Ronald Dworkin: An Appreciation

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Waldron
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin

The Solidarity Solution

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristi A. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Gender Wage Gap ◽  
Measurement Problem ◽  
Wage Gap ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Easy Task ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Equal Income ◽  
Ideal Part

What is a fair income distribution? The empirical literature seems to assume that equal income would be fair, but the equal income answer faces two objections. First, equal income is likely to be inefficient. This book sets aside efficiency concerns as a downstream consideration; it seeks to identify a fair distribution. The second objection—pointed out by both leftist political philosopher G. A. Cohen and conservative economist Milton Friedman—is that equal income is unfair to the hardworking. Measuring labor burdens in order to adjust income shares, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers and economists attempt to sidestep the measurement problem by invoking the envy test. Yet a distribution in which no one prefers someone else’s circumstances to her own, as the envy test requires, is unlikely to exist—and, even if it does exist, the normative connection between the envy test and fairness has not been established. The Solidarity Solution provides a novel answer: when someone claims that her situation should be improved at someone else’s expense, she must be able to give a reason that cannot be rejected by a free and equal individual who regards everyone else as the same. Part I develops the solidarity solution and shows that rigorous distributive implications can be derived from a relational ideal. Part II uses the solidarity solution to critique the competing theories of Ronald Dworkin, Philippe Van Parijs, and Marc Fleurbaey. Finally, part III identifies insights for the gender wage gap and taxation.

Taking Children’s Human Rights Seriously

2020 ◽  
pp. 48-69
Author(s):  
Michael Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Children's Rights ◽  
Popular Media ◽  
Children’S Rights ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Persuasive Argument ◽  
The Law ◽  
Deficit View

Despite the development of the children’s rights movement, human rights scholarship continues to overlook the rights of children. Even those like Ronald Dworkin, who proclaim the need to take rights seriously, are curiously silent, even ambivalent, when it comes to children. This inattention often forces advocates of children’s rights to the margins of human rights scholarship. In the few places where serious philosophical discussion of children’s rights does take place, the analysis intends to diminish the value of rights for children. These critics are not malevolent, and typically want what is best for children, but they do not think it can be accomplished through a children’s rights agenda. This chapter lays out a persuasive argument for a children’s rights agenda, or, for taking children’s rights seriously. Drawing from philosophy, history, literature, popular media, and of course the law, this chapter argues against the conventional deficit view underlying most arguments against the recognition of children’s rights and makes a case for the importance of children’s rights where rights are the currency in use.

scholarly journals Judicial authority, legitimacy and the (international) rule of law as essentially contested and interpretive concepts: Introduction to the special issue

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
KNUT TRAISBACH
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Final Point ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
International Rule

AbstractBeyond setting the stage, the Introduction makes three claims about the conceptual triangle of the rule of law, judicial authority and legitimacy. The first is that all three are essentially contested and interpretive concepts in the sense of Walter B. Gallie and Ronald Dworkin. In their expositions, the contested and interpretative nature of such concepts is nothing to be ‘solved’, rather the formulation of different conceptions and contestation about them are central functions of such concepts. The interpretive and essentially contested nature points us to the relevant ‘actors’ and to conflicts and trade-offs between contested competencies. Thus the second point is that arguments about the rule of law and judicial legitimacy are often a means of questioning or securing the authority of a particular actor or institution in relation to other actors and institutions. The final point is that transposing concepts from the domestic to the supranational is a constructive endeavour because it entails creating new conceptions and substituting old ones as well as legitimising new authorities and delegitimising old ones. Thus, this special issue also cautions against discourses that ultimately are more about legitimation than about legitimacy and more about new ways of ruling than the rule of law.

Das Recht auf Asyl bei Emer de Vattel 1758: unvollkommenes Recht, vollkommenes Recht, Menschenrecht

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-254
Author(s):  
Rainer Keil
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Moral Legitimacy ◽  
Self Help ◽  
Perfect Duties ◽  
Xxist Century ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
Specific Country

