Neither Hero Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the Twentieth Century -- Chapter 2: The Progressive Era

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Klarman
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
The Supreme Court

“Ravished by Some Moron”: The Eugenic Origins of the Minnesota Psychopathic Personality Act of 1939

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Ladd-Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Sex Offenders ◽  
Social Control ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
Civil Commitment ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Sex Crimes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Indefinite Detention ◽  
Administrative Framework

Abstract:Twenty U.S. states permit the indefinite detention of civilly committed sex offenders after the end of their prison sentences if their dangerousness is due to a “mental abnormality.” This article explores the origins of one such law by examining its predecessor, the Minnesota Psychopathic Personality Act of 1939. Passed in the wake of a panic over sex crimes and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1940, Minnesota’s psychopath statute extended a 1917 eugenics law providing for the compulsory civil commitment and institutionalization of “defectives” to persons alleged to have a psychopathic personality. Analyzing the 1917 and 1939 laws together shows how one state’s psychopath statute had less to do with psychiatric authority than with the legal and administrative framework established by Progressive-era eugenics. From the 1910s until today, dubious claims about the ability of science to identify potential criminals legitimized politically popular, but constitutionally questionable, forms of administrative and social control.

Centenary of HM Seervai – Doyen of Indian constitutional law – an Australian appreciation

Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-378
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fourth Edition ◽  
High Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of India ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Authority

For much of the second half of the twentieth century, HM Seervai was a leading advocate of the Bombay High Court. He argued some of the most important constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court of India and eventually resolved in 1970 to write his Constitutional Law of India. It became the leading text on Indian constitutional law. It is still in widespread use. Many instances of recent citations are quoted. But it is not the usual commentary on the text of the Indian constitutional and case law. Instead, the book contains a running discussion on the shifts in direction as well as sharp criticisms where Seervai felt that the courts had strayed from correct constitutional doctrine. Seervai died in 1996 as the fourth edition was just completed. In this paper, originally given as a lecture in Mumbai in 2007 on the centenary of Seervai’s birth, the author questions Seervai’s testamentary prohibition on posthumous editions of his text. He urges that a new edition should be produced to keep Seervai’s legacy alive not only in India but in other constitutional democracies where Indian judicial authority is increasingly cited.

The Mandate of the Ninth Amendment: Why Footnote Four Is Wrong

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
New Deal ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ninth Amendment ◽  
The New Deal

This chapter examines the revival of the presumption of constitutionality and its almost immediate qualification in the form of Footnote Four, which it argues is inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment. The era in which the Supreme Court attempted to scrutinize the necessity and propriety of state and federal restrictions on liberty came to a close as the perceived legitimacy of legislative activism continued to grow. The doctrinal vehicle used by the New Deal Court to overturn the Progressive Era precedents was the adoption of a presumption of constitutionality. The chapter first provides an overview of Footnote Four before discussing the Ninth Amendment, which mandates that unenumerated rights be treated the same as those that are listed. It shows that Footnote Four runs afoul of the text of the Constitution, and more specifically the Ninth Amendment.

All Things in Proportion? The United States

2019 ◽  
pp. 96-126
Author(s):  
Alec Stone Sweet ◽  
Jud Mathews
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Current Approach ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Rational Basis ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Strict Scrutiny ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter considers constitutional rights doctrines of the United States in light of the global spread of proportionality. It challenges the view that proportionality is alien to the American constitutional experience, showing that American courts have developed approaches to rights that closely resemble proportionality. In particular, the Supreme Court’s test for state laws that burdened interstate commerce, developed in the nineteenth century, resembled proportionality, and so did “strict scrutiny” review as it was initially applied by the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century. The Supreme Court’s current approach to constitutional rights, relying heavily on separate tiers of review, is characterized by three pathologies: (i) judicial abdication, in the form of rational basis review; (ii) analytical incompleteness, when an explicit balancing stage is omitted; and (iii) instability, leading to reclassification and doctrinal incoherence. The chapter argues that proportionality can protect rights more consistently and coherently than the current American approach, and concludes by showing how courts courts could give proportionality greater expression in constitutional doctrine.

scholarly journals Retrospectives: American Economists in the Progressive Era on the Minimum Wage

1999 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Prasch
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Paper Briefly ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage Legislation

Beginning in 1912, a number of states passed minimum wage legislation that applied exclusively to women and minors. These tentative experiments in economic legislation ended in 1923 when the Supreme Court overturned the District of Columbia's minimum wage law. Remarkably, at this time virtually all professional American economists supported some variety of minimum wage legislation; however, they did not all give the same reasons. This paper briefly examines the context in which this minimum wage legislation was passed and then surveys several of the arguments that American economists gave in support of minimum wage laws.

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