Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Hulya Eraslan ◽  
Antonio M. Merlo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Coalition Governments

Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

2002 ◽  
Vol 46 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 893-907 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Hülya Eraslan ◽  
Antonio Merlo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Coalition Governments

Constituting Scotland

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Elliot Bulmer
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Global Trends ◽  
National Movement ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Thought ◽  
Scottish Government ◽  
Historical Trajectory ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

The rise of the Scottish national movement has been accompanied by the emergence of distinct constitutional ideas, claims and arguments, which may affect constitutional design in any future independent Scotland. Drawing on the fields of constitutional theory, comparative constitutional law, and Scottish studies, this book examines the historical trajectory of the constitutional question in Scotland and analyses the influences and constraints on the constitutional imagination of the Scottish national movement, in terms of both the national and international contexts. It identifies an emerging Scottish nationalist constitutional tradition that is distinct from British constitutional orthodoxies but nevertheless corresponds to broad global trends in constitutional thought and design. Much of the book is devoted to the detailed exposition and comparative analysis of the draft constitution for an independent Scotland published by the SNP in 2002. The 2014 draft interim Constitution presented by the Scottish Government is also examined, and the two texts are contrasted to show the changing nature of the SNP’s constitutional policy: from liberal-procedural constitutionalism in pursuit of a more inclusive polity, to a more populist and majoritarian constitutionalism.

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

scholarly journals Do Institutions Really Matter?

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
SVEN STEINMO ◽  
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Institutional Variation ◽  
National Tax ◽  
Dominant Coalition ◽  
And Cluster Analysis ◽  
Policy Variation ◽  
Party Dominance

New institutionalism has emerged as one of the most prominent research agendas in the field of comparative politics, political economy, and public policy. This article examines the role of institutional variation in political/economic regimes in shaping tax burdens in industrialized democracies. An institutionalist model for tax policy variation is tested across the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) democracies. Countries are conceptualized and statistically modeled in terms of majoritarian, shifting coalition, and dominant coalition governments. Regression analysis and cluster analysis are used to statistically model cross-national tax burdens relative to the strength of labor organization and party dominance in parliament. This study finds that political and economic institutions are important in explaining tax policy variation. Specifying the structure of political and economic institutions helps to explain the size of the state in modern capitalist democracies. This article specifies and demonstrates which institutions matter and how much they matter.

scholarly journals Professional activists? Party activism among political staffers in parliamentary democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110273
Author(s):  
Pieter Moens
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
High Intensity ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Strong Commitment ◽  
Staff Recruitment

Although the position of the party on the ground has been weakened by cartelization, grassroots activists remain an important recruitment pool for political professionals. Based on unique survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and Dutch parties (N = 1009), this article offers an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new supply and demand framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by candidate preferences (supply) and party preferences (demand). The findings demonstrate that most political staffers are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy and communication experts, ministerial staff, and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These findings show that paid staffers do not necessarily widen the gap between parties and activists. They also raise normative questions about internal congruence within parties in coalition governments.

scholarly journals Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Paniagua ◽  
Jan P. Vogler
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Scholarly Work ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Economic Elite ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
Resource Diversity

AbstractWhat explains the emergence and persistence of institutions aimed at preventing any ruling group from using the state apparatus to advance particularistic interests? To answer this recurring question, a burgeoning literature examines the establishment of power-sharing institutions in societies divided by ethnic or religious cleavages. Going beyond existing scholarly work focused on these specific settings, we argue that political power-sharing institutions can also be the result of common disputes within the economic elite. We propose that these institutions are likely to emerge and persist when competition between elite factions with dissimilar economic interests is balanced. To address the possibility of endogeneity between elite configurations and public institutions, we leverage natural resource diversity as an instrument for elite configurations. We show that, where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful economic groups is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of power-sharing mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging economic interests.

When Marriage Gets Hard: Intra-Coalition Conflict and Electoral Accountability

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Carolina Plescia ◽  
Sylvia Kritzinger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Economic Evaluations ◽  
Responsibility Attribution ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Level Data ◽  
European Election ◽  
Election Studies

Combining individual-level with event-level data across 25 European countries and three sets of European Election Studies, this study examines the effect of conflict between parties in coalition government on electoral accountability and responsibility attribution. We find that conflict increases punishment for poor economic performance precisely because it helps clarify to voters parties’ actions and responsibilities while in office. The results indicate that under conditions of conflict, the punishment is equal for all coalition partners when they share responsibility for poor economic performance. When there is no conflict within a government, the effect of poor economic evaluations on vote choice is rather low, with slightly more punishment targeted to the prime minister’s party. These findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability and political representation in coalition governments.

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