scholarly journals Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gilo ◽  
Yossi Spiegel
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Cross Ownership

scholarly journals Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gilo ◽  
Yossi Moshe ◽  
Yossi Spiegel
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Cross Ownership

scholarly journals Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Roig
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Hand Preference ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Opposing Effects ◽  
Lock In

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.

scholarly journals Scanner Data: New Opportunities for Demand and Competitive Strategy Analysis

1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Scanner Data ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Price Response ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Sufficient Detail ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition ◽  
Reaction Equations

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.

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