The Dynamics of Belief Formation and Price Momentum

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Dontoh ◽  
Joshua Ronen ◽  
Bharat Sarath
CFA Digest ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-52
Author(s):  
John R. Minahan

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-44
Author(s):  
Martin Bernard ◽  
Malabika Deo

Momentum has remained an unanswered anomaly in finance literature. Researchers have pointed out two arguments, whether the source of prior return anomalies are rational or behavioral. In this paper, we examined return chasing tendency investors and the profitability of probable price momentum strategy in Indian equity market using the monthly return data of equities represented in BSE-500 index encompassing the time period from July 2004 to Jun 2014. Study is an attempt to analyze momentum effect before, during and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009 to check whether investors continue to follow the same strategy during crisis or their behavior undergoes any change. Also study examined the adequacy of rational CAPM models to explain momentum profits. The result evidenced a strong presence of economically and statistically significant momentum profit in Indian stock market equity returns. Therefore return chasing tendency of Indian investors is found to be persistent in the intermediate horizon in Indian context. Closer observation of the results reveals that, Indian investors are winners chasers rather than investor in past losers. Study also confirmed that investors sentiments are volatile according to general market environment and inadequacy of rationalist equilibrium model to explain momentum profits.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Kieren ◽  
Jan Müller-Dethard ◽  
Martin Weber

Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.


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