Benchmarking of Pay Components in CEO Compensation Design

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaniv Grinstein ◽  
Beni Lauterbach ◽  
Revital Yosef
2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. S. Miller ◽  
R. M. Wiseman ◽  
L. R. Gomez-Mejia

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 810-826
Author(s):  
Bill Francis ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan ◽  
Yun Zhu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500 firms and 1,563 distinct CEO-directors. The authors use ordinary least squared method with firm and year fixed effect in most of the analysis. Findings With both annual and excess compensation, the authors find strong evidence that CEO-directors’ compensation is related to the compensation of the CEO. Causally, when CEO-director overturns his/her excess compensation from negative to positive, the CEO is more likely to have similar upward change in the following year, while more interestingly, the opposite does not hold. These findings are persistent over time and remain robust to various additional tests. Research limitations/implications Due to the data availability, this paper investigates the S&P 1500 public firms. Originality/value It is the first work that investigates the link between board members’ external compensation and the CEO’s compensation. This sheds new light on the process of the CEO’s compensation design, in regard to both the information being utilized in the design procedure and the CEO’s influence on his/her own compensation. Second, this paper adds additional evidence to the choice of peer groups in compensation construction. Third, the authors enhance the understanding of the role of CEO-directors. The authors show that CEO-directors may be the ally of CEO, and help in justifying CEO’s compensation, especially when underpaid.


2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ellen Carter ◽  
Luann J. Lynch ◽  
I˙rem Tuna

We examine the role of accounting in CEO equity compensation design. For a sample of ExecuComp firms in 1995–2001, we find that financial reporting concerns are positively related to stock option use and total compensation, and negatively related to the use of restricted stock. We confirm our findings by examining changes in CEO compensation in firms that begin expensing options in 2002 or 2003. We find that these firms reduce their option use and increase their restricted stock use after starting to expense options but exhibit no decrease in total compensation. Taken together, our analyses suggest that favorable accounting treatment for options led to a higher use of options and lower use of restricted stock than would have been the case absent accounting considerations.


2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice S. Miller ◽  
Robert M. Wiseman ◽  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia

2010 ◽  
Vol E93-C (3) ◽  
pp. 253-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xianmin CHEN ◽  
Peilin LIU ◽  
Dajiang ZHOU ◽  
Jiayi ZHU ◽  
Xingguang PAN ◽  
...  

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