Who Consumes the Credit Union Tax Subsidy?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert DeYoung ◽  
John Goddard ◽  
Donal G. McKillop ◽  
John O. S. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Credit Union ◽  
Tax Subsidy

Financial Assessment of A Credit Union In West Timor, Indonesia

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-208
Author(s):  
Paskalis Seran ◽  
◽  
Corazon Anzano ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Credit Union ◽  
Financial Assessment ◽  
West Timor

Implicit Taxes Amid Race to the Bottom in a Global Tax Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn
Keyword(s):  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Tax Returns ◽  
Tax Hypothesis

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation

THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS, COMPENSATION COMPLIANCE, AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ON THE TENDENCY OF ACCOUNTING FRAUD (A CASE STUDY ON SEHATI CREDIT UNION)

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Amalia Nurul Hidayah ◽  
Misdiyono
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Credit Union ◽  
Accounting Fraud ◽  
Internal Control System ◽  
System Compensation ◽  
System Effectiveness

A cooperative is a governmental organization established to enhance economic growth and national unity. As the development of the law on cooperatives, the present and developing institutions similar to Savings and Loan Union is called Credit Union. A cooperative is very vulnerable to the risk of loss. Insecurity is possible because of the tendency of accounting fraud. Some things that can affect the tendency of accounting fraud are internal control, compliance compensation, and information asymmetry. This research aims to determine whether there is any influence of internal control system effectiveness, compensation compliance, and information asymmetry on the tendency of accounting fraud. The research uses the quantitative method, and the research subject is Sehati Credit Union. The research data consist of primary and secondary data, especially the purposive sampling data which are collected from 36 respondents. Whereas, the data analysis technique uses multiple regression analysis using SPSS 21 software for Windows. The research concludes that the effectiveness of internal control system has a partially positive significant influence on the tendency of accounting fraud, compensation compliance has a partially negative significant influence on the tendency of accounting fraud, and information asymmetry has a partially positive significant influence on the tendency of accounting fraud. It means that the effectiveness of the internal control system, compensation compliance, and the information asymmetry have significant influences on the tendency of accounting fraud. Keywords: Internal Control System, Compensation Compliance, Information Asymmetry, Accounting Fraud.

Dealing with Country Diversity: Challenges for the IMF Credit Union Model

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregor Irwin ◽  
Adrian Penalver ◽  
Chris Salmon ◽  
Ashley Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Credit Union ◽  
Union Model ◽  
The Imf

scholarly journals Mechanism Design for Demand Management in Energy Communities

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Xupeng Wei ◽  
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Demand Management ◽  
Management Problem ◽  
Energy Company ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Allocation Function ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Energy Community ◽  
Message Space

We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of energy as well as a separate price for peak demand. Since users’ utilities are their private information, which they may not be willing to share, a mediator, known as the planner, is introduced to help optimize the overall satisfaction of the community (total utility minus total payments) by mechanism design. A mechanism consists of a message space, a tax/subsidy, and an allocation function for each user. Each user reports a message chosen from her own message space, then receives some amount of energy determined by the allocation function, and pays the tax specified by the tax function. A desirable mechanism induces a game, the Nash equilibria (NE), of which results in an allocation that coincides with the optimal allocation for the community. As a starting point, we design a mechanism for the energy community with desirable properties such as full implementation, strong budget balance and individual rationality for both users and the planner. We then modify this baseline mechanism for communities where message exchanges are allowed only within neighborhoods, and consequently, the tax/subsidy and allocation functions of each user are only determined by the messages from their neighbors. All of the desirable properties of the baseline mechanism are preserved in the distributed mechanism. Finally, we present a learning algorithm for the baseline mechanism, based on projected gradient descent, that is guaranteed to converge to the NE of the induced game.

scholarly journals The Effect of Bundling Trade Association Monitoring and Female Board Representation on Loan Losses in Community Credit Unions

2021 ◽  
pp. 089976402110014
Author(s):  
Anne Marie Ward ◽  
John Forker ◽  
Barry Reilly
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Credit Unions ◽  
Credit Union ◽  
Trade Association ◽  
Complementary Effect ◽  
Nuanced Understanding ◽  
Board Representation ◽  
Loan Losses ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Different Levels

Loan book management is important to community credit union survival, particularly in deprived localities. Consistent with agency theory, prior studies of credit unions report an association among individual monitoring mechanisms, trade association monitoring, and female board representation, respectively, and reduced loan losses. This study provides a more nuanced understanding by investigating the moderating influence of these monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between loan losses and deprivation and by considering the effect of bundle combinations of different levels of the two monitoring mechanisms on loan losses. The results reveal that credit unions subject to trade association monitoring have the lowest loan losses. However, in the absence of trade association monitoring, female board representation has a moderating effect on loan losses as deprivation increases. Finally, trade association monitoring and female board representation have a substitutive, rather than a complementary effect on loan losses.

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