Social Responsibility and Executive Pay Performance Sensitivity in State-Owned Enterprises in China

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiming Hu ◽  
Yi Miao
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Performance Sensitivity

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

scholarly journals The effect of race on CEO pay-performance sensitivity in South Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-29
Author(s):  
Mark Bussin ◽  
Sean Barrett
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Quantitative Descriptive

South Africa’s labour policies and the growing societal calls to better explain executive remuneration create a unique opportunity to examine the effects of race on CEO pay. This empirical research study sought to investigate the effects of race on the sensitivity of executive pay to corporate performance. The study aims to contribute to the literature by providing an evidence-based approach to understanding the effect of race on CEO remuneration. The research design was quantitative, descriptive and longitudinal in nature, utilising validated secondary data sources. The sample consisted of 19 black CEOs and a random sample of 45 white CEOs. All components of South African CEO remuneration studied were found to correlate strongly with PAT (Profit after Tax) and EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation) and to a lesser degree with ROE (Return on Equity) and HEPS (Headline Earnings per Share). Black and white CEO mean remuneration was found to show no significant difference as a result of race. A notable difference found was the higher degree of payperformance sensitivity and variability seen within the black CEO sample. The study showed that race does not affect the level of CEO remuneration but does impact on pay-performance sensitivity and variability.

scholarly journals Top executive pay in Spanish banking system

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Idoya Ferrero-Ferrero ◽  
María Ángeles Fernández-Izquierdo ◽  
María Jesús Muñoz-Torres
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Compensation Systems ◽  
Managerial Power

AbstractThis study examines consistency between compensation systems and corporate performance. The main purpose is to analyse how the performance has affected the short-term executive pay in Spanish banking system during the period 2004–2008. The main results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity is asymmetrical regarding the sign of the variation of the performance, since the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the variation of the results is positive than when the variation of the results is negative. This finding is consistent with the managerial power theory and calls into question the role of the pay-performance incentives to align interest of executives and shareholders.

Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Litigation

2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhonglan Dai ◽  
Li Jin ◽  
Weining Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Pay ◽  
Performance Sensitivity

scholarly journals The Impact of Governance Mechanism of Financial Listed Companies on the Pay and the Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Executives

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
Liu Feng
Keyword(s):  
Negative Impact ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Significant Negative Impact ◽  
Board Of Supervisors

The corporate governance mechanism is very important to solve the principal-agent problem effectively. Based on the particularity of the financial industry, this paper uses the panel data of 45 listed companies in China's financial industry from 2007 to 2015, the empirical results show that the degree of ownership concentration, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board and the independent directors proportion have a significant negative impact on executive pay, and the size of the board of supervisors has no marked impact on executive pay. The degree of ownership concentration has a significant positive impact on the pay-performance sensitivity, and the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the independent directors proportion and the size of the board of supervisors have a significant negative impact on the pay-performance sensitivity. For the listed companies in the financial sector, they should pay attention to the executive pay disclosure system, the board of supervisors governance mechanism and the independent director system. We can use the degree of ownership concentration to improve the pay-performance sensitivity, and make corporate governance more effective.

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