scholarly journals Top executive pay in Spanish banking system

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Idoya Ferrero-Ferrero ◽  
María Ángeles Fernández-Izquierdo ◽  
María Jesús Muñoz-Torres
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Compensation Systems ◽  
Managerial Power

AbstractThis study examines consistency between compensation systems and corporate performance. The main purpose is to analyse how the performance has affected the short-term executive pay in Spanish banking system during the period 2004–2008. The main results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity is asymmetrical regarding the sign of the variation of the performance, since the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the variation of the results is positive than when the variation of the results is negative. This finding is consistent with the managerial power theory and calls into question the role of the pay-performance incentives to align interest of executives and shareholders.

Optimal Executive Compensation versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S Weisbach
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Effective Potential ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Compensation Systems ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Positive Perspective ◽  
Normative Perspective

This essay reviews Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders' welfare. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried argue that executive compensation is more consistent with executives who control their own boards and who maximize their own compensation subject to an “outrage constraint.” They provide a host of evidence consistent with this alternative viewpoint. The book can be evaluated from both positive and normative perspectives. From a positive perspective, much of the evidence they present, especially about the camouflage and risk-taking aspects of executive compensation systems, is fairly persuasive. However, from a normative perspective, the book conveys the idea that policy changes can dramatically improve executive compensation systems and consequently overall corporate performance. It is unclear to me how effective potential reforms designed to achieve such changes are likely to be in practice.

scholarly journals Does the Interest Rate Form Business Cycle?

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-34
Author(s):  
Bijan Bidabad ◽  
Abul Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Business Cycle ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Rate Form ◽  
The Interest Rate

Dynamic structural behavior of depositor, bank and borrower and the role of banks in forming business cycle are investigated. We test the hypothesis that does banks behavior make oscillations in the economy through the interest rate. By dichotomizing banking activities into two markets of deposit and loan, we show that these two markets have non-synchronized structures, and this is why the money sector fluctuation starts. As a result, the fluctuation is transmitted to the real economy through saving and investment functions. Empirical results assert that in the USA, the banking system creates fluctuations in the money sector and real economy as well through short-term interest rates

Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1176-1199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Chen ◽  
Mahmoud Ezzamel ◽  
Ziming Cai
Keyword(s):  
Executive Pay ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Tournament Theory ◽  
Managerial Power

scholarly journals How do executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence corporate performance? Evidence from Thailand tourism listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Ferry ◽  
Guanming He ◽  
Chang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Pay Gap ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe authors investigate how executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence the performance of Thailand tourism listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors manually collect data on the executives' and employees' remunerations for Thailand tourism listed companies and use the data for the authors’ OLS regression analysis. To check the robustness of the results to potential endogeneity issues, the authors employ the two-stage least-squares regression analysis and the impact threshold for a confounding variable approach.FindingsThe authors find that short-term executive compensation enhances firm performance, and that long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood of unfavorable corporate performance. The authors also find that the gap in short-term pay between executives and employees has an inverted-U relation with firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis study suggests that higher executive pay relative to employee pay could encourage executives to work hard to improve corporate performance, but that too large a pay gap between executives and employees could impair employees' morale and harm firm performance.Practical implicationsIt is important for tourism companies to not only pay executives well but also avoid too large a pay gap between executives and employees.Social implicationsThis study implies the important role of compensation design in contributing to employee engagement and good performance for tourism firms.Originality/valueThis study sheds light on agency problems between executives and employees in tourism companies and provides new evidence and insights on compensation research in the tourism sector in emerging markets.

scholarly journals Law, Economics, and Beyond: A Case for Retheorizing the Business Corporation

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 911-964
Author(s):  
P. M. Vasudev
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Hostile Takeovers ◽  
Business Corporation ◽  
Share Prices ◽  
Managerial Power

This essay presents a critical analysis of the economic theory of corporations and its idioms, such as “nexus of contracts”, “agency costs”, and “shareholder value”. It calls for the development of a richer and more inclusive theory of business corporations that draws on the experience of the last three decades and better addresses the needs of the post-Enron, post-AIG world. The author identifies the following shortcomings of the economic theory of corporations. First, the contractarian interpretation overlooks the role of law and public policy in corporations. Second, using share prices as the yardstick of corporate performance and encouraging practices such as the buyback of shares have serious implications for the competitiveness and sustainability of corporations. Third, there is inadequate attention to the characteristic and normative distinctions between debt and equity. And fourth, hostile takeovers are treated as virtually the only solution to entrenched managements. The problem of managerial power must be reviewed in the light of evidence regarding managerial power and the efficacy of boards. Equally, there is a case for developing a more deliberated, fair, and equitable policy on executive pay.

Role of affect in short-term memory for paired associates.

1968 ◽  
Vol 78 (3, Pt.1) ◽  
pp. 494-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Calvin F. Nodine ◽  
James H. Korn
Keyword(s):  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Paired Associates
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