CEO Compensation Structure and Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition - An Empirical Analysis from Debt Contracting Perspective

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao Ma ◽  
Xiumin Martin
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Debt Contracting ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Timely Loss Recognition

scholarly journals Corporate Payout Policy and CEO Compensation Structure

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Lee-Hsien Pan ◽  
Thomas Barkley ◽  
Shaio-Yan Huang
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Leverage Ratio ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Investment Projects

This paper examines how corporate payout policy is affected by CEO compensation structure using data from more than 1,600 firms during 1992-2006. Specifically, it studies the effects of CEO compensation structure, firm characteristics, and dividend payout policies on dividend type and relative dividend size.It finds CEO salary is positively associated with cash dividends, share repurchases, and relative dividend size whereas CEO salary (compared to bonus) as a percentage of total compensation has negative effects on cash dividends and share repurchases. It also discovers CEO stock awards as a percentage of total compensation are positively associated with share repurchases and CEO option awards are negatively related to cash dividends.In addition, this paper shows larger firms and firms with more free cash flow distribute more cash dividends and share repurchases. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage ratio and more investment opportunities prefer to save earnings for future re-investment projects. Finally, it show dividend payout policy (either cash dividends or share repurchases) increases relative dividend size. The results of this study suggest that CEO compensation components affect CEOs’ dividend payout decisions: when CEOs’ stock award increases, they prefer to use share repurchases; when CEOs’ option award increases, they prefer not to use cash dividends.

Impact of CEO Compensation Structure on Cost Stickiness

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajiv D. Banker ◽  
Byunghoon Jin ◽  
Mihir N. Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Cost Stickiness

The Effect of CEO Compensation Structure on CSR Disclosure

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Sewon Kwon ◽  
Bum-Joon Kim ◽  
Su-keun Kwak ◽  
Jae Yong Shin
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Csr Disclosure

The effect of analyst coverage on CEO compensation structure: evidence from the S & P 1500

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Analyst Coverage ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Institutional Holdings

Purpose – What is the role of analysts in reducing agency problems and information asymmetry between stockholders and managers? The purpose of this paper is to confirm the analyst’s role by examining his or her influence on CEO compensation structure. Design/methodology/approach – The major population for this study consists of publicly traded corporations of the S & P 1500 for which data on CEO compensation is available from Standard & Poor’s Execucomp database, along with the proxy statements of these firms. Regression analysis is used to test hypotheses about the effect of analyst coverage on CEO compensation. Findings – The evidence shows that CEOs of firms with greater analyst coverage or higher analyst coverage quality (analyst coverage index) have higher pay-for-performance (Delta), more compensation incentives to increase firm risk (Vega), more total compensation, and more excess compensation. Even after controlling for the effect of other types of corporate governance, including internal governance and institutional holdings, analysts’ activities still have an incremental effect on CEO compensation structure. Practical implications – The authors findings may be useful to investors who use analyst coverage to evaluate the firm’s CEO compensation, as it suggests that investors may reference the information about analyst coverage of firms to craft appropriate CEO compensation structures. Originality/value – The authors results contribute by showing that the extra effect of analyst activities on CEO compensation structure exists, even after controlling for other types of governance mechanisms, such as internal governance and institutional investors’ holdings.

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