scholarly journals Systemic Risk, Interbank Market Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort Function

Author(s):  
Michael Bowe ◽  
Olga Kolokolova ◽  
Marcin Jerzy Michalski
Author(s):  
Calixto Lopez-Castañon ◽  
Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo ◽  
Fabrizio Lopez-Gallo

Despite the acknowledgment of the relevance of Systemic Risk, there is a lack of consensus on its definition and, more importantly, on the way it should be measured. Fortunately, there is a growing research agenda and more financial regulators, central bankers, and academics have recently been focusing on this field. In this chapter, the authors obtain a distribution of losses for the banking system as a whole. They are convinced that such distribution of losses is the key element that could be used to develop relevant measures for systemic risk. Their model contemplates several aspects, which they consider important regarding the concept of systemic risk: an initial macroeconomic shock, which weakens some institutions (some of them to the point of failure), a contagion process by means of the interbank market, and the resulting losses to the financial system as a whole. Finally, once the distribution is estimated, the authors derive standard risk measures for the system as a whole, focusing on the tail of the distribution (where the catastrophic or systemic events are located). By using the proposed framework, it is also possible to perform stress testing in a coherent way, including second round effects like contagion through the interbank market. Additionally, it is possible to follow the evolution of certain coherent risk measures, like the CVaR, in order to evaluate if the system is becoming more or less risky, in fact, more or less fragile. Additionally, the authors decompose the distribution of losses of the whole banking system into the systemic and the contagion elements and determine if the system is more prone to experience contagious difficulties during a certain period of time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-209
Author(s):  
John Berdell ◽  
Thomas Mondschean

At nearly the same moment, Jeremy Bentham and Henry Thornton adopted diametrically opposed approaches to stabilizing the financial system. Henry Thornton eloquently defended the Bank of England’s actions as the lender of last resort and saw its discretionary management of liquidity as the key stabilizer of the credit system. In contrast, Jeremy Bentham advocated the imposition of strict bank regulations and examinations, without which, he predicted, Britain would soon experience a systemic crisis—which he called “universal bankruptcy.” There are strong parallels but also dramatic differences with our recent attempts to reduce systemic risk within financial systems. The Basel III bank regulatory framework effectively intertwines Bentham’s and Thornton’s diametrically opposed approaches to stabilizing banks. Yet Bentham’s and Thornton’s concerns regarding the stability of the wider financial system remain alive today due to financial innovation and the politics of responding to financial crises.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanshan Jiang ◽  
Hong Fan

The increasing frequency and scope of the financial crisis have attracted more attention in the research of the systemic risk of banking system. A new model for the interbank market with overlapping portfolios is proposed to simulate a banking system in this work. The proposed model uses a bipartite network of banks and their assets to analyze the impact of bank investment on the stability of the banking system. In addition, this model introduces investment risk and allows banks to make up for liquidity by selling devaluated assets, which reflects the operating rules of the banking system more realistically. The results show that allowing banks to sell devaluated assets to make up for liquidity can improve the stability of the banking system and the interbank market can also improve the stability of the banking system. For the investment of banks, the investment risk is an uncertain factor that affects the stability of the banking system. The proposed model further analyzes the impact of average investment interest rate, savings interest rate, deposit reserve ratio, and investment asset diversity on the stability of the banking system. The model provides a tool for policy-makers and supervision agencies to prevent the systemic risk of banking system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Viral V. Acharya ◽  
Aaditya M. Iyer ◽  
Rangarajan K. Sundaram

We address the paradox that financial innovations aimed at risk-sharing appear to have made the world riskier. Financial innovations facilitate hedging idiosyncratic risks among agents; however, aggregate risks can be hedged only with liquid assets. When risk-sharing is primitive, agents self-hedge and hold more liquid assets; this buffers aggregate risks, resulting in few correlated failures compared to when there is greater risk sharing. We apply this insight to build a model of a clearinghouse to show that as risk-sharing improves, aggregate liquidity falls but correlated failures rise. Public liquidity injections, for example, in the form of a lender-of-last-resort can reduce this systemic risk ex post, but induce lower ex-ante levels of private liquidity, which can in turn aggravate welfare costs from such injections.


Author(s):  
Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo ◽  
Calixto Lopez-Castañon ◽  
Fabrizio Lopez-Gallo

By using the proposed framework, it is also possible to perform stress testing in a coherent way, including second round effects like contagion through the interbank market. Additionally, it is possible to follow the evolution of certain coherent risk measures, like the CVaR, in order to evaluate if the system is becoming more or less risky, in fact, more or less fragile. Additionally, the authors decompose the distribution of losses of the whole banking system into the systemic and the contagion elements and determine if the system is more prone to experience contagious difficulties during a certain period of time.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Jasova ◽  
Luc A. Laeven ◽  
Caterina Mendicino ◽  
Jose-Luis Peydro ◽  
Dominik Supera

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