scholarly journals La responsabilidad extracontractual por ilícitos antitrust en Europa. Comentario del auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid, de 23 mayo 2018 = The non-contractual liability from European antitrust law infringements. Commentary ofdecision of Commercial Court of Madrid, of 23 may 2018

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliana Rodríguez Rodrigo
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Harmful Event

Resumen: El Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid, objeto de comentario en este trabajo, resuelve una declinatoria por falta de jurisdicción en un caso de reclamación de daños por un ilícito antitrust. El comportamiento anticompetitivo del que derivan los perjuicios, que ahora se reclaman, es el conocido como cártel de los camiones, que sancionó la Comisión Europea en el año 2016. Una de las víctimas de ilícito antitrust pide una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por el hecho de haber tenido que pagar un sobreprecio en la compra de uno o varios camiones objetos del acuerdo colusorio. El Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid rechaza la declinatoria por hallarse el domicilio de la demandada en territorio español.Palabras clave: aplicación privada del Derecho de la competencia, acciones follow on, cártel de los camiones, indemnización por daños derivados de un ilícito antitrust, foro del lugar del hecho ilícito, foro del lugar del daño.Abstract: The Decision of Commercial Court of Madrid, object of comment in this paper, resolves a declinatory for lack of jurisdiction in a case of claim of damages from European antitrust law infringement. The anticompetitive behavior from which the damages derive is known as the truck cartel, which was sanctioned by the European Commission in 2016. One of the victims of this behavior seeks compensation for the damages suffered by the fact of having to pay a surcharge in the purchase of one or more trucks that belong to scope of collusive agreement. The Commercial Court of Madrid rejects the declinatory because the defendant’s domicile is located in Spanish territory.Keywords: private enforcement of competition law, follow on actions, cartel of trucks, compensation for damages from European antitrust law infringement, forum of place in which the harmful event occurred, forum of place of damage.

Part I EU Competition Law Private Enforcement and the Antitrust Damages Directive, 1 Damages Actions in the Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Traditional Role ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sets the context for the EU’s Antitrust Damages Directive of 2014 in order to understand its significance and potential impact. It first provides a historical background to EU competition law before discussing its public enforcement, focusing on the traditional role of the European Commission in enforcing the EU competition law rules. It then considers developments in EU law private enforcement, citing the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and European Commission in seeking to promote and facilitate private enforcement, particularly damages actions. It also examines the experience of damages actions in the EU, the issue of collective redress, the US antitrust private enforcement context and experience, and EU private international law rules and their significance for raising damages actions across the Member States’ courts. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the development of competition law damages actions under EU law.

A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
German Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Injunctive Relief ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.

scholarly journals Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Approach ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts

scholarly journals Aplicabilidad de un acuerdo de elección de foro a una reclamación de indemnización de daños por vulneración del Artículo 102 TFUE: el caso Apple Sales International (C-595/17) = Applicability of a jurisdiction agreement to a claim of damages by infringement of Article 102 TFEU: the Apple Sales International case (C-595/17)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 439
Author(s):  
Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca ◽  
Julia Suderow
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Damage Claims ◽  
The Will ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

Resumen: La aplicación privada del derecho de la Competencia no se limita tan sólo a acciones de daños por infracciones del art. 101 TFUE, sino que también abarca las acciones follow on y stand alone contra los abusos de posición de dominio sancionados por el art. 102 TFUE. Se trata de acciones que tienen su origen en conductas unilaterales en las que las cláusulas de atribución de competencia juegan un papel esencial. El TJUE resuelve con la sentencia Ap-ple Sales ciertas dudas sobre el alcance de estas cláusulas si bien su respuesta genera nuevas cuestiones que podrán plantearse en futuros litigios. La voluntad de las partes y la proporcio-nalidad tendrán que seguir siendo los elementos sobre los que pivote la exclusividad del foro de sumisión expresa.Palabras clave: acciones para la indemnización de daños anticompetitivos, acciones autónomas, acciones de seguimiento, acuerdos de elección de foro, arbitraje, competencia judicial internacional, Daños, Derecho antitrust, Derecho europeo de la competencia, Unión Europea.Abstract: Private enforcement of Competition Law is not limited to cartel damage claims based on infringements of art. 101 TFUE. Follow on and Stand alone actions against the abuse of dominance sanctioned by art. 102 TFUE are also included. They are actions derived from unilateral conducts where jurisdiction agreements play an important role. In the ruling Apple Sales, the ECJ solves certain doubts about the scope of this type of clauses but its answer generates new questions that will be dealt in future disputes. The will of the parties as well as the proportionality will still be the basis of the exclusivity of the forum.Keywords: antitrust damages actions, stand-alone actions, follow-on actions, jurisdiction agreements, arbitration, jurisdiction, damages (Torts), Antitrust Law, European Competition Law, European Union.

scholarly journals The Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 237-257
Author(s):  
Rimantas Antanas Stanikunas ◽  
Arunas Burinskas
Keyword(s):  
Economic Effect ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Antitrust Policy ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Leniency Programme

This paper provides a study of the interaction between public and private enforcement of Lithuanian antitrust law. The study refers to the Damages Directive. It has been found that private enforcement depends greatly on public enforcement of competition law. Therefore, their compatibility and balance are of great importance to antitrust policy. The Lithuanian NCA prioritises cases where an economic effect on competition does not have to be proven. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of private enforcement cases. Private enforcement in Lithuania is also in need of detailed rules on the identification of harm and causality. The analysis reveals how challenging it can be to estimate and prove harm or a causal link in private enforcement cases. Support from the NCA is therefore exceedingly needed. Moreover, even though the use of the leniency programme helps, it remains insufficient to solve the problem of under-deterrence. However, measures introduced by the Damages Directive do not make the leniency programme safe.

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