scholarly journals Coasian Bargaining with an Arriving Outside Option

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilwoo Hwang ◽  
Fei Li
Keyword(s):  
Outside Option ◽  
Coasian Bargaining

scholarly journals Asymmetric Opportunities After an Unsuccessful Sports Career

2021 ◽  
pp. 152700252199587
Author(s):  
Martin Grossmann
Keyword(s):  
Outside Option ◽  
Career Opportunities

Contestants enter a risky contest when pursuing a sports career or choose a secure outside option. If contestants enter this contest but their sports career fails, they may have asymmetric career opportunities outside of sport. Greater opportunities reduce the risk of entering this contest. However, contestants’ incentives to exert effort decrease. Two types of equilibria exist if the initial pool of contestants is large. Either only types with high opportunities or only types with low opportunities enter the sports contest. If the initial pool of contestants is low, both types of contestants participate in the contest.

scholarly journals Experimental Markets and Environmental Policy

1993 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason F. Shogren
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Experimental Auction ◽  
Dynamic Choice ◽  
Auction Markets ◽  
Experimental Markets ◽  
Reduction Mechanisms ◽  
Sequential Reduction ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Coasian Bargaining

Experimental markets can be a useful tool to guide and evaluate environmental policy. This paper reviews four experiments to illustrate. Two institutional experiments are considered—Coasian bargaining with positive transaction costs, and a gaming experiment of dynamic choice in a conflict. Two valuation experiments are also discussed—the impact of sequential reduction mechanisms on the value of risk, and experimental auction markets to elicit the value of safer food.

Analyzing Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes

2019 ◽  
pp. 64-106
Author(s):  
Paul Poast
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Omitted Variable Bias ◽  
Suggestive Evidence ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Variable Bias

This chapter explores basic patterns in the data described in the previous chapter using cross tabulations. These tabulations show that having strategic and operational compatibility is strongly associated with a higher rate of agreement in alliance treaty negotiations. They also demonstrate that agreement can be reached, though less often, even between states that lack ideal war plan compatibility. The suggestive evidence offered by these cross tabulations is useful, but the cross tabulations also raise questions. While the initial patterns are supportive of this book's theory, the chapter is concerned about potential complications in the data that could undermine the ability to draw inferences about the relationships between variables. These potential complications include selection bias and omitted variable bias. The chapter then identifies how and under what conditions the existence of an outside option influences the outcome of alliance treaty negotiations.

scholarly journals A Note on Buyers’ Behavior in Auctions with an Outside Option

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Alexander Maslov
Keyword(s):  
Outside Option ◽  
Posted Prices

In this note I show that the equilibrium in cutoff strategies observed in auctions with a buy-it-now price may also arise in markets where objects are sold simultaneously by auctions and posted prices. However, contrary to auctions with a buy-it-now price where buyers need to know only the total number of players in the market, in the latter environment buyers must also observe the number of active bidders in the auction for the equilibrium to exist in cutoff strategies.

scholarly journals Partial Versus General Compulsory Solidarity: an Experimental Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 249-279
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Arianna Galliera ◽  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
Voluntary Contribution

AbstractWe focus on ways and means of solidarity and their more or less voluntary and involuntary character. Alternative ways of redistribution are modeled by combining redistribution as emergent from a non-discriminatory voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM, with an outside option for a “super-rich”, R, participant to donate to VCM participants. The outsider may discriminate between participants of the VCM on the basis of information accessible at a cost to her. Inclusion in and exclusion from the VCM are involuntary while contributions in it are voluntary. How involuntary inclusion of R in VCM affects her discriminatory voluntary donations and contribution behavior is explored experimentally.

Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Buyer Power

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Inderst ◽  
Tommaso Valletti
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Uniform Pricing ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Buyer Power ◽  
Pricing Power

Abstract This paper introduces a model of third-degree price discrimination where a seller's pricing power is constrained by buyers' outside options. Price uniformity performs more efficiently than discriminatory pricing, as uniform pricing allows weaker buyers to exploit the more attractive outside option of stronger buyers. This mechanism is markedly different from the mechanisms that are at work in case uniform pricing is imposed on an unconstrained monopolist.

Marriage and Labor Market Outcomes

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terra McKinnish
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Labor Market Outcomes ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Marital Stability ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Income Effects ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Premarital Investments

Marriage and labor market outcomes are deeply related, particularly for women. A large literature finds that the labor supply decisions of married women respond to their husbands’ employment status, wages, and job characteristics. There is also evidence that the effects of spouse characteristics on labor market outcomes operate not just through standard neoclassical cross-wage and income effects but also through household bargaining and gender norm effects, in which the relative incomes of husband and wife affect the distribution of marital surplus, marital satisfaction, and marital stability. Marriage market characteristics affect marital status and spouse characteristics, as well as the outside option, and therefore bargaining power, within marriage. Marriage market characteristics can therefore affect premarital investments, which ultimately affect labor market outcomes within marriage and also affect labor supply decisions within marriage conditional on these premarital investments.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document