The Effect of Patent Length on Social Welfare: The Economics of Modifying Patent Life as a Policy Instrument

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaiyi Xie
2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinli Zeng ◽  
Jie Zhang ◽  
Michael Ka-Yiu Fung

This paper considers the effects of patent length and price regulation in an R&D growth model with variety expansion. Innovation requires lower bounds on patent length and price. Increasing patent duration promotes growth; increasing the cap on the price of patented products promotes growth below the monopoly-pricing level. Each policy instrument can raise welfare unless excessively used, and their welfare ranking depends on parameterizations. It is desirable, on welfare grounds, to limit patent protection along both dimensions, namely by limiting patent length and capping the price of patented products. Such limits raise welfare despite reducing the growth rate.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-38
Author(s):  
Wisnu Winardi

This paper analyzes the impact of entry ports reduction on horticultural production on the economic activities, prices and also toward social welfare by using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The simulation shows higher import restriction on horticultural products will not only increase the factor income (at current value), but will also increase the composite prices. The higher effect of the latter leads to social welfare reduction, but on the other hand favors the agriculture household types. This finding shows import restriction on horticulture product serves as income redistribution policy instrument. With regard to this, the monetary authority should take the issue into account, especially in order to anticipate the effect of composite prices increase, which could lead to the need of extra efforts in managing price stability. Keywords: import reduction; prices, inflation, CGE; social welfare; income distribution.JEL Classification: E25, E27


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 715-739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elettra Agliardi ◽  
Luigi Sereno

AbstractThe effects of four environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes, emission standards, auctioned permits and freely allocated permits, are analyzed. The setup is a real option model where the amount of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under each policy instrument. The regulator solves an optimal stopping problem in order to find the critical threshold for policy adoptions taking into account revenues from taxes and auctioned permits and government spending. In this framework we find the ranking of the alternative policy options in terms of their adoption lag and social welfare. We show that when the output demand is elastic, emission standards are preferred to freely allocated permits. Taxes and auctioned permits are always equivalent in terms of their adoption lag and social welfare, and also equivalent to emission standards when the regulator redistributes revenues.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 205-222
Author(s):  
Junlong CHEN ◽  
Jiali LIU ◽  
Yuncheng LONG ◽  
Jialing LUO
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41
Author(s):  
Wisnu Winardi

This paper analyzes the impact of entry ports reduction on horticultural production on the economic activities, prices and also toward social welfare by using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The simulation shows higher import restriction on horticultural products will not only increase the factor income (at current value), but will also increase the composite prices. The higher effect of the latter leads to social welfare reduction, but on the other hand favors the agriculture household types. This finding shows import restriction on horticulture product serves as income redistribution policy instrument. With regard to this, the monetary authority should take the issue into account, especially in order to anticipate the effect of composite prices increase, which could lead to the need of extra efforts in managing price stability. Keywords: import reduction; prices, inflation, CGE; social welfare; income distribution.JEL Classification: E25, E27


2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua S Gans ◽  
Stephen P King ◽  
Ryan Lampe

A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. We find, however, that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structure. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented, patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.


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