Optimal Information Design of Online Marketplaces

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas von Wangenheim
Keyword(s):  
Information Design ◽  
Online Marketplaces ◽  
Optimal Information

scholarly journals Information Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ina Taneva
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Signal Distribution ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Optimal Information

A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Information and Communication in Organizations

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 545-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Deimen ◽  
DezsÖ Szalay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Communication In Organizations ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Optimal Information

We study a constrained information design problem in an organization. A designer chooses the information structure. A sender with preferences different from the decision-maker observes and processes the information before he communicates with the decision-maker. Information shapes conflicts within the organization: the optimal information structure essentially eliminates conflicts and serves as a substitute to the allocation of decision-making authority in the organization.

scholarly journals Optimal Information Design for Search Goods

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 550-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Choi ◽  
Kyungmin Kim ◽  
Marilyn Pease
Keyword(s):  
Information Design ◽  
Elastic Demand ◽  
True Value ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Optimal Information

We consider a monopoly pricing problem in which a consumer with an uncertain valuation of a search good receives a signal of value before deciding whether to visit the seller. She discovers her true value upon visiting and before purchase. We characterize the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals in such an environment and deliver two main insights. First, both the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals generate a unit-elastic demand. Second, the two signals coincide if and only if visitation costs are sufficiently small.

Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emir Kamenica
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Information Design ◽  
The State ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Job Outcomes ◽  
Noisy Information ◽  
Data Generating Process ◽  
Optimal Information

A school may improve its students’ job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A social planner might raise everyone's welfare by providing only partial information about solvency of banks. All of this can happen even when everyone is fully rational and understands the data-generating process. Each of these examples raises questions of what is the (socially or privately) optimal information that should be revealed. In this article, I review the literature that answers such questions.

Scenarios and Information Design

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary L Rice-Lively ◽  
Hsin-Liang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Information Design
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