'Wife Beating' and 'Uninvited Kisses' in the Supreme Court and Society in the Early Twentieth Century

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Katz
Author(s):  
Christopher Munn

In 1928 Carvalho Yeo was accused of stealing more than a quarter of a million dollars from the Government Treasury through an elaborate cheque fraud. Yeo was traced to Shanghai and brought back to Hong Kong, where, after a sensational trial before the Supreme Court, he was convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. His actions exposed chaotic management in the Treasury and brought into question the competence of senior government officials. Carvalho Yeo was a man of ‘mysterious antecedents and doubtful nationality’ – a criminal wanted by police in other Asian cities before he came to Hong Kong. Possibly of ‘Sino-Siamese’ origins, he presented himself by turns as a Chinese, a Portuguese, and a British subject, and deployed various aliases, fictional partners, and fake companies to carry out his plans. His story fascinated the Hong Kong public as much as it embarrassed the authorities. The chapter asks what Yeo’s manipulation of identities tells us about relations between the communities in early twentieth-century Hong Kong and suggests that, while racial divides were real and often rigid, individual choices sometimes challenged this rigidity, even – as in Carvalho Yeo’s case – to the point of making a farce out of the divides.


Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-378
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby

For much of the second half of the twentieth century, HM Seervai was a leading advocate of the Bombay High Court. He argued some of the most important constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court of India and eventually resolved in 1970 to write his Constitutional Law of India. It became the leading text on Indian constitutional law. It is still in widespread use. Many instances of recent citations are quoted. But it is not the usual commentary on the text of the Indian constitutional and case law. Instead, the book contains a running discussion on the shifts in direction as well as sharp criticisms where Seervai felt that the courts had strayed from correct constitutional doctrine. Seervai died in 1996 as the fourth edition was just completed. In this paper, originally given as a lecture in Mumbai in 2007 on the centenary of Seervai’s birth, the author questions Seervai’s testamentary prohibition on posthumous editions of his text. He urges that a new edition should be produced to keep Seervai’s legacy alive not only in India but in other constitutional democracies where Indian judicial authority is increasingly cited.


Author(s):  
Alec Stone Sweet ◽  
Jud Mathews

This chapter considers constitutional rights doctrines of the United States in light of the global spread of proportionality. It challenges the view that proportionality is alien to the American constitutional experience, showing that American courts have developed approaches to rights that closely resemble proportionality. In particular, the Supreme Court’s test for state laws that burdened interstate commerce, developed in the nineteenth century, resembled proportionality, and so did “strict scrutiny” review as it was initially applied by the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century. The Supreme Court’s current approach to constitutional rights, relying heavily on separate tiers of review, is characterized by three pathologies: (i) judicial abdication, in the form of rational basis review; (ii) analytical incompleteness, when an explicit balancing stage is omitted; and (iii) instability, leading to reclassification and doctrinal incoherence. The chapter argues that proportionality can protect rights more consistently and coherently than the current American approach, and concludes by showing how courts courts could give proportionality greater expression in constitutional doctrine.


Author(s):  
G. Edward White

Of all the areas of twentieth-century constitutional jurisprudence, that of free speech has had the most dramatic transformation. From a state of insignificance, the First Amendment has been applied against the states in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and made the basis for invalidating restrictions on the expressive activities of political and religious minorities, corporations, contributors to political campaigns, and commercial advertisers.


Author(s):  
James E. Pfander

This chapter describes the way a requirement of contestation was introduced into definitions of federal judicial power in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The case-or-controversy requirement arose as a tool with which federal courts could refrain from lending support to the investigatory and regulatory initiatives of the growing administrative state. Justice Stephen Field played a central role in the introduction of the contestation construct, and it took hold at the Supreme Court in the twentieth century, as progressive Justices came to embrace contestation as an essential limit on the judicial role in constitutional litigation.


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

This chapter contends that for much of American history, constitutional tradition confirmed the Founders' basic commitments about separation of powers, foreign affairs, and the courts. In particular, the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary more generally played their part as originally envisioned. That meant, among other things, fulfilling their assigned roles of checking both Congress and the president, not to mention the states, in the service of protecting individual rights under both domestic and international law. These general patterns, moreover, persisted though the mid-twentieth century. However, the chapter makes its case mainly though a consideration of certain landmark controversies and decisions that are nonetheless representative. These cases suffice to confirm the overall fidelity of subsequent constitutional tradition to the Constitution's initial vision.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam W. McCall

102 Cornell L. Rev. 1367 (2017)Reckoning with the constitutional status of the United States’ overseas territories has been a tricky business for the Supreme Court. Saddled with anachronistic doctrines left over from the turn of the twentieth century, the Court has attempted to avoid the significant constitutional problems raised by the vestiges of colonialism. These problems are particularly acute in regard to Puerto Rico, an island of 3.4 million people that is formally organized as a commonwealth of the United States with its own democratically elected government. Unsurprisingly, the Court again dodged the issue of deciding Puerto Rico’s constitutional status in two cases in the October 2015 term, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle and Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust. The Court’s failure to clarify Puerto Rico’s status in those cases has further contributed to the ongoing uncertainty caused by Puerto Rico’s shaky economy. Basic questions about the nature of Puerto Rico’s authority to govern itself remain unanswered.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document