The Enforcement of Spanish Antitrust Law: A Critical Assessment of the Fines Setting Policy and of the Legal Framework for Private Enforcement Actions

Author(s):  
Francisco Marcos
Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘The legal framework’ outlines the key competition provisions currently in the US and EU. Like in most other jurisdictions, EU and US laws include competition provisions that are used to address antitrust violations such as anti-competitive agreements or abuse of monopoly power. They also include laws dealing with proposed mergers and acquisitions. The US Antitrust Law prohibits contracts and agreements between two or more individuals or entities in restraint of trade or commerce. Meanwhile, EU competition law prohibits agreements between ‘undertakings’ that have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, and affect trade between the EU member states.


Author(s):  
Joseph E Stiglitz

For over 100 years, competition policy has been a central part of a market economy’s legal framework. Over the past third of a century, however, the scope and effectiveness of competition policy has been narrowed, under the influence of certain ideas about the functioning of the market economy—ideas which have subsequently been widely discredited within the economics profession, but whose influence within antitrust law remains significant. This chapter argues that, to the contrary, changes in our economy and our understandings of the interplay between economics and politics necessitates a broader reach for competition policy than envisaged by the original advocates of antitrust law, and that this is especially so in developing countries and emerging markets.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Orlando ◽  
Wim Vandevelde

The article briefly describes the smart meters technology in the electricity field, its potentials and risks in terms of privacy and data protection, which could undermine the trust of customers. Then, the article delineates the EU legal framework that applies to the technology. A critical assessment of the latter follows, with the identification of some flaws. The focus shifts subsequently to the national level of legislation, when the Flemish laws on the matter are analysed. A different part is dedicated to the role that some technologies could have to reduce the risks and implement privacy. In conclusion, some recommendations are proposed to make the law more prone to enhance trust by the customers.   


1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazaré Albuquerque Abell

This article analyzes the international legal framework that surrounds the issue of safe third country (STC) in the European Union and in Canada. The argument put forward is that Canada is not immune to the developments in the European Union and that Canada's immigration policies towards refugees have changed accordingly. My position is that the Canadian model respects the legal constraints which govern the acceptability of mechanisms to apportion responsibility to examine a claim to refugee status, in particular the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. By testing the international legal viability of both the European and the Canadian system of safe third country against Articles 31 and 33 of the Geneva Convention and Executive Committee Conclusion No. 58 and Conclusion No. 15, and by addressing the draft Memorandum of Understanding between Canada and the United States and comparing it with some of the readmission agreements between the European Union and some third states, the article concludes that the Canadian STC model is preferable to that in Europe from both a legal and a humane point of view.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel

The machine learning capabilities of new technologies raise provocative questions and challenges for the development of competition law within the digital economy. Academic discussions have focused on how antitrust law should avoid, anticipate, and respond to such behavior. The predominant emerging narrative is that antitrust law, in its current form, is unable to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable algorithmic collusion. The purpose of this article is to challenge that claim in the context of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU). The reference within Article 101 TFEU to “associations of undertakings” plays a crucial role in that regard and offers a promising tool to better identify and regulate forms of unacceptable algorithmic collusion. Against that background, this article will propose an alternative compliance-focused way forward that could be set up without requiring modifications to the EU legal framework.


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