scholarly journals Executive Compensation, Earnings Management and Over Investment in Malaysia

Author(s):  
ei yet Chu ◽  
Saw-Imm Song
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li ◽  
Caleb Thibodeau

This paper empirically studies the connection between earnings management and corporate social performance, conditional on the existence of CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts, an emerging practice to link executive compensation to corporate social performance. We find that executives are more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal compensation goals when CSR rating is low, as well as their CSR-contingent compensation. Because of public pressure on their excessive total compensation, corporate executives see no need to manipulate earnings to increase compensation when their CSR-contingent compensation is already high. Our results suggest that earnings management and CSR-contingent compensation are substitute tools to serve the interests of executives, which is an agency problem that was never previously studied. Additionally, we explore how managerial characteristics affect earnings management, driven by the incentive effects of CSR-linked compensation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ye Wang ◽  
Fusheng Wang ◽  
Shiyu Liu

To pursue higher compensation, the agent’s earnings management behavior may damage the principal’s interests. Can managers whose compensation reaches the expected level seek benefits for the company through earnings management? This study takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as samples. The conclusions show that managers with higher compensation levels will carry out earnings management in favor of the company while taking their own interests into consideration. For companies with stronger profitability, the higher the managers’ compensation is, the more they are inclined to reduce accrued earnings in the current period to further reduce taxes and fees. For companies with weaker profitability, managers with higher compensation tend to choose to increase real earnings to further optimize financial indicators. It has been found through further research that high pressure generated by media attention can make well-paid executives restrain the above earnings management behavior, which serves as an effective method to protect investors’ rights and interests.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-18
Author(s):  
Abubakar Yayangida ◽  
◽  
Agbi Samuel ◽  
Joshua Okpanachi ◽  
Victor Atabo ◽  
...  

This paper is an empirical analysis of the impact of Executive compensation on earnings quality of listed firms in Nigeria for the period of 2015-2019. The study adopts the multiple regression technique. Data were collected from the annual reports and accounts of sampled firms. The findings reveal that Executive compensation positively and significantly affect the earnings quality of listed Conglomerates in Nigeria, the result implies that firms that pay higher emoluments to its executive are likely to improve the quality of earnings. It is recommended that the listed Conglomerates firms should increase the amount paid as emoluments to their executives as the higher emolument paid and received by executives improve the level of earnings quality and reduces earnings management which may be detrimental to the goal and objectives of the firm. Key words: Compensation, Conglomerates, Executive, Incentives, Performance, Shareholders


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Fajar Dwi Nurmanto

<pre><em><span lang="EN-ID">This study examines the effect of executive compensation, firm size, corporate value and leverage to earning management with good corporate management as a moderating at <span>manufacturing companies listing on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).This study used a sample of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2014-2016. Sample was determined by using purposive sampling method. The study has 159 samples from 53 companies. In this study, hypotheses were tested using multiple regression.</span></span></em></pre><pre><em><span lang="EN-ID">This study used a method developed by Stubben (2010) for the measurement of earnings management, with earnings management approach using revenue discretionary model and conditional revenue model, where the results show that executive compensation, firm size and leverage significantly effect earnings management, while the corporate value has no effect on earnings management. Good corporate governance is also proven to affect leverage and earnings management relationships, but it can not affect executive compensation, firm size and corporate value of earnings management.</span></em></pre><pre><em><span lang="EN-ID"><span><br /></span></span></em></pre>


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