Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Belgium and the Netherlands Is There a Race to Attract Antitrust Damages Actions?

Resumen: El Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid, objeto de comentario en este trabajo, resuelve una declinatoria por falta de jurisdicción en un caso de reclamación de daños por un ilícito antitrust. El comportamiento anticompetitivo del que derivan los perjuicios, que ahora se reclaman, es el conocido como cártel de los camiones, que sancionó la Comisión Europea en el año 2016. Una de las víctimas de ilícito antitrust pide una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por el hecho de haber tenido que pagar un sobreprecio en la compra de uno o varios camiones objetos del acuerdo colusorio. El Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid rechaza la declinatoria por hallarse el domicilio de la demandada en territorio español.Palabras clave: aplicación privada del Derecho de la competencia, acciones follow on, cártel de los camiones, indemnización por daños derivados de un ilícito antitrust, foro del lugar del hecho ilícito, foro del lugar del daño.Abstract: The Decision of Commercial Court of Madrid, object of comment in this paper, resolves a declinatory for lack of jurisdiction in a case of claim of damages from European antitrust law infringement. The anticompetitive behavior from which the damages derive is known as the truck cartel, which was sanctioned by the European Commission in 2016. One of the victims of this behavior seeks compensation for the damages suffered by the fact of having to pay a surcharge in the purchase of one or more trucks that belong to scope of collusive agreement. The Commercial Court of Madrid rejects the declinatory because the defendant’s domicile is located in Spanish territory.Keywords: private enforcement of competition law, follow on actions, cartel of trucks, compensation for damages from European antitrust law infringement, forum of place in which the harmful event occurred, forum of place of damage.

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Disgorgement and Private Enforcement as Mitigating Circumstances for the Determination of Fines in Antitrust Law

Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe - ZEW Economic Studies ◽

10.1007/978-3-662-43975-3_7 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 105-119

Author(s):

Kai Hüschelrath ◽

Heike Schweitzer

Keyword(s):

Private Enforcement ◽

Antitrust Law ◽

Mitigating Circumstances

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Leniency in exchange for cartel confessions

European Journal of Criminology ◽

10.1177/1477370819874432 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 106-124 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

J.D. Jaspers

Keyword(s):

Law Enforcement ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Empirical Support ◽

Civil Liability ◽

Private Enforcement ◽

Legal Counsel ◽

Structured Interviews ◽

Detection Tool ◽

Theoretical Assumptions ◽

To Come

Leniency offers corporations the possibility to come clean about their involvement in cartel conduct (for example, price-fixing, bid-rigging) in exchange for immunity or reduction of financial penalties. In Europe, nearly 60 percent of detected cartels are discovered through leniency. This makes leniency the most applied detection tool for uncovering cartel conduct violations. What are the considerations in applying for leniency or refraining from doing so? How do those considerations relate to private law enforcement through civil liability regarding business cartels? These questions are discussed based on semi-structured interviews ( n = 34) with cartelists, competition lawyers and in-house legal counsel to study theoretical assumptions underpinning leniency arrangements in the Netherlands. This study investigates four scenarios on the use of leniency suggested in the literature and finds empirical support for only two. Strategic use of leniency and false confessions occur in the Netherlands, but to a lesser extent than the existing literature suggests. Moreover, various disincentives, and especially the rise of private enforcement, make leniency an unattractive and uncertain option for cartelists.

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