Intended and Accidental Bequests in a Life-cycle Economy

Author(s):  
Lutz Hendricks
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Kapička

I characterize optimal taxes in a life-cycle economy where ability and human capital are unobservable. I show that unobservable human capital effectively makes preferences over labor nonseparable across age. I generalize the static optimal tax formulas to account for such nonseparabilities and show how they depend both on own-Frisch labor elasticities and cross-Frisch labor elasticities. I calibrate the economy to US data. I find that the optimal marginal income taxes decrease with age, in contrast to both the US tax code and to a model with observable human capital. I demonstrate that the behavior of cross-Frisch elasticities is essential in explaining the decline. (JEL D91, H21, H24, J24)


ICCTP 2011 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiangbi Hu ◽  
Zifeng Wang ◽  
Yan Liu ◽  
Lingling Gao
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
G Seliger ◽  
A Buchholz ◽  
U Kross

Cycle economy is not only ecologically reasonable but also a chance for new business. Selling utilization instead of selling products is advantageous once additional costs for information processing and logistics are less than costs for underutilized capacity. A competitive provider offers product functionality in quality, time and location as required by the user. Lifetime component monitoring is conditional for this performance. Modern microelectronic technology enables the acquisition of component deterioration with sensorial devices, information processing and storing with microcontrollers and initiating appropriate actions such as maintenance. The architecture of a microsystem called the life cycle unit (LCU) for product and component monitoring is introduced and specified. Product examples illustrate some application areas.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Golosov ◽  
Maxim Troshkin ◽  
Aleh Tsyvinski

We study optimal redistribution and insurance in a life-cycle economy with private idiosyncratic shocks. We characterize Pareto optima, show the forces determining optimal labor distortions, and derive closed form expressions for their limiting behavior. The labor distortions for high-productivity shocks are determined by the labor elasticity and the higher moments of the shock process; the labor distortions for low-productivity shocks are determined by the autocorrelation of the shock process, redistributive objectives, and past distortions. In a model calibrated using newly available estimates of idiosyncratic shocks, the labor distortions are U-shaped and the savings distortions generally increase in current earnings. (JEL D82, D91, H21, H23, I38, J22, J24)


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