Coasian Bargaining, Property Rights, and the State

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Rothschild
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Coasian Bargaining

Implications

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Property ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Taking Action ◽  
Disadvantaged People

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.

Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim.

Turbulent Property Rights

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hazel Gray
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
High Growth ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Land Markets ◽  
Export Agriculture ◽  
Key Sectors ◽  
Political Settlement

This chapter explores the role of the political settlement in shaping outcomes of land investments by analysing struggles in key sectors of the economy. Land reform during the socialist period had far-reaching implications for the political settlement. Reforms to land rights under liberalization involved strengthening land markets; however, the state continued to play a significant role. Corruption within formal land management systems became prevalent during the period of high growth. Vietnam experienced a rapid growth in export agriculture but, in contrast with stable property rights for smallholders, Tanzania’s efforts to encourage large land investments were less successful. Industrialization in both countries generated new forms of land struggles that were influenced by the different distributions of power between the state, existing landowners, and investors.

Significant choice-of-law interests and its impact on the formation of choice-of-law regulation in the field of intellectual property

2021 ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
Svetlana I. Krupko
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Close Connection ◽  
Choice Of Law ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Special Rules

This article analyzes the choice-of-law interests of specific and potential participants in the relations of intellectual property rights and the state in order to establish the closest connection of the above type of relation with the state, whose law should be applied. Taking into account the directionality of significant choice-of-law interests, advantages and disadvantages of territorial and universal approaches, a theoretically based solution is proposed for the formation of a general choice-of-law rule on the law to be applied to the relation of intellectual property rights. It was revealed in the study that the diversity of the relations of intellectual property rights (their obligatory and non-obligatory, property and personal non-property nature, other differences in legal features) does not automatically generate a multidirectionality of significant choice-of-law interests that should be taken into account when establishing a close connection of the above type of the relation with the state for determination of applicable law, does not prevent the formation of a general choice-of-law rule for the relations of intellectual property rights in general and does not unequivocally testify in favor of the specialization of its binding. However, the diversity of the relations of intellectual property rights should be examined and evaluated for the feasibility and limits of exceptions from the general choice-of-law rule and the development of special rules for resolving certain private of the relations of intellectual property rights.

scholarly journals Sovereignty and the Politics of Property

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Benvenisti
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Economic Market ◽  
Political Market ◽  
Political Markets ◽  
High Politics ◽  
Visibility Politics

AbstractThe debate whether property is a limit on or the product of sovereignty envisages a tension between “the individual owner” and “the state.” But “the state” is not more than the aggregate of individuals who define theirs and others’ property rights through the state’s political process. The underlying tension between property and sovereignty is thus the tension between the economic market and the political market. Owners and others compete simultaneously at both levels to define, protect or improve the value of property. There are two ways to compete in the political marketplace: by engaging in either “high visibility politics” or “low visibility politics.” Diffuse owners rely on high visibility politics promoted by agents such as political parties or trade unions and on elections, referenda and the like, whereas smaller groups of owners prefer the low politics of capturing lawmakers and state executives.When economic markets became global at the end of the Cold War, so did the political markets: property rights increasingly became defined by international agreements, by decisions of international organizations, and by the exercise of “low politics” in foreign, weaker states. The global political markets were dominated by the executive branches of a handful of relatively strong states that, in turn, were responsive to the “low politics” of special interests. The high transaction costs of cooperation among diffuse owners inhibited the parallel rise of “high politics” at the global level. The skewed global political market for property continues to favor special interests, but there are budding attempts to reclaim the space for “high politics” by national regulators and courts. Current negotiations over the so-called “Mega Regional” agreements between the United States and its trading partners will, if successful, nip these buds as they render certain property rights almost immune to the subsequent challenges of high politics.

A Theory of Partial Property Rights and the Illusion of State-Owned Enterprises

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng Hong
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Great Risk ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
Private Enterprise ◽  
The State ◽  
Senior Managers ◽  
Partial Property ◽  
Turn Over

Abstract China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) enjoy many special benefits. They do not turn over profits and rents to the state, they pay much less interests than other enterprises in their use of capital, they enjoy monopolistic power in the marketplace, incomes of SOE employees, including managers, are free of policy restrictions. Because these substantial interests are not transferrable to individuals, competition exists for them. Compared with executives of private enterprise, senior managers of SOEs are 94 times more likely of being convicted of a crime. High benefits enjoyed by senior managers of SOEs come with a great risk. Once the illusion of SOEs is punctured, SOE leaders with higher education and long-term visions may become the driving force of SOE reform.

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