scholarly journals Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryo Kato ◽  
Takayuki Tsuruga
Author(s):  
Nunzia Carbonara

Agglomeration economies are positive externalities associated with the co-location of firms within a bounded geographic area. Traditionally, these agglomerative advantages have been expressed in terms of pecuniary externalities and they have been identified as one of the key sources of geographical cluster (GC) competitive advantage. However, in the last years the basics of competition are changed and the ability of firms to create new knowledge is more crucial for success rather than the efficiency in production. This has shifted the attention of scholars on the role of knowledge and learning in GCs. In line with these studies, this chapter suggests that agglomeration economies are related to both pecuniary externalities and knowledge-based externalities. The latter are benefits that co-located firms can gain in terms of development of knowledge. To investigate whether knowledge-based externalities affect geographical clustering of firms, an agent-based model is developed. By using this model, a simulation analysis is carried out.


Author(s):  
Nunzia Carbonara

According to the economic geography literature, firms tend to geographically cluster when agglomeration economies exist. These are positive externalities associated with the co-location of firms within a bounded geographic area. Traditionally, the agglomerative advantages have been expressed in terms of pecuniary externalities and they have been identified as one of the key sources of the geographical clusters' competitive advantage. However, in the last years the basics of competition are changed and the ability of firms to create new knowledge is more crucial for success rather than the efficiency in production. This has shifted the attention of scholars on the role of knowledge and learning for the competitiveness and success of geographical clusters. In line with these studies, the chapter suggests that agglomeration economies are related to both pecuniary externalities and knowledge-based externalities. The latter are benefits that co-located firms can gain in terms of development of knowledge. To investigate whether knowledge-based externalities affect geographical clustering of firms, an agent-based model is developed. By using this model, a simulation analysis is carried out.


2009 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Jacques Laffont

Abstract This historical note describes from Sidgwick on the evolution of the concepts related to the interdependencies of economic agents outside markets. In a first section, we show how the concept of externality introduced by some precursors had later to reemerge from the confuse discussion of "empty boxes". The second sector clarifies the distinction between two avenues of research, the first one associated with pecuniary externalities, the other one associated with technological externalities. Coase's criticisms of Pigouvian policy are developed in section 3. In a last section we gather the main results obtained recently by economic theory in this field. In particular we discuss the difficulties of the creation of artificial markets, the second best approaches often needed in a Pigouvian policy, results of game theory in models with externalities, planning with externalities.


Author(s):  
Yongsung Chang ◽  
Yena Park

Abstract We derive a fully nonlinear optimal income tax schedule in the presence of private insurance. We fill the gap in the literature by studying the optimal tax formula with a comprehensive structure of the private markets—including incomplete markets models— both theoretically and quantitatively. As in the standard taxation literature without private insurance (e.g., Saez (2001)), the optimal tax formula can still be expressed in terms of standard sufficient statistics. With private insurance, however, the formula involves additional terms that reflect how the private market interacts with public insurance. For example, the optimal tax formula should also consider asset distribution and pecuniary externalities as well as the welfare effects of borrowing constraints.


Kyklos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwight R. Lee ◽  
Robert D. Tollison

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