scholarly journals Comparing the Impacts of Financial Regulation in Australia and the United States via Simulation with Country-Specific Financial CGE Models

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Nassios ◽  
James Giesecke ◽  
Peter B. Dixon ◽  
Maureen T. Rimmer

Firms generally begin as privately owned entities. When they grow large enough, the decision to go public and its consequences are among the most crucial times in a firm’s life cycle. The first time a firm is a reporting issuer gives rise to tremendous responsibilities about disclosing public information and accountability to a wide array of retail shareholders and institutional investors. Initial public offerings (IPOs) offer tremendous opportunities to raise capital. The economic and legal landscape for IPOs has been rapidly evolving across countries. There have been fewer IPOs in the United States in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and associated regulatory reforms that began in 2002. In 1980–2000, an average of 310 firms went public every year, while in 2001–2014 an average of 110 firms went public every year. At the same time, there are so many firms that seek an IPO in China that there has been a massive waiting list of hundreds of firms in recent years. Some countries are promoting small junior stock exchanges to go public early, and even crowdfunding to avoid any prospectus disclosure. Financial regulation of analysts and investment banks has been evolving in ways that drastically impact the economics of going public—in some countries, such as the United States, drastically increasing the minimum size of a company before it can expect to go public. This Handbook not only systematically and comprehensively consolidates a large body of literature on IPOs, but provides a foundation for future debates and inquiry.


2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-335
Author(s):  
Harald A. Benink ◽  
Reinhard H. Schmidt

AbstractThe turbulence in the international financial markets in the 1980s inspired the idea that independent academics might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation and thus ultimately also to the stability of the national financial sector in the United States. This led to the creation of the US “Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee“, a group of academics and other independent experts working in the field of financial regulation, which meets regularly and issues statements concerning conceptual as well as current issues in financial regulation. Two years ago, a similar shadow committee was founded in Europe. It is composed of members from 11 different countries. The special problems of financial regulation in Europe, as well as the special features of the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC), derive from the fact that despite the trend towards economic and political integration, Europe is still a collection of different nations with different institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, describe the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Quaglia

AbstractThe international financial crisis was followed by waves of domestic regulatory reforms, first and foremost, in the United States and the European Union. Post-crisis financial regulation was sometimes different across jurisdictions. Moreover, the United States and the European Union sought in various ways to (re)assert their regulatory power not only vis-à-vis the market, but also with regard to other jurisdictions, which often resisted the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders. Consequently, a handful of important post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes emerged concerning E.U. rules on hedge funds, U.S. rules on bank structure and E.U. and U.S. rules on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. These disputes mainly involved the terms of access to each other's markets, the equivalence between domestic rules, and the extraterritorial effects of those rules. Some of these disputes were also intra-E.U. disagreements, whenever the preferences of the United Kingdom were different from those of Continental countries and similar to those of the United States. The network structure of the financial industry and the patterns of financial interdependence across the Atlantic amplified the extra territorial effects of domestic reforms, but at the same time triggered an active involvement of the transnational financial industry in the management and, eventually, the settlement of these disputes.


2016 ◽  
Vol 140 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Staci L. Sudenga ◽  
B. Nelson Torres ◽  
William J. Fulp ◽  
Roberto Silva ◽  
Luisa L. Villa ◽  
...  

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