Credit Spreads ◽  
Compensation Structure

scholarly journals Executive compensation structure and the motivations for seasoned equity offerings

2014 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 330-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric R. Brisker ◽  
Don M. Autore ◽  
Gonul Colak ◽  
David R. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Compensation Structure

Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Equity Financing Decisions*

2005 ◽  
Vol 78 (5) ◽  
pp. 1859-1890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Datta ◽  
Mai Iskandar‐Datta ◽  
Kartik Raman
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Financing Decisions

Tracing the links between executive compensation structure and firm performance: evidence from the Brazilian market

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 1393-1408
Author(s):  
Alexandre Dias ◽  
Victor Vieira ◽  
Bruno Figlioli
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Performance Indicators ◽  
Multiple Correspondence Analysis ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Structure

Purpose This study aims to investigate how different executive compensation structures were related to the performance of firms. Design/methodology/approach This study was based on a sample of companies with the highest standards of corporate governance listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange. We adopted the multiple correspondence analysis followed by the hierarchical cluster analysis to propose a typology defined by fixed and variable components of the executive compensation and multiple firm performance indicators. Findings The analysis produced three clusters, which were submitted to robustness tests, highlighting that companies used the compensatory incentives in striking distinct ways as governance mechanisms. The study found a positive relationship between the performance of companies and the variable incentives of executive compensation, especially the long-term incentive, as well as a negative relationship between the performance of firms and the fixed component of the compensation structure. Research limitations/implications This research, whose sample was based on an emerging market, adds empirical evidence to the literature. However, future studies are invited to address the relationships between executive compensation structures and firm performance in other markets, as well as to examine these relationships in companies with distinct levels of governance. Practical implications This study provides insights on how the incentive structure can be adopted as an efficient governance mechanism, especially for companies in emerging markets. Originality/value The main novelty of this paper is that the methodological strategy used here enabled the authors to discriminate distinct executive compensation structures and establish a relationship between these compensation structures and different types of performance indicators.

scholarly journals The Influence of Auditor Quality and Executive Compensation Structure on Financial Reporting Executives' Restatement Decisions in a Clawback Environment

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. P28-P36
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Pyzoha ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Unintended Consequence ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
Practical Implications

SUMMARY Based on a recent SEC proposal, publicly traded companies will be required to adopt a clawback in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act. In response, firms have been voluntarily adopting clawbacks at an increasing rate. Prior research finds one benefit of voluntarily adopting a clawback is a decrease in restatements. A recent study by Pyzoha (2015) uses an experiment to further investigate restatements in a clawback environment by studying executives' restatement decisions based on auditor quality and executive compensation structure. Results show there may be an unintended consequence of clawbacks that partially offsets the aforementioned benefit. The study finds executives are less likely to agree with restating financial statements when their pay consists of a higher percentage of incentives and there is a lower quality auditor. Importantly, the study shows this tendency is reduced with a higher quality auditor. This article summarizes the study's motivation, research method, results, and practical implications.

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