Tacit Collusion of Partial Cross Ownership Under Cournot Model

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Gong
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Cross Ownership

scholarly journals Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gilo ◽  
Yossi Moshe ◽  
Yossi Spiegel
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Cross Ownership

On the Equilibrium Uniqueness in Cournot Competition with Demand Uncertainty

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanos Leonardos ◽  
Costis Melolidakis
Keyword(s):  
Failure Rate ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Cournot Competition ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Equilibrium Uniqueness ◽  
Residual Demand ◽  
Uniqueness Of Equilibrium ◽  
Additional Assumptions

AbstractWe revisit the linear Cournot model with uncertain demand that is studied in Lagerlöf (2006. “Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 6, no. 1. (Topics), Article 19: 1–6.) and provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium uniqueness that complement the existing results. We show that if the distribution of the demand intercept has the decreasing mean residual demand (DMRD) or the increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) property, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. The DMRD condition implies log-concavity of the expected profits per unit of output without additional assumptions on the existence or the shape of the density of the demand intercept and, hence, answers in the affirmative the conjecture of Lagerlöf (2006. “Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 6, no. 1. (Topics), Article 19: 1–6.) that such conditions may not be necessary.

scholarly journals A Full Description of ω-Limit Sets of Cournot Maps Having Non-Empty Interior and Some Economic Applications

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 452
Author(s):  
Antonio Linero-Bas ◽  
María Muñoz-Guillermo
Keyword(s):  
Economic Models ◽  
Full Description ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Empty Interior ◽  
Limit Sets ◽  
Economic Applications

Given a continuous Cournot map F(x,y)=(f2(y),f1(x)) defined from I2=[0,1]×[0,1] into itself, we give a full description of its ω-limit sets with non-empty interior. Additionally, we present some partial results for the empty interior case. The distribution of the ω-limits with non-empty interior gives information about the dynamics and the possible outputs of each firm in a Cournot model. We present some economic models to illustrate, with examples, the type of ω-limits that appear.

scholarly journals Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Roig
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Hand Preference ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Opposing Effects ◽  
Lock In

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document