scholarly journals Redistribution and Social Insurance

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Golosov ◽  
Maxim Troshkin ◽  
Aleh Tsyvinski
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Higher Moments ◽  
Pareto Optima ◽  
Productivity Shocks ◽  
Limiting Behavior ◽  
High Productivity ◽  
Shock Process ◽  
Cycle Economy ◽  
Idiosyncratic Shocks

We study optimal redistribution and insurance in a life-cycle economy with private idiosyncratic shocks. We characterize Pareto optima, show the forces determining optimal labor distortions, and derive closed form expressions for their limiting behavior. The labor distortions for high-productivity shocks are determined by the labor elasticity and the higher moments of the shock process; the labor distortions for low-productivity shocks are determined by the autocorrelation of the shock process, redistributive objectives, and past distortions. In a model calibrated using newly available estimates of idiosyncratic shocks, the labor distortions are U-shaped and the savings distortions generally increase in current earnings. (JEL D82, D91, H21, H23, I38, J22, J24)

Optimal Mirrleesean Taxation in a Ben-Porath Economy

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Kapička
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Cycle Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Optimal Taxes

I characterize optimal taxes in a life-cycle economy where ability and human capital are unobservable. I show that unobservable human capital effectively makes preferences over labor nonseparable across age. I generalize the static optimal tax formulas to account for such nonseparabilities and show how they depend both on own-Frisch labor elasticities and cross-Frisch labor elasticities. I calibrate the economy to US data. I find that the optimal marginal income taxes decrease with age, in contrast to both the US tax code and to a model with observable human capital. I demonstrate that the behavior of cross-Frisch elasticities is essential in explaining the decline. (JEL D91, H21, H24, J24)

scholarly journals A Quantitative Theory of Information, Worker Flows, and Wage Dispersion

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda M. Michaud
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Type I ◽  
Model Learning ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Employer Learning ◽  
High Productivity ◽  
Employment Dynamics ◽  
Worker Flows ◽  
Theory Of Information

Employer learning provides a link between wage and employment dynamics. Workers who are selectively terminated when their low productivity is revealed subsequently earn lower wages. If learning is asymmetric across employers, randomly separated high-productivity workers are treated similarly when hired from unemployment, but recover as their next employer learns their type. I provide empirical evidence supporting this link, then study whether employer learning is an empirically important factor in wage and employment dynamics. In a calibrated structural model, learning accounts for 78 percent of wage losses after unemployment, 24 percent of life-cycle wage growth, and 13 percent of cross-sectional dispersion observed in data. (JEL D83, E24, J23, J24, J31, J62)

scholarly journals Can Workfare Programs Moderate Conflict? Evidence from India

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 3337-3375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thiemo Fetzer
Keyword(s):  
Social Insurance ◽  
Public Employment ◽  
Alternative Source ◽  
Productivity Shocks ◽  
Social Insurance System ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Weather Shocks ◽  
Adverse Weather ◽  
Household Incomes ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Can public interventions persistently reduce conflict? Adverse weather shocks, through their impact on incomes, have been identified as robust drivers of conflict in many contexts. An effective social insurance system moderates the impact of adverse shocks on household incomes, and hence, could attenuate the link between these shocks and conflict. This paper shows that a public employment program in India, by providing an alternative source of income through a guarantee of 100 days of employment at minimum wages, effectively provides insurance. This has an indirect pacifying effect. By weakening the link between productivity shocks and incomes, the program uncouples productivity shocks from conflict, leading persistently lower conflict levels.

Model of Bridge Life-Cycle Economy Cost

ICCTP 2011 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiangbi Hu ◽  
Zifeng Wang ◽  
Yan Liu ◽  
Lingling Gao
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Cycle Economy
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document