Is There Too Much Traffic on the Competition Law Enforcement Autostrada: A Role for Negative Comity

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Calvani ◽  
Justin Stewart-Teitelbaum
2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.


Author(s):  
Toshiaki Takigawa

ABSTRACT This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová

Abstract Digitalisation is a challenge from the regulatory point of view. Competition law, as a special type of regulation, is no exception to this. The article explores the risks of digitalisation, especially the ones related to the enhanced use of pricing algorithms. In theory, pricing algorithms are not easily assessed from the perspective of competition law, let alone its application in practice. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) is applied with certain difficulty to agreements created by using pricing algorithms. This is an unfortunate situation, as horizontal agreements represent one of the worst infringements of EU competition law, including price cartels or bid rigging. Apart from presenting a theoretical background, the article dives into the practice of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) in order to assess which practical issues the AMO might face when applying the theoretical concepts. In sum, the article asks from a theoretical perspective which issues of competition law have been introduced (or deepened) by the enhanced digitalisation, looking in particular to pricing algorithms. On top of that, the article explores the issues which may be encountered in practice, taking the Slovak jurisdiction as the example. The willingness and feasibility of the AMO to enforce digital issues such as pricing algorithms is assessed based on the previous acts of the AMO as well as the new Act on Protection of Competition, adopted by the Slovak parliament on 11 May 2021.


Author(s):  
Hieu Trong Truong

The goals of competition law and policy play a notable navigator in law enforcement and lead to new rule inauguration regimes. However, Vietnam avoids signifying its goals in all two competition law versions, the Vietnamese Competition Law 2004 and the Vietnamese Competition Law 2018. The practical merger regulation has been thus confusing in the circumstances. Be continued with the lengthy controversial discussions in the academic world; the paper opens the comparative approach to other major jurisdictions. Rather than the Asian earlies system of Japanese anti-monopoly law or the European Union's primary youngest competition law, the United States antitrust law contributes to the original explanation of the law's objectives and directions. It experiences that Vietnam could maintain the diverse goals of competition law with its priority interests. Rejecting the aspect of free and fair competition, or the workable competition, the analysis traces the identification of effective competition mainly according to the European Union's perspective. Notably, the industrial policy takes a significant connection with the competition policy; however, it does not always ensure competition law enforcement. Be mainly based on Japanese historical achievement; the paper leads to an appropriate direction to resolve this complicated relationship between the two conflict but reciprocity policies. These implications will contribute to enhancing the legalization of competition law in Vietnam.


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