Legal Doctrine and Judicial Review of Eminent Domain in China

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenzheng Mao ◽  
Shitong Qiao
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Wenzheng Mao ◽  
Shitong Qiao

Which of the three legal doctrines of public use, just compensation, and due process is the most effective in constraining abuses of eminent domain power? This article addresses this question for the first time and presents the first-ever systematic investigation of the judicial review of eminent domain in China. Our empirical study reveals that Chinese courts focus on eminent domain procedures while rarely supporting claims based on public interest or just compensation. Procedural rules are determinate and therefore easier to enforce than substantial standards of public interest and just compensation. Chinese courts also choose to focus on eminent domain procedures to confine their own judicial review power for the purpose of self-preservation in an authoritarian state that empowers the courts to monitor and control local governments but does not want them to become too powerful. The study calls for a “due process revolution” in eminent domain law and introduces the “judicial politics of legal doctrine” approach to the study of Chinese law, an approach that takes both political institutions and legal doctrines seriously.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-134
Author(s):  
Andrzej Bator

The paper analyses the sources of diversity in opinions about the acceptability of direct application of constitution by courts in the so-called confrontational version (a judicial review: the refusal of application of the parliamentary act which is incoherent with a constitution). I claim that such differences result from diverging assumptions accepted within analytic jurisprudence. More precisely speaking, the above differences stem from the three alternative approaches within analytic legal theory: a traditional, a modern, and a postmodern (postanalytic) one. Polish legal thought is dominated by the modern approach, what influence also a debate on the direct applicability of constitution. The modern approach hardly accepts a situation in which a legal professional (a judge) needs to face new social and political challenges. The more adequate in this respect seems to be the postanalytic approach. Thus, arguments which refuse the judge’s right to directly and autonomously apply the constitution against the parliamentary law (which are put forth by some representatives of both legal doctrine and judiciary), are based mainly upon the modern version of the analytic legal theory. Alternatively, the postanalytic perspective offers theoretical foundations for the acceptability of direct and autonomous judicial application of the constitution. As for the traditional version of analytic theory, it possesses some explanatory force towards Polish political practice of the day. Since it supports claims which question any form of judicial activism. This approach seems to undermine any reasons for the existence of independent constitutional judiciary, the direct application of constitution byordinary courts included.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Böhle

The book examines the legal relationships in international loan syndicates based on the model contracts developed by the Loan Market Association (LMA). German law qualifies loan syndicates as partnerships. This qualification is questioned as it conforms neither to the expectations nor to the needs of the parties involved. With a constant comparative law approach (primarily England and France), the work brings together legal doctrine, legal theory and economics in order to develop practical solutions with regard to syndicate voting and duties of information in an LMA loan syndicate as well as the interpretation and judicial review of an LMA syndicate agreement.


2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Elliott ◽  
Robert Thomas

AbstractThe tribunals system in England and Wales has been transformed by the entry into force of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007; among other things, tribunals are now located more firmly and explicitly than ever before within the judicial branch. Questions concerning the relationship between tribunals and regular courts fall to be confronted afresh within this new institutional landscape. Those questions form the focus of this article, which is particularly concerned with the issue recently considered by the Supreme Court in Cart whether, and if so to what extent, decisions taken within the tribunals system (by the Upper Tribunal) should be susceptible to judicial review by the High Court. In Cart, emphasis was placed upon the concept of “proportionate dispute resolution” as a means by which to delimit regular courts' oversight of tribunals' decisions, raising fundamental questions both of legal doctrine (relating to the relevance of the orthodox doctrinal tools of administrative law) and legal policy (concerning the degree of error on the part of a tribunal that a higher court should tolerate in the interests of the efficient, or proportionate, use of judicial resources).


