From Apology to Functionalism: A Retrospective Look at the Military Campaign against the Self-Declared Islamic State

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tal Mimran
2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-391
Author(s):  
Tal Mimran

This article discusses the military campaign against the ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh) in an attempt to illustrate the gaps in the international legal framework that regulates the use of force in dealing with a challenge such as that presented by the Islamic State. This case study was demanding given the need to reconcile state-centred rules with a diverse reality which includes several players, and particularly non-state armed groups in control of territory and population. In order to deal with this issue, the article proposes the invocation of a functional approach, compared with a binary approach, which is suitable in cases where several players exercise power in the same territory. In particular, it suggests that the Islamic State could have been treated functionally as a state for the purposes of self-defence or collective security measures, rather than invoking legal doctrines of unclear status that might result in undermining the international legal system they are invoked to protect.


Bluster ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 93-112
Author(s):  
Peter R. Neumann

This chapter shows that, despite Trump's claims to the contrary, he did not entirely defeat Islamic State, and it was not him or -- rather -- him alone who had achieved the military successes against the group. The campaign consisted of three distinct phases. After some hesitation, Obama made defeating Islamic State a priority, created a plan and structure, and executed a significant part of the military campaign. Trump's "generals" continued implementing this strategy, albeit with the new "rules of engagement" that involved greater risks in return for faster, more decisive operations. Trump's personal involvement was limited to the last phase, in which he declared victory over Islamic State and announced a pull-out of American forces from Syria. In doing so, he contradicted his own administration's policy, alienated allies, strengthened America's adversaries, and emboldened the nearly defeated Islamic State.


Subject Saudi-Turkish relations. Significance After ties soured in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Saudi and Turkish leaderships are managing bilateral relations better in order to combat rising regional challenges. These include a potential agreement on Iran's nuclear programme, the expansion of the Islamic State group (ISG) and the stalemate in the Syrian rebel campaign to unseat President Bashar al-Assad. In particular, relations have improved at the leadership level, with the death of Saudi King Abdallah enabling a symbolic turning of a new page in the kingdom's foreign policy and a toning down in the kingdom's hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Impacts Saudi support for the Sisi regime could revive tensions with Turkey, particularly if Egypt intensifies its anti-Islamist crackdown further. Despite common concerns over ISG, both Turkey and Riyadh will limit their involvement in the military campaign owing to domestic concerns. The kingdom's change in tone towards the Brotherhood could strengthen its regional position by improving ties with key Islamist groups. Improved diplomacy could boost already strong trade ties.


Subject Yemen conflict risk. Significance The Huthi movement is preparing a military campaign to oust President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi from his seat in Aden. As part of this campaign it took control of Ta'izz on March 22. As the Huthis advance deeper into Sunni majority areas, the risk of sectarian conflict is rising. On March 20, the Islamic State group (ISG) claimed the bombings of Zaydi Shia mosques in Sana'a and Sa'ada which killed 143 people. If the claim is authentic, this would be the first known attack by the group on Yemeni soil. Impacts The Huthis' tactical alliance with Saleh will break down eventually, leading to conflict. The military is splitting, and could turn against Huthi control. Huthis may seek to close down Aden airport while increase in foreign arms supplies to local actors will raise risks for civil aviation. Hadi could defeat the Huthi campaign if he organises anti-Huthi forces effectively. A power struggle will weaken government efforts to fight al-Qaida, while sectarian conflict would benefit the ISG.


Author(s):  
Boris G. Koybaev

Central Asia in recent history is a vast region with five Muslim States-new actors in modern international relations. The countries of Central Asia, having become sovereign States, at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries are trying to peaceful interaction not only with their underdeveloped neighbors, but also with the far-off prosperous West. At the same time, the United States and Western European countries, in their centrosilic ambitions, seek to increase their military and political presence in Central Asia and use the military bases of the region’s States as a springboard for supplying their troops during anti-terrorist and other operations. With the active support of the West, the Central Asian States were accepted as members of the United Nations. For monitoring and exerting diplomatic influence on the regional environment, the administration of the President of the Russian Federation H. W. Bush established U.S. embassies in all Central Asian States. Turkey, a NATO member and secular Islamic state, was used as a lever of indirect Western influence over Central Asian governments, and its model of successful development was presented as an example to follow.


