scholarly journals Information Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ina Taneva
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Signal Distribution ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Optimal Information

A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Information and Communication in Organizations

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 545-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Deimen ◽  
DezsÖ Szalay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Communication In Organizations ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Optimal Information

We study a constrained information design problem in an organization. A designer chooses the information structure. A sender with preferences different from the decision-maker observes and processes the information before he communicates with the decision-maker. Information shapes conflicts within the organization: the optimal information structure essentially eliminates conflicts and serves as a substitute to the allocation of decision-making authority in the organization.

Information Design and Strategic Communication

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-66
Author(s):  
Daniel Krähmer
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Private Knowledge

I study sender-receiver games where the receiver can disclose information to the sender by designing an information structure. I show that by secretly randomizing over information structures, the receiver can virtually attain her complete information payoff even for large conflicts of interest. The key insight is that private knowledge of the information structure induces truthful communication because it allows the receiver to cross-check the consistency of the sender’s report. (JEL C72, D82, D83)

Optimal information structure in a simple economic system

1979 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-29
Author(s):  
Bernardo Nicoletti ◽  
Luigi Mariani ◽  
Ferdinando Pezzella
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Simple Economic

scholarly journals Optimal Information Design for Search Goods

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 550-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Choi ◽  
Kyungmin Kim ◽  
Marilyn Pease
Keyword(s):  
Information Design ◽  
Elastic Demand ◽  
True Value ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Optimal Information

We consider a monopoly pricing problem in which a consumer with an uncertain valuation of a search good receives a signal of value before deciding whether to visit the seller. She discovers her true value upon visiting and before purchase. We characterize the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals in such an environment and deliver two main insights. First, both the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals generate a unit-elastic demand. Second, the two signals coincide if and only if visitation costs are sufficiently small.

scholarly journals Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 1313-1360
Author(s):  
Benjamin Brooks ◽  
Songzi Du
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Single Unit ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Joint Mechanism

A profit‐maximizing seller has a single unit of a good to sell. The bidders have a pure common value that is drawn from a distribution that is commonly known. The seller does not know the bidders' beliefs about the value and thinks that beliefs are designed adversarially by Nature to minimize profit. We construct a strong maxmin solution to this joint mechanism design and information design problem, consisting of a mechanism, an information structure, and an equilibrium, such that neither the seller nor Nature can move profit in their respective preferred directions, even if the deviator can select the new equilibrium. The mechanism and information structure solve a family of maxmin mechanism design and minmax information design problems, regardless of how an equilibrium is selected. The maxmin mechanism takes the form of a proportional auction: each bidder submits a one‐dimensional bid, the aggregate allocation and aggregate payment depend on the aggregate bid, and individual allocations and payments are proportional to bids. We report a number of additional properties of the maxmin mechanisms, including what happens as the number of bidders grows large and robustness with respect to the prior over the value.

scholarly journals THE OBJECTIVE OF CONSTRUCTING THE OPTIMAL INFORMATION STRUCTURE HIERARCHIC STRUCTURE SYSTEMS

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 355-360
Author(s):  
K.S. Imanbaev ◽  
◽  
S.D. Zhanuzakov ◽  
Zh.Zh. Kozhamkulova ◽  
A.S. Zhanuzakov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Sequential Analysis ◽  
External Factors ◽  
System Structure ◽  
Main Attention ◽  
Hierarchic Structure ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Subsequent Selection ◽  
Selection Of

This paper presents the results of an analysis of the structures of an information system of a hierarchical structure using algebraic methods, emphasizing its functioning as a result of the interaction of external factors. An assessment of the structure bonds is obtained using a matrix apparatus. The main attention in this paper is paid to methods of structure analysis with unknown principles and algorithms for the functioning of systems. The proposed approach to the analysis of the structure of systems is based on the principle of a sequential analysis of acceptable options for constructing individual elements, parts and systems as a whole with the subsequent selection of the best option for its implementation and development on an acceptable set of system structure. This paper presents the results of an analysis of the structures of an information system by the methods of algebra, emphasizing its functioning as a result of the interaction of external factors.

scholarly journals Information Design: A Unified Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Uncertain Payoffs ◽  
Metaphorical Interpretation

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)

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