The Supreme Court and Property Rights in the Progressive Era

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-70
Author(s):  
JAMES W. ELY
2021 ◽  
pp. 537-582
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines torts of trespass to land and nuisance. Trespass to land is concerned with direct harm, and the tort’s primary importance is the protection of property rights. Harm in this context does not necessarily mean actual damage to the land concerned. The harm lies in the fact that land owned by one party has been unjustifiably interfered with by another. Private nuisance deals with indirect and unreasonable interferences to land, including what might be called consequential interferences resulting from a direct action. Private nuisance regulates relationships and conflicts between neighbours, defining their mutual rights and obligations with respect to land use. Many aspects of the law of nuisance, including determining whether an injunction or damages is the appropriate remedy, were clarified by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014].


Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 535-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines torts of trespass to land and nuisance. Trespass to land is concerned with direct harm, and the tort’s primary importance is the protection of property rights. Harm in this context does not necessarily mean actual damage to the land concerned. The harm lies in the fact that land owned by one party has been unjustifiably interfered with by another. Private nuisance deals with indirect and unreasonable interferences to land, including what might be called consequential interferences resulting from a direct action. Private nuisance regulates relationships and conflicts between neighbours, defining their mutual rights and obligations with respect to land use. Many aspects of the law of nuisance, including determining whether an injunction or damages is the appropriate remedy, have recently been clarified by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014].


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Sam McMullan

Many New Zealanders live in shared living arrangements. The result of this is that reasonable expectations of privacy are becoming more limited. State officials may conduct a lawful search where a person consents to such a search if that person has the authority to consent. Where people live in shared living arrangements, several people may have authority to consent to a search of the same property. This article explores the extent of a third party's power to consent to property searches where more than one person has authority to consent to a search under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. It argues that the question of reasonable expectations of privacy should not be assessed by reference to property rights. It also considers the concept of "apparent" authority which has arisen in New Zealand from the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Bradley as well as the concept of a present and objecting occupant which has arisen in the United States in the Supreme Court decision of Georgia v Randolph.


2021 ◽  
pp. 111-122
Author(s):  
Yevhenii KOMPANETS

Based on the analysis of scientific works, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, foreign and national law enforcement practice, the theoretical aspects and the practice of use of standards of proof «weighty conviction», «beyond reasonable doubt» in criminal proceedings for infringement of intellectual property rights have been studied. Based on the opinions of scholars and the positions of the courts, the problematic issues, in particular, the place of the balance of probabilities in the judicial standards of proof and criminal proceedings have been identified. Critical remarks on the existing approaches have been made and the consequences of the lack of unity of the approach to implementation of standards of proof in Ukraine have been outlined. Recognition by the Supreme Court of the permanent criteria of the standard «beyond reasonable doubt» does not secure against contradictory judgements/decisions in similar cases. Such decisions do not contribute to the principles of legal certainty and fairness; they lead to avoiding of liability by infringers, repeated infringement of intellectual property rights and introduction of counterfeit products/counterfeit content into turnover. For discussion in the scientific community and for taking into consideration by the practical workers, a number of the decisions of the Supreme Court, which could guide further implementation of judicial standards of proof on the basis of the established criteria, inner conviction and «common sense», has been proposed.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Ladd-Taylor

Abstract:Twenty U.S. states permit the indefinite detention of civilly committed sex offenders after the end of their prison sentences if their dangerousness is due to a “mental abnormality.” This article explores the origins of one such law by examining its predecessor, the Minnesota Psychopathic Personality Act of 1939. Passed in the wake of a panic over sex crimes and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1940, Minnesota’s psychopath statute extended a 1917 eugenics law providing for the compulsory civil commitment and institutionalization of “defectives” to persons alleged to have a psychopathic personality. Analyzing the 1917 and 1939 laws together shows how one state’s psychopath statute had less to do with psychiatric authority than with the legal and administrative framework established by Progressive-era eugenics. From the 1910s until today, dubious claims about the ability of science to identify potential criminals legitimized politically popular, but constitutionally questionable, forms of administrative and social control.


Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This chapter examines the revival of the presumption of constitutionality and its almost immediate qualification in the form of Footnote Four, which it argues is inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment. The era in which the Supreme Court attempted to scrutinize the necessity and propriety of state and federal restrictions on liberty came to a close as the perceived legitimacy of legislative activism continued to grow. The doctrinal vehicle used by the New Deal Court to overturn the Progressive Era precedents was the adoption of a presumption of constitutionality. The chapter first provides an overview of Footnote Four before discussing the Ninth Amendment, which mandates that unenumerated rights be treated the same as those that are listed. It shows that Footnote Four runs afoul of the text of the Constitution, and more specifically the Ninth Amendment.


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