Author(s):  
Douglas E. Edlin

“JUDICIAL REVIEW”[1] SEM UMA CONSTITUIÇÃO ESCRITA* JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION Douglas E. Edlin**RESUMO: Nos Estados Unidos, o “judicial review” é entendido, desde Marbury v. Madison (1803), como a avaliação judicial de atos governamentais para assegurar a compatibilidade com a Constituição. Mas antes e depois do caso Marbury, cortes estaduais e federais desenvolveram e praticaram uma espécie de “judicial review” no qual os princípios do “Common Law”, conjuntamente ou ao invés de um cânon documental, onde se utiliza o corpo fundamental da doutrina jurídica para avaliar as ações públicas. Este artigo corrige alguns erros de concepção pelos quais a forma de “judicial review” utilizada no caso Marbury [controle de constitucionalidade] seria a única forma de “judicial review” que existiu ou possa existir neste país. Mais particularmente, o artigo esclarece uma falha de certos escritores em distinguir corretamente o “Common Law” e o direito natural como áreas da teoria e da doutrina do direito. Ao corrigir alguns destes erros históricos e teóricos, o artigo delineia uma compreensão do “judicial review” que descreve mais ampla e corretamente o seu desenvolvimento durante o período formativo do pensamento constitucional norte-americano. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Judicial Review. Common Law. Direito Natural. Marbury. Constituição. ABSTRACT: In the United States, judicial review is understood, since Marbury v. Madison (1803), as judicial evaluation of government action to ensure compliance with the Constitution. But before and after Marbury, state and federal courts developed and practiced a form of judicial review in which common law principles, along with or instead of a canonical document, were the foundational body of legal doctrine against which public actions were assessed. This article carefully examines the cases in which this alternative form of judicial review emerged, and corrects certain misconceptions that Marbury must be the only form of judicial review that has existed or can exist in this country. More particularly, the article clarifies a failure by certain writers to distinguish properly between common law and natural law as matters of legal theory and legal doctrine. In correcting some of these theoretical and historical errors, the article outlines an understanding of judicial review that more fully captures its development during the formative period of American constitutional thought. KEYWORDS: Judicial Review. Common Law. Natural Law. Marbury. Constitution. SUMÁRIO: Introdução. 1. Os Precedentes das Cortes Estaduais. 2. Os Casos da Suprema Corte. 2.1 O Caso Calder v. Bull. 2.2. O Caso Chisholm v. Geórgia. 2.3. O Caso Fletcher v. Peck. Conclusão. Referências.[1] N. do T. A expressão “judicial review” é normalmente traduzida por controle de constitucionalidade, mas neste artigo o autor analisa o controle de atos legislativos com base em parâmetros que não coincidem, necessariamente, com a Constituição escrita, de modo que preferimos manter o termo no original.* O tradutor para a língua portuguesa, Romulo Ponticelli Giorgi Júnior, é mestre e doutorando em Direito Constitucional pela UFRGS, Procurador da Fazenda Nacional e Professor de Direito Constitucional na Faculdade São Judas Tadeu. Foi Procurador do Município de Porto Alegre, Procurador do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul e Advogado da União.** Professor Assistente do Departamento de Ciência Política da Faculdade Dickinson. O autor agradece a Ken Kersch, a Dick Morgan, a Jim Murphy e a Sylvia Snowiss, assim como aos revisores anônimos que providenciaram várias sugestões muito úteis, por ter lido as versões prévias deste artigo e por terem corrigido erros nas idéias e na expressão destas. O autor assume a responsabilidade pelos erros que permaneceram.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Hettinger

This thesis analyses the unconventional monetary policy measures taken by the ECB during the eurozone crisis, with a focus on the form of the action chosen. Using tools such as analysing both European composite administration (Verwaltungsverbund) and institutional rational choice, it considers the peculiarities of the operation of monetary policy in general and the administrative organisation of the European System of Central Banks. The thesis aims to clarify the extent to which these measures are amenable to judicial review by European courts. To this end, the author assesses legal doctrine and the case law of the ECJ and other European Courts. It examines new decisions by European courts during the crisis in terms of whether they exhaust the existing possibilities of judicial review or whether they open up new avenues. This is contextualised against the background of the evolving role of the ECB within the European Monetary Union going forward.


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