The Will Theory of Rights and Criminal Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elias Moser
Keyword(s):  
The Will ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamish Ross

This essay revisits themes touched upon in an influential debate on the nature of rights between two of the leading jurists of the past century – H. L. A. Hart and Neil MacCormick. Consideration is given to how MacCormick uses children’s rights as a basis for a critique of Hart’s version of the will theory of rights towards support of MacCormick’s version of the rival interest theory of rights. While MacCormick argues, in some respects persuasively, that children’s rights and ‘rights’ apparently grounded in the criminal law present significant challenges to Hart’s version of the will theory of rights, these challenges – including the notion that Hartian will theory, in a sense, ‘disenfranchises’ children – are shown to have less force in the light of careful reassessment. It is also maintained that MacCormick’s version of the interest theory is itself significantly challenged by difficulties, including possible conflicts of interest, inherent in practical mechanisms – such as those enabling adult representatives to act on behalf of children – which the law provides to ensure that children’s rights may be properly exercised.


Ratio Juris ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-472
Author(s):  
David Frydrych
Keyword(s):  
The Will ◽  

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
S. K. Stepanov

Calls to rethink the content of “legal personhood” are increasingly being heard at the present time: to recognize animals, artificial intelligence, etc. as a subject. There are several explanations for this: firstly, a change in ideas about a person and their position in society, and secondly, attempts to rethink the traditional categories of law. Throughout long periods of history, the definition of legal personhood depended on the definition of subjective right; the subjective right was associated with the legally significant will of the person. Consequently, a change in views on the will theory of subjective right inevitably lead to a revision of the content of the person. The main purpose of this article is to determine the essence of the legal personhood. To do this, using the historical method, the evolution of ideas about the legal personhood is revealed. It is argued that Hohfeld’s approach to understanding subjective-legal structures made it possible to look differently at the content of the category of legal personhood: it became possible to recognize animals or artificial intelligence as the owners of various subjective-legal categories. Nevertheless, the logic of modern commentators, as well as supporters of such a flexible approach to the definition of legal personhood, is not free from shortcomings. Using the method of analytical jurisprudence, the author demonstrates the emerging problems.


Grotiana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-87
Author(s):  
Sören Koch

This article discusses to what extent the widely accepted hypotheses of Hugo Grotius’s crucial impact on the theory of contract law – also in Scandinavia – may be maintained or even positively confirmed. Although few direct references to the works of Grotius can be found in Scandinavian legal literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it would be premature to draw a negative conclusion. An impact of Grotius’s thoughts may rather be demonstrated by thoroughly analysing patterns of argumentation concerning specific contractual topics both in legal literature and case law. The article provides the reader with necessary information on the institutional and intellectual preconditions for the reception of Grotius in the Scandinavian legal orders before discussing the impact of the ‘will-theory’ on the requirements of a legally binding contractual agreement in the works of selected influential legal scholars and in case law in more detail. The analysis confirms that Grotius’s work contributed substantially to shaping the intellectual framework in which the first contract law doctrines in Scandinavia evolved.


Legal Theory ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
George W. Rainbolt

Christopher Wellman argues that Joel Feinberg fails to grasp the distinction between will theories and interest theories. According to Wellman, this failure leads Feinberg to defend a will theory in “The Nature and Value of Rights” and an interest theory in “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations” and therefore to hold an inconsistent theory of rights. Wellman's interpretation of Feinberg is plausible. I will argue that there is another plausible interpretation and that the texts do not allow us to determine which of the two plausible interpretations is correct. I will also argue that this alternative interpretation allows Feinberg to avoid Wellman's charge of inconsistency but has problems of its own. Along the way, I will make some points about how to defend a theory of rights and about the strengths and weaknesses of the will and interest theories of rights. (Wellman holds that choice theories are a subset of will theories. I have argued elsewhere that it is better to see will theories as a subset of choice theories. However, how one cuts up the field is irrelevant to the issue at hand. For the sake of argument, I will assume that Wellman's topology is correct.)


Author(s):  
Roman Borisovich Kulichev

This article is dedicated to the legal issues of protection of the rights of individuals who have concluded civil transactions under psychological duress, namely hypnosis. The object of this research is civil law relations that emerge in conclusion of transaction by individuals. The subject of this research is the person’s will and its characteristics in deciding to conclude a transaction under psychological coercion unrelated to physical violence, as well as legal consequences of concluding such transactions. The author examines the factors that contribute to conclusion of transactions under psychological coercion and possible reasons for psychological coercion. The article examines civil and criminal law methods of protection of the rights of citizens who concluded transactions with a defect of volition, but are legally capable and aware of their actions. The conclusion is made that the only effective way to protect the individual from concluding such transaction lies in cultivation of the will. It is noted that the key evidence in challenging such transactions is forensic psychiatry evaluation; however, its commission depends solely on the judge’s decision on a particular dispute. The author assumes that the implementation of punitive measures for coercing into conclusion of such transactions is improbable, since the law enforcement authorities would refuse to initiate a criminal case due to civil nature of the dispute. The scientific novelty of consists in carrying out a comprehensive analysis of both, civil and criminal law methods of protection of the rights of citizens who have concluded transactions with the defect of volition, and the possibility of their practical implementation.


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