What Is the Will Theory of Rights?

Ratio Juris ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-472
Author(s):  
David Frydrych
Keyword(s):  
The Will ◽  
Will Theory

scholarly journals Deconstruction of the legal personhood of artificial intelligence

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
S. K. Stepanov
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Flexible Approach ◽  
Historical Method ◽  
Legal Personhood ◽  
Legal Structures ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Theory ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Evolution Of Ideas

Calls to rethink the content of “legal personhood” are increasingly being heard at the present time: to recognize animals, artificial intelligence, etc. as a subject. There are several explanations for this: firstly, a change in ideas about a person and their position in society, and secondly, attempts to rethink the traditional categories of law. Throughout long periods of history, the definition of legal personhood depended on the definition of subjective right; the subjective right was associated with the legally significant will of the person. Consequently, a change in views on the will theory of subjective right inevitably lead to a revision of the content of the person. The main purpose of this article is to determine the essence of the legal personhood. To do this, using the historical method, the evolution of ideas about the legal personhood is revealed. It is argued that Hohfeld’s approach to understanding subjective-legal structures made it possible to look differently at the content of the category of legal personhood: it became possible to recognize animals or artificial intelligence as the owners of various subjective-legal categories. Nevertheless, the logic of modern commentators, as well as supporters of such a flexible approach to the definition of legal personhood, is not free from shortcomings. Using the method of analytical jurisprudence, the author demonstrates the emerging problems.

Grotius’s Impact on the Scandinavian Theory of Contract Law

Grotiana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-87
Author(s):  
Sören Koch
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Legal Literature ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Theory ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Negative Conclusion ◽  
Contractual Agreement

This article discusses to what extent the widely accepted hypotheses of Hugo Grotius’s crucial impact on the theory of contract law – also in Scandinavia – may be maintained or even positively confirmed. Although few direct references to the works of Grotius can be found in Scandinavian legal literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it would be premature to draw a negative conclusion. An impact of Grotius’s thoughts may rather be demonstrated by thoroughly analysing patterns of argumentation concerning specific contractual topics both in legal literature and case law. The article provides the reader with necessary information on the institutional and intellectual preconditions for the reception of Grotius in the Scandinavian legal orders before discussing the impact of the ‘will-theory’ on the requirements of a legally binding contractual agreement in the works of selected influential legal scholars and in case law in more detail. The analysis confirms that Grotius’s work contributed substantially to shaping the intellectual framework in which the first contract law doctrines in Scandinavia evolved.

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF FEINBERG'S THEORY OF RIGHTS

Legal Theory ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
George W. Rainbolt
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Joel Feinberg ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Theory ◽  
Inconsistent Theory ◽  
The Way

Christopher Wellman argues that Joel Feinberg fails to grasp the distinction between will theories and interest theories. According to Wellman, this failure leads Feinberg to defend a will theory in “The Nature and Value of Rights” and an interest theory in “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations” and therefore to hold an inconsistent theory of rights. Wellman's interpretation of Feinberg is plausible. I will argue that there is another plausible interpretation and that the texts do not allow us to determine which of the two plausible interpretations is correct. I will also argue that this alternative interpretation allows Feinberg to avoid Wellman's charge of inconsistency but has problems of its own. Along the way, I will make some points about how to defend a theory of rights and about the strengths and weaknesses of the will and interest theories of rights. (Wellman holds that choice theories are a subset of will theories. I have argued elsewhere that it is better to see will theories as a subset of choice theories. However, how one cuts up the field is irrelevant to the issue at hand. For the sake of argument, I will assume that Wellman's topology is correct.)

scholarly journals Right to be Punished?

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-74
Author(s):  
Adriana Placani ◽  
Stearns Broadhead
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Theory ◽  
The Right

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint of the two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator’s interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state.

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