Sociology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 898-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Frisk

The article challenges the thesis that western societies have moved towards a post-heroic mood in which military casualties are interpreted as nothing but a waste of life. Using content analysis and qualitative textual analysis of obituaries produced by the Royal Danish Army in memory of soldiers killed during the Second World War (1940–1945) and the military campaign in Afghanistan (2002–2014), the article shows that a ‘good’ military death is no longer conceived of as a patriotic sacrifice, but is instead legitimised by an appeal to the unique moral worth, humanitarian goals and high professionalism of the fallen. The article concludes that fatalities in international military engagement have invoked a sense of post-patriotic heroism instead of a post-heroic crisis, and argues that the social order of modern society has underpinned, rather than undermined, ideals of military self-sacrifice and heroism, contrary to the predominant assumption of the literature on post-heroic warfare.


1998 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quentin Gausset

Traditional accounts of the nineteenth-century Fulbe conquest in northern Cameroon tell roughly the same story: following the example of Usman Dan Fodio in Nigeria, the Fulbe of Cameroon organized in the beginning of the nineteenth century a “jihad” or a “holy war” against the local pagan populations to convert them to Islam and create an Islamic state. The divisions among the local populations and the military superiority of the Fulbe allowed them to conquer almost all northern Cameroon. They forced those who submitted to give an annual tribute of goods and servants, and they raided the other groups. In these traditional accounts the Fulbe are presented as unchallenged masters, while the local populations are depicted as slaves who were powerless over their fate; their role in the conquest of the region and in the administration of the new political order is supposed to have been insignificant.I will show that, on the contrary, in the area of Banyo the Wawa and Bute played a crucial role in the conquest of the sultanate and in its administration. I will then re-examine the cliche that all members of the local populations were the slaves of the Fulbe by distinguishing the fate of the Wawa and Bute on one side from that of the Kwanja and Mambila on the other, and by showing the importance of the Fulbe's identity in shaping the definition of slavery. Finally I will argue that, if the historical accounts found in the scientific literature invariably insist on Fulbe hegemony and minimize the role played by the local populations, it is because those accounts are often based on Fulbe traditions, and because these traditions are remodeled by the Fulbe in order to correspond to their discourse on identity.


Significance The deployment of the UK troops comes at a time when jihadists attacks are intensifying across the Sahel amid an escalating internecine conflict between the al-Qaida-affiliated Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Impacts Mali’s coup is likely to distract the military leadership away from its core mandate to improve national security. The G5 Sahel Joint Force may continue to struggle to curb jihadist cross-border operations. The deployment of UK troops underscores the still strong commitment of Western governments to improving the security situation in the Sahel.


Epohi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Momchil Mladenov ◽  
◽  
◽  

The current publications present information about the history of church union negotiations in the second half of the 13th century. The mane goal of emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus is to stop the military campaign against Byzantium. At the Second Council of Lyons (6 July 1274) was declared a union between Catholics and Orthodox. This is the most significant opportunity for the unity of Christendom. But the union also became an occasion for final division. Then any attempt at rapprochement is doomed to failure.


2018 ◽  
pp. 115-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fanar Haddad

Both Shia-centric state building and Sunni rejection of the post-2003 order are the result of cumulative processes that have unfolded over the course of the twentieth century. These developments ranged from the homogenizing nation building propagated by successive Iraqi regimes to the rise of a sect-centric Shia opposition in exile. The sectarianization of Iraq was not inevitable, but regime change in 2003 accelerated the empowerment of new and preexisting sect-centric actors. The necessary will, vision, and political skill to avert the sectarianization of Iraq were absent among Iraqi and U.S. decisionmakers at the time. The failure of the occupation forces and the new political classes to construct a functioning state that could deliver basic services exacerbated the problem. Sunni opponents of the post-2003 order became as sect-centric as the system they once derided for its Shia-centricity. Sectarianization will continue to define Iraqi politics. The spread of the self-proclaimed Islamic State across much of Iraq in 2014 represents the most extreme form of Sunni rejection,while the state-sanctioned Hashd al-Shaabi, the term given to the mass mobilization of volunteers to repel the Islamic State, embodies the most serious defense of Shia-centric state building as of late 2015.


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