Systemic Risk and Monetary Policy: The Haircut Gap Channel of the Lender of Last Resort

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Jasova ◽  
Luc A. Laeven ◽  
Caterina Mendicino ◽  
Jose-Luis Peydro ◽  
Dominik Supera
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort

scholarly journals How Central Should the Central Bank Be?

2010 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan S Blinder
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Economies Of Scope ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort

The nature and scope of the Federal Reserve's authority and the structure of its decision making are now “on the table” to an extent that has not been seen since 1935, and the Fed's vaunted independence is under some attack. This essay asks what the Federal Reserve should—and shouldn't—do, leaning heavily on the concept of economies of scope. In particular, I conclude that the central bank should monitor and regulate systemic risk because preserving financial stability is (a) closely aligned with the standard objectives of monetary policy and (b) likely to require lender of last resort powers. I also conclude that the Fed should supervise large financial institutions because that function is so closely to regulating systemic risk. However, several other functions now performed by the Fed could easily be done elsewhere. (JEL E52, E58, G21, G28)

scholarly journals Fiscal-Monetary-Financial Stability Interactions in a Data-Rich Environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hodula ◽  
Lukáš Pfeifer
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
House Prices ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
Fiscal And Monetary Policy

Abstract In this paper, we shed some light on the mutual interplay of economic policy and the financial stability objective. We contribute to the intense discussion regarding the influence of fiscal and monetary policy measures on the real economy and the financial sector. We apply a factor-augmented vector autoregression model to Czech macroeconomic data and model the policy interactions in a data-rich environment. Our findings can be summarized in three main points: First, loose economic policies (especially monetary policy) may translate into a more stable financial sector, albeit only in the short term. In the medium term, an expansion-focused mix of monetary and fiscal policy may contribute to systemic risk accumulation, by substantially increasing credit dynamics and house prices. Second, we find that fiscal and monetary policy impact the financial sector in differential magnitudes and time horizons. And third, we confirm that systemic risk materialization might cause significant output losses and deterioration of public finances, trigger deflationary pressures, and increase the debt service ratio. Overall, our findings provide some empirical support for countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies.

scholarly journals ECB policy responses between 2007 and 2014: A chronological analysis and an assessment of their effects

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos Carrasco
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
The One ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The paper analyses the monetary policy responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Our goals are on the one hand to explain chronologically the main measures in conventional and unconventional policies adopted by the ECB and on the other hand to analyse their effects on key interest rates, monetary aggregates and the money multiplier. The assessment is that the ECB?s monetary policy responses to the crisis have been ?too little, too late?, constrained by the institutional framework, which prevents the ECB from acting as a true central bank with the role of lender of last resort.

Monetary Policy and Systemic Risk

2015 ◽  
pp. 291-328
Author(s):  
Xavier Freixas ◽  
Luc Laeven ◽  
José-Luis Peydró
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Systemic Risk

Qard-al-Hasan-based monetary policy and the role of the central bank as the lender of last resort

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Selim ◽  
M. Kabir Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Equal Opportunities ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Fair Competition ◽  
Real Gdp

Purpose This paper aims to examine how a central bank (CB) can act as a lender of last resort (LOLR) for both Islamic and conventional interest-based banks by pursuing a Qard-al-Hasan (QH)-based monetary policy (MP). Design/methodology/approach The role of the CB as LOLR under QH-based MP and its effects on major macroeconomic variables, including deposits, loan creation and aggregate expenditures, are examined on theoretical grounds by using the aggregate output and aggregate expenditure model under the framework of Islamic MP. Findings When the CB acts as LOLR by pursuing QH-based MP, it automatically empowers Islamic banks (IBs) by providing access to borrowing funds from the CB on a QH basis. As a result, IBs will not be required to hold billions of dollars as liquid assets against liquidity risks. Thus, the lending capacity of IBs will increase and deposit expansion, loan creation and aggregate expenditures in the economy will all expand. This will in turn increase real GDP and employment while reducing the unemployment rate. Originality/value This is the first paper to analyze CBs acting as LOLR for both IBs and conventional interest-based banks by pursuing a QH-based MP, thus providing equal opportunities and equal access to borrowing facilities from the CB, along with equal partnership and fair competition for all and absolutely no discrimination to anyone. The LOLR service to all banks under QH-based MP will unveil a new horizon of opportunities where all financial institutions are expected to thrive. IBs will escape the constraints of the constant fear of liquidity risks and find a level-playing field.

Shadow banking, monetary policy and systemic risk

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Xiao-Li Gong ◽  
Xiong Xiong ◽  
Wei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Shadow Banking

scholarly journals Monetary Policy and Cyclical Systemic Risk - Friends or Foes?

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 522-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kurowski ◽  
Paweł Smaga
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Systemic Risk
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