When, within the framework of a highly controversial debate of the early 1990s in Germany on the right to asylum, Winfrid Brugger argued, a human right to asylum could not be based on sound reason, he referred to the supposed impossibility of an imputation of the plight of refugees to certain foreign states. In more recent debates, similar arguments have been brought forward and formulated as a problem of imperfect or perfect duties and rights. Much earlier, in 1758, Emer de Vattel already had discussed the right to asylum as a right that has aspects of both an imperfect right and a perfect right. This has mostly been ignored in the recent debate. In this article, I try to show how de Vattel reasoned. His argumentation limited the otherwise strong sovereignty of states by referring to the reasons of the moral legitimacy of their powers. This led him to the result that the per se perfect right to asylum, imperfect in relation to specific states, can, if states collectively fail to admit a refugee in urgent danger, become a claim against a specific country in the shape of a perfect right to self-help. I will briefly try to reconstruct some of de Vattel‘s ideas with concepts of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. The difference between Dworkin’s rule and Alexy’s Regel becomes relevant for understanding de Vattel’s perfect and human right to asylum. In the end, I will briefly investigate how much of de Vattel’s thought depends on assumptions a XXIst century thinker would probably not be ready to suppose any more. It will become clear that de Vattel’s thought on asylum is mostly independent from rather controversial assumptions of his work; it fits rather well to some recent approaches limiting sovereignty by human rights and concepts of territorial justice.

A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Mateus Matos Tormin
Keyword(s):  
General Structure ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Moral Domain

This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.

scholarly journals O que é uma vida boa?

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-616
Author(s):  
Ronald Dworkin
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin

A partir de seu novo livro, Justice for Hedgehogs¹, Ronald Dworkin estabelece uma diferente relação entre moral e ética, bem como fundamenta a necessidade de cumprir tais normas por meio da diferença entre vida boa e viver bem.

scholarly journals O DEBATE SOBRE A DISCRICIONARIEDADE JUDICIAL À LUZ DOS FUNDAMENTOS DE HERBERT HART E RONALD DWORKIN

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Luiza Tuma da Ponte Silva ◽  
Dennis Verbicaro
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin

O presente artigo, feito por pesquisa teórica e pelo método dedutivo, tem como objetivo demonstrar a importância da hermenêutica, como ciência interpretativa, na atualidade, destacando a aplicabilidade da discricionariedade judicial, principalmente, nos casos difíceis, à luz dos fundamentos dos filósofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin, os quais apresentam diferentes concepções sobre o tema. A discussão entre os filósofos traz à tona a pluralidade das demandas e singularidade dos indivíduos e magistrados, enfatizando, nesse contexto, a importância de diferentes interpretações judiciais no cotidiano dos magistrados.

scholarly journals Igualdad en Rebaja. Reflexiones críticas en torno a la filosofía política de Ronald Dworkin

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Gustavo Arosemena
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Ronald Dworkin

El artículo presenta una crítica a la filosofía política igualitaria de Ronald Dworkin a la luz de concepciones alternativas de la igualdad. Primero, a la luz de una igualdad política basada en el pensamiento de Thomas Hobbes. Luego, a la luz de una igualdad “mística” basada en la obra de autores como Elizabeth Anscombe y Bernard Williams. Se sostiene que estas dos concepciones alternativas de la igualdad son más fuertes que la presentada por Dworkin y que juntas dejan poca cabida para la especie de igualdad liberal preferida por este autor. Al final, el artículo presenta reflexiones acerca de la importancia de concederle a la ética un rol más fuerte que el avizorado por Dworkin en la fundamentación te teorías normativas. Dworkin busca crear una relación de reenvío y mutua acomodación entre ética y moral. En realidad, la ética tiene primacía y lo que debe buscarse no es acomodar estas dos ideas, sino derivar completamente la moral de la ética.

scholarly journals Conflito Entre a Dimensão Negativa do Direito à Moradia e o Direito à Conservação do Patrimônio Histórico Cultural: Uma Solução não Extraível dos Manuais de Direito Constitucional

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 214
Author(s):  
Fernanda Fortes Litwinski ◽  
Flora Augusta Varela Aranha
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Politica Publica

O proprietário do imóvel afetado pelo tombamento fica responsável pela sua manutenção, sendo que qualquer reparo deve ter autorização prévia do IPHAN. A construção de obras novas também depende dessa autorização. Todavia, esse processo é bastante oneroso, tendo em vista a necessidade de contratação de engenheiro e arquiteto para a elaboração dos projetos exigidos. Assim, verifica-se, em alguns casos, um conflito entre os deveres decorrentes do direito à conservação e utilização do patrimônio histórico e cultural e a dimensão negativa do direito à moradia. Os conflitos entre direitos fundamentais, de acordo com os Manuais de Direito Constitucional, são solucionados de acordo com o lecionado por Robert Alexy ou Ronald Dworkin. Contudo, a solução mais viável está em uma política pública, concernente na criação de Escritórios Públicos de Arquitetura e Engenharia. Nesse estudo foi utilizada como fonte primária a revisão bibliográfica, a legislação e os dados dos tombamentos. Ademais, foi realizada a análise desses dados através da confecção de gráficos.

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