The Effect of Compensation Design and Corporate Governance on the Transparency of CEO Compensation Disclosures

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff J. Coulton ◽  
Clayton James ◽  
Stephen L. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Design

scholarly journals Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ruonan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Compensation Committees

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

scholarly journals TATA KELOLA, KOMPENSASI CEO, KARAKTERISTIK CEO, ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES DAN TAX AGGRESSIVENESS

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Ririn Juliawaty ◽  
Christina Dwi Astuti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Positive Effect

<p><em>The purpose of this research is</em><em> </em><em>to examine the effect of corporate governance, CEO characteristic, CEO compensation, and accounting irregularities on tax aggressiveness. The dependent variable in this research is tax aggressiveness, while the independent variable in this research are corporate governance, characteristic CEO and CEO compensation</em><em>.</em></p><p><em>This study used secondary data with entire population manufacture companies listed at the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for 2015 -2017. The research sample are consists of 37 companies. The sampling method used to determine the sample is purposive sampling. The analysis model used in this research is multiple regression of panel data.</em><em></em></p><p><em>Based on analytical results concluded that independent director have a significant and negative effect on tax aggressiveness while accounting irregularities has a significant and positive effect on tax aggressiveness. The board size, CEO compensation, age, and CEO tenure have no significant effect on tax aggressiveness. </em></p>

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Young Sang Kim ◽  
Wallace N. Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Shareholder Rights

scholarly journals A Literature Review of the Perspectives of CEO Pay: An Analysis of Issues and Controversies

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Faitira Manuere ◽  
Precious Hove
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
The Core ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Conceptual Background

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on various theories that are used in organisations today to determine executive compensation. This paper analyses the relevance of the theories that are used to determine CEO compensation in modern corporations. The paper makes an attempt to review extensively the literature on CEO compensation. This paper looks at the concerns of sixteen theories of executive compensation. This paper further analyses the special features that are associated with CEO pay. These features help us to understand the problems that experts on executive pay experience when they try to define the exact CEO pay when compared to other rewards that are non financial. The drivers of executive pay are quantified and qualified in order to provide the conceptual background needed to understand the core factors that determine executive pay. Therefore the role of institutional investors in driving managerial salary is explored in detail. Finally, the effects of firm size and good corporate governance on executive pay are carefully analysed.

CEO compensation, IOS and the role of corporate governance

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fathi Elloumi ◽  
Jean‐Pierre Gueyié
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation

scholarly journals Theory And Practice In CEO Pay: A Course Module And Integrative Case Based On Boeing Inc.

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-260
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Business Students ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Capstone Course ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Case Based

Business students may dream of receiving pay packages like that of Michael Eisner at Disney. However, many of them will work for the compensation consultant who determines the economics of the pay arrangements, for the valuation consultant who values the different components of the pay arrangements, for the accountant who must audit the financial statement impacts of the pay arrangements, or as a manager in the company whose employees respond to the incentives provided by the pay arrangements. No matter their eventual role, it is critical that every student understands these various aspects of executive pay arrangements, and how these practices have evolved over time. The course module presented herein is designed to effectively integrate these perspectives in as few as five or as many as nine 80-minute sessions that could be a substantive component of an MBA or Master of Accounting capstone course, or a component of a corporate governance elective. A case based on the CEO compensation of Boeing Inc. over the last 60 years provides a series of assignments that effectively integrate the module.

Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation in China

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver M. Rui ◽  
Michael Firth ◽  
Peter M.Y. Fung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation

The impact of corporate governance on the relationship between earnings management and CEO compensation

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oheneba Assenso-Okofo ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Kamran Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe study examines whether corporate governance moderates the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses 1,800 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010 and employ multiple regression analyses and other sensitivity tests.FindingsThe study finds a positive relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. The study’s results also suggest that CEO bonus compensation increases in relation to earnings management and therefore the study infers that managers may become involved in earnings management to increase their compensation. However, the study finds that the relationship is moderated by a strong corporate governance system which reduces the impact of earnings management on CEO compensation.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is conducted in a specific context, and therefore it may be subject to a set of limitations. The study emphasises exclusively on whether executives manage earnings to increase their compensation. The study does not consider the issue of several other and potentially contradictory motivations here.Practical implicationsThe study’s findings highlight potential implications and offer useful propositions for stakeholders, particularly accounting and corporate governance regulators, to consider. The findings offer a basis for the accounting professions to further discuss and improve accounting standards to provide adequate regulations and monitoring to decrease managerial opportunistic behaviours in earnings manipulations. The findings also emphasise the need for appropriately designed CEO compensation packages in such a manner that improves the manager–shareholder alignment and reduces the information asymmetry problem. The results signify that corporate governance plays a vital role in mitigating the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management.Originality/valueThis study adds to the existing literature by documenting empirical support on the link between earnings management and CEO compensation against a backdrop of high demand for strong corporate governance practices